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EPIGRAPH
Poverty is not just a lack of money;
it is not having the capability
to realize one’s full potential as a human being.
Amartya Sen
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A fundamental concern in development economics is the presence of institutional and
labor market failures that interact with frictions in financial markets, which may prevent economic
growth. This dissertation studies the importance of these interactions in a series of three papers.
Chapter 1 studies the extent to which by allowing grassroots organizations–as opposed to
banks–to allocate publicly-funded credit, it is possible to overcome existing financial frictions
and deliver resources the community members who need it the most: poor, high-productivity
households. Using a long panel dataset I find evidence of misallocation: credit was provided to
households with poor credit history, which were richer and less productive than non-borrowers.
Instead, resources were delivered to households with connections to local political leaders. The
xvi
results highlight the limitation of community-based approaches to allocating public resources
in developing countries. Chapter 2 shows that a cash-transfer program targeted to children in
Bolivian public schools boosted employment among mothers of beneficiary children by providing
extra-liquidity in a context of fixed costs to work. Chapter 3 exploits rich data from Thailand to
show that estimates of total factor productivity can be used to predict business success in the
aftermath of credit-expansion programs.
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Chapter 1
Targeting Credit through Community
Members
Abstract
Delegating the allocation of public resources to community members is an increasingly
popular form of delivering public resources in developing countries. However, this approach
is associated with the tradeoff between improved information about potential beneficiaries and
favoritism towards local elites, which could be strengthened in the context of credit. Unlike
targeting cash transfers to the poor, the optimal targeting of credit is a more complex problem
involving issues of productivity, repayment, and market responses: This paper analyzes this
problem using a large-scale lending program, the Thai Million Baht Credit Fund, which decen-
tralizes the allocation of loans to an elected group of community members, and provides three
main results. First, exploiting a long and detailed panel, I recover pre-program structural esti-
mates of household productivity and find that resources from the program were not allocated to
high-productivity, poor households, which is inconsistent with poverty and productive efficiency
as targeting criteria. Second, using socioeconomic networks data, I show that actual targeting
is strongly driven by connections to village elites and is related to lower program profitability,
which suggests favoritism as a reason for mistargeting. Finally, I exploit quasi-experimental
variation in the rollout of the program and uncover evidence that, in general equilibrium, informal
credit markets compensate for targeting distortions by redirecting credit towards unconnected
1
households, albeit at higher interest rates than those provided by the program. The results
highlight the limitations of community-driven approaches to program delivery and the role of
markets in attenuating potential targeting errors.
1.1 Introduction
Community-driven development approaches to delivering public resources have gained
increasing attention from academics and policy makers around the world. In developing countries,
a number of social programs such as public works or cash transfer programs rely on community
members for their implementation or monitoring.1 One of the foundations of this approach is the
idea that community members, as opposed to traditional policy makers, have better information to
identify local needs. In the context of credit, delegating the allocation of resources to community
members may lead to more accurate identification of potential borrowers and may fulfill the
promise that was only partially materialized by traditional microfinance: providing affordable
credit to poor, high-productivity households.2
One important class of community-based policies to expand access to credit is that of
government infusions of resources into villages for the establishment of local credit funds which
are managed by elected groups of community members.3 The economic rationales for this
approach include the reduction of intermediation and administrative costs as well as the benefit
1See for example Mansuri and Rao (2004) for a review in the case of community-based approaches to infrastruc-
ture projects. Community based targeting of cash transfers has been studied by Alatas et al. (2012), and participatory
rankings among community members have been used in graduation programs (Banerjee et al., 2015), and other
programs that involved the delivery of cash transfers to the ultra poor (Bandiera et al., 2017).
2Uptake of credit in recent microcredit interventions has been low, due to, among other reasons, high interest
rates and the difficulty of identifying high-productivity borrowers (Banerjee et al., 2015; Crpon et al., 2015; Banerjee
et al., 2015). Reviews from either a policy or an academic perspective regarding the challenges of microfinance are
provided by World Bank (2008); Armenda´riz de Aghion and Murdoch (2004); Banerjee and Duflo (2010); Morduch
(1999); Karlan and Morduch (2010).
3Broadly, community-based credit approaches consist of fostering local credit funds to be managed by community
members. A clear example is the Million Baht program in Thailand (Kaboski and Townsend, 2012) and the Integrated
Rural Development Program in India (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006b). While self-funded village credit groups
are a growing research topic in the literature (see Deininger (2013); Greaney et al. (2016); Ksoll et al. (2016);
Karlan et al. (2017), among others), there are other types of government-funded programs with a community based
approach around the world such as the Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty Reduction Project in India, and the Rural
Financial Institutions Programme in Uttar Pradesh.
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from information available to community members, which is costly to obtain by policy makers.
On the other hand, community members may engage in favoritism towards politically connected
households (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). This tension is particularly salient in cases in
which community members disperse public funds based on criteria that are hard to observe
(unlike poverty targeting) and subject to moral hazard, as is the case with credit markets. Thus,
whether the allocation of resources is consistent with poverty, productive efficiency or favoritism
as targeting criteria is an empirical question. While the ability of community members to identify
profitable households has been documented (Hussam et al., 2017), little is known regarding the
effective use of this information when community members themselves are in charge of the
allocation of public credit. Moreover, although the use of pre-program data has been essential
for the empirical analysis of community-based approaches to delivering resources to the needy
(Alatas et al., 2012), other studies analyzing how local leaders allocate productive resources are
based on post-program measures of productivity which are likely to be affected by the program
itself (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006b; Basurto et al., 2017). In addition, previous studies have
focused only on understanding how community members allocate resources but have ignored the
role of markets in reallocating resources, which may attenuate potential targeting errors.
This paper empirically assesses these issues in the context of the Thai Million Baht
Village Fund (MBVF) which is one of the largest community-based credit programs. Between
2001 and 2002, the government donated resources to over 90% of rural villages for the creation
of local credit funds, which represented, on average, a 25% increase in the available funds for
credit in each village. These funds were fully managed by elected village committees made up
of community members, who decided who obtained credit and under what loan conditions.4
This paper reports results from three empirical exercises: first, using a long panel, I structurally
4The importance of this program and the fundamental tradeoffs in the allocation of productive resources have
been of interest in the literature, but there are both unanswered questions and methodological limitations to existing
studies. Kaboski and Townsend (2012) and Kaboski and Townsend (2011) have documented the effects of the
MBVF on several household outcomes and the cost-effectiveness of the program. Breza et al. (2017) analyze
whether baseline productivity explains heterogeneity in the effects of the program on investment and income growth
but do not explore the mechanisms behind the allocation of resources from the program. Thus, what the program’s
de facto targeting criterion was–poverty reduction, productive efficiency, or favoritism–is yet unknown.
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estimate a household production function and use the estimated factor elasticities to recover
pre-program estimates of household total factor productivity.5 I combine these estimates with
baseline per-capita consumption data to test: (i) whether village committee members delivered
credit to poor, high-productivity households, and (ii) whether offering credit to villagers based
on alternative targeting criteria (i.e., means-testing and a baseline repayment probabilities) would
have delivered credit to poor, high-productivity households. Second, I combine detailed data
on pre-program socioeconomic networks with data about loan characteristics and repayment to
test for favoritism towards households with connections to the local elite. Third, I use quasi-
experimental variation in the rollout of the program to test for within-village general equilibrium
responses in credit markets, which could lead to program spillovers to households with limited
access to credit from the program.
First, I find that the program does not target poor, high-productivity households and
that, in terms of poverty and productive efficiency, the program is outperformed by alternative
targeting criteria. In practice, the allocation of loans was regressive and productively inefficient:
the distribution of baseline per-capita consumption corresponding to program beneficiaries
first-order stochastically dominated that of non-beneficiaries. Moreover, only 40% of high-
productivity households (top 25% of the productivity distribution) borrowed from the program,
and , on average, program borrowers had lower baseline productivity than non-borrowers.
This allocation was not consistent neither with concerns regarding equity nor repayment. By
comparing program borrowers to households that would have been eligible under an alternative
targeting criterion based on baseline wealth rankings (i.e., means testing), I find that, on average,
the means-testing criterion would have targeted the poorest households without sacrificing
productivity. Furthermore, by comparing program borrowers to households that would have been
eligible under an alternative targeting criterion based on baseline repayment probabilities (i.e.,
repayment score), I find that 38% of households who received credit from the program would
5Concretely, I exploit data on households’ financial statements, in particular balance sheets, to measure capital
as the value of the stock of total fixed assets for each household. The financial accounts data was compiled by
Samphantharak and Townsend (2010).
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have been ineligible under the repayment-score criterion. On average, these households were
12% less productive than households who did not borrowed from the program but exhibited high
repayment probabilities. Reallocating program resources across these groups would have led to
an average productivity gain of 4.5%, at no cost in terms of baseline per-capita consumption.
Second, while neither poverty targeting nor productive efficiency were the relevant
allocation criteria, subsidized credit was disproportionately allocated to households with socioe-
conomic connections to the local elite. Combining socioeconomic networks data and data on
baseline membership in the village council (the highest political authority in each village), I
classify households as connected with the elite if they i) are members of the village council,
ii) are first-order kin of the local elite, or iii) had direct pre-program socioeconomic ties to the
local elite. I find that connected households are 20 percentage points more likely to obtain credit
from the program than unconnected households. Connected households were not poorer or
more productive than unconnected households, and yet they obtained more credit. Moreover,
connected households already had access to institutional credit before the program and had
similar baseline delinquency rates. While the correlation between program participation and
connection to local elites falls by 45% after controlling for total number of connections in the
village, demographic characteristics, business orientation, and credit history, connected house-
holds were still 10 percentage points more likely to obtain credit from the program. Thus, the
slanted allocation towards connected households was only partially explained by improvements
in information regarding borrower characteristics.
I find evidence of favoritism towards connected households with implications for program
profitability. Connected households were favored with low initial interest rates leading to ex post
lower internal rates of return for the program. A cross-section sample of loans corresponding to
344 households who borrowed both from the program and privately funded local credit groups
allows me to compare loan performance across different lenders for the same household and
control for unobserved borrower characteristics.6 I test for favoritism by analyzing whether
6These groups constitute quasi-formal sources of credit. They include production credit groups and women’s,
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connected households obtain more favorable loan conditions in the case of program loans
compared to loans from private credit groups and comparing these differences to those for
unconnected households. The results show that program loans to connected households were
granted at lower initial interest rates (1.5 percentage points). These differences compromised the
profitability of the program: the ex post internal rate of return on program loans to connected
households is 2 percentage points lower than the return on privately funded loans (on average 7%).
These results are driven by differences for connected households, as there were no detectable
differences for unconnected households.
Third, while committee members favored connected households and the program might
not have directly reached unconnected households, the program indirectly benefited unconnected
households by increasing the supply of overall credit available in the village. Aggregate borrow-
ing increased by 24% in the sample villages within a year from the rollout of the program. Using
high-frequency data, I exploit cross-village variation in the monthly rollout of the program to
identify the short-term effects of the program on credit use for unconnected households. While
connected households benefited directly from the program, unconnected households obtained
loans from other lenders in the system. Event-study estimates for unconnected households
show that borrowing from informal lenders increased by 30%; this result was mostly driven
by loans from relatives. I also find suggestive evidence of an increase in formal borrowing
for unconnected households, albeit at higher interest rates than those from the program. There
was also re-lending: the probability of lending to other households increased by 2 percentage
points in the case of connected households. Overall, spillovers mildly offset the difference
in program borrowing between connected and unconnected households: back of the envelop
calculations suggest that these effects only account for one-third of program-borrowing gap
between connected and unconnected households.
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature studying community-based
approaches to distributing public resources. First, it highlights the limitations of these approaches
groups among others. See Kaboski and Townsend (2005) for an in-depth assessment of these type of lenders.
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to distribute productive resources when attributes of program beneficiaries are not easily observ-
able by most community members. Unlike the context of poverty targeting, in the context of
credit, the relevant targeting criteria may only be observable by direct economic interactions,
strengthening the tension between information and favoritism. Alatas et al. (2012) provide
evidence that households with connections to local elites are not more likely to receive cash
transfers when resources are allocated by community members relative to a proxy-means-testing
targeting criterion. The results from this paper show that this pattern may not hold in the case of
credit and are consistent with evidence of favoritism in financial markets in the context of banks
and firms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Haselmann et al., 2017). In addition, while Hussam et al.
(2017) show that community members can identify productive households in India, this paper
shows that accurate use of information may depend on social connections. In practice, both
lack of information about unconnected households and favoritism can impose higher program-
participation costs to households without the relevant connections, with consequences for poverty
targeting, productive efficiency, and program sustainability. These losses should be considered
whenever policy makers choose among alternative approaches to program delivery.
The second contribution to the targeting literature is methodological. The use of pre-
program data has been central to the assessment of community-based approaches to allocate cash
transfers to the needy (Alatas et al., 2012). However, studies evaluating the productive efficiency
of community-based allocations rely on contemporary or post-program measures of productivity
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006b; Basurto et al., 2017). This paper improves previous empirical
assessments by exploiting a long panel dataset to recover pre-program structural estimates of
household productivity, which are unlikely to be affected by the program. In terms of results,
using self-reported data collected after the implementation of a fertilizer subsidy program in
Malawi, Basurto et al. (2017) provide evidence of a tradeoff between targeting the poor and
targeting high-return households. Using post-program structural estimates of baseline household
productivity, I show that such a tradeoff was not relevant in the more general case of credit.
Third, by studying a context in which active credit markets interact with the implemen-
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tation of a large-scale program, this paper examines the targeting problem both from a partial
and general equilibrium perspective. The literature has generally focused only on the targeting
or screening process. This paper expands the analysis beyond the program and tests the conse-
quences of the de facto targeting criterion on village credit markets. By providing novel evidence
on the role of informal credit markets in attenuating targeting errors, this paper contributes to
the literature documenting general equilibrium effects and spillovers from large-scale programs
(Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009; Muralidharan et al., 2017; Kaboski and Townsend, 2012). In
particular, the results show that economic connections and political economy factors can affect
not only the distribution of public resources in the village economy, but also the redistribution
of these resources through markets (Kinnan and Townsend, 2012; Acemoglu, 2010). More
broadly, the results suggest that a complete understanding of targeting problems should involve
an analysis of how resources are redistributed across agents.
The results from this paper also build on the literature studying the introduction of
micro-credit products in developing countries. A core concern in the development economics
literature is that of delivering affordable credit to poor, high-productivity households to enable
them to escape poverty traps (Banerjee and Duflo, 2010; Morduch, 1999). While the literature
has mostly focused on studying the effects of the introduction of credit products on several
household outcomes,7 an empirical assessment of the productive efficiency of the allocation
of credit in large-scale programs has not yet been provided. My results show that even with
low intermediation and administrative costs, credit from the MBVF program did not reach poor,
productive households. A comparison of these results with those from studies analyzing selection
into credit highlights the importance of different screening mechanisms in credit markets. For
instance, Beaman et al. (2014) show that high-return households select into credit in a context
7Banerjee et al. (2015) provide a review of six randomized controlled trials studying the introduction of
microcredit products in a varied of contexts. In particular, Banerjee et al. (2015) and Crpon et al. (2015) document
low uptake rates in contexts in which credit was not directly offered to entrepreneurs. Deininger (2013) analyzes
the impacts of access to credit on members of self-help groups. Kaboski and Townsend (2012) also provide an
assessment in the context of the MBVF program.
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in which the screening mechanism is price.8 This paper documents a less efficient result in a
context in which the de facto screening mechanisms are social connections with local elites.
1.2 The village financial system and the Village Fund pro-
gram
1.2.1 The village financial system
The context of this study corresponds to Thai villages, an environment in which most
households own land (80%) and obtain over one-third of their revenues from agricultural activi-
ties (see Appendix table A.7). While most households obtain revenues from cultivation activities,
the average household obtains revenues from 4 different economic activities: most households
also obtain revenues from wage labor (78%), fishing and shrimping (40%) and off-farm family
businesses (30%). To finance their economic activities, households borrow either from insti-
tutional lenders, informal lenders or relatives. Among institutional sources of credit there are
formal lenders, mainly the state-owned Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives
(BAAC), and quasi-formal lenders such as savings and credit groups and cooperatives.9 In terms
of the quantity of loans, half come from informal sources, while formal and quasi-formal sources
of credit provide over 70% of the total loan amount in the village financial system.10 On average,
households hold more than one loan and around one-third of the households hold informal loans
(see Appendix Table A.8), which have higher interest rates than formal or quasi-formal loans.
8They do so in the context of a micro-credit program in Mali, managed by an NGO with no government
intervention at all.
9Quasi-formal institutions include organizations that have a set of procedures for recording their operations,
but do not have a physical location. Examples of these are production credit groups (PCGs), women’s groups and
other village credit groups. See Kaboski and Townsend (2005) for a detailed description of these quasi-formal
organizations in the Thai context.
10The top panel in Figure A.5 illustrates the structure of the portfolio of loans associated with the villages in
the study sample, both in terms of the number of loans and the amount of credit provided before the program was
implemented.
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1.2.2 The Million Baht Village Fund program
The Million Baht Village Fund (MBVF) program consisted of an initial transfer of THB
1 million (USD 22,500 in 1999 values), from the Government of Thailand to rural and peri-urban
villages.11 The aim of the program was to stimulate the village economies by expanding access
to credit; program funds were used as seed capital for the creation of revolving credit funds in
95% of all villages in Thailand. 12 Moreover, the program increased the aggregate gross lending
portfolio by 24% during the first year of its implementation in the sample villages, and modified
significantly the composition of the portfolio of loans in each village (See and Appendix Figure
A.5). The program offered loans at an average interest rate of 7% per year, which was the lowest
rate in the market at that time: The average interest rate for other institutional loans was 11% per
year . The program represents an unexpected event in that it was announced following a change
in government and rapidly reached borrowers: As of the second year of implementation, the
program had provided individual liability loans to 62% of households in the study sample.
The MBVF program differs from formal lenders in its management, relying on community
members to manage credit funds. While there are other local savings and credit groups in which
community members manage funds, they differ from the MBVF program in the way that they are
funded: The MBVF is mostly subsidized, and local credit and saving groups are self-funded.13
In each village, the MBVF program is managed by a village fund committee (VFC),a group
of 10-12 elected community members that is responsible for evaluating loan applications and
monitoring loans.14 Committee members generally met once or twice a year to review loan
applications. While the program was governed by a set of regulatory guidelines, committee
11Average loan size is approximately USD 450 which represents roughly 25% of a households’s yearly income.
12A detailed discussion of the application process that villages were required to follow to get access to the funds
and the way in which those funds were delivered is provided by Kaboski and Townsend (2012), Boonperm et al.
(2013), Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) and Haughton et al. (2014).I do not address that process here as all of
the villages in the sample participated in the program.
13In order to borrow, households were require to purchase a share of the fund, at a very low costs. However, the
funds themselves come from a one-time transfer by the Government.
14The members of the Village Fund Committee were elected for a 2 year term in a transparent setting and received
a small compensation for their services (Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011), however Haughton et al. (2014)
documents that most of the members continued in the position for several years.
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members had full discretion to approve or deny applications and set loan amounts, terms, and
the initial interest rate.15 Although the Central Government provided villages with incentives
for sustainable management and sanctions in case of mismanagement, there were no direct
incentives for committee members.
1.2.3 Local elites and the MBVF program
Each Thai village is governed by a village head and a group of advisors who make up
the village council; they are hereinafter referred to as the “local elite”. The Village Council
members are elected by villagers, appointed by district authorities, and usually serve in office
until retirement.16 The Village Council represents the main link between community members
and higher-level authorities. For instance, village council members attend district meetings,
collect resources from villagers for religious celebrations or public works, and oversee resolution
of disputes between villagers (Moerman, 1969; Mabry, 1979). In the study sample, Village
Council members are richer, have larger extensions of land, and are more likely to have off-farm
family businesses (see Appendix Table A.9).
The village fund committee was de jure an independent entity, but it is possible that the
local elite, had enough de facto authority to influence committee decisions. Although the election
of village fund committee members is intended to induce accountability in the allocation of
loans, committee members may have incentives to favor their political supporters or households
with connections to the local elite. For instance, when elections could not take place, the
committee members were appointed by the village Head.17 The local elites could indirectly
influence committee members through their economic or family connections: On average, 46%
of households in the sample report transacting with village council members during the two years
15The most important of these regulations were that loans could not exceed THB 20,000, a positive interest rate
had to be imposed on all loans, the initial loan term could not exceed one year, and collateral could not be required,
although households had to have one or two cosigners.
16This was the case during the study period. However, a reform in 2011 established 5 year terms, but allowed
Village Heads to run for reelection.
17Haughton et al. (2014) document that 15% of village fund committee members were appointed directly by
either the Village Head or the Village Council
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preceding the program and 13% of sample households are direct relatives of elite members (see
Appendix Table A.10). In addition, relatives of the local elite could end up in charge of the funds
even in transparent elections. 18 Moreover, households with business connections to local elites
could use their privileged position to influence loan allocation decisions or to obtain preferential
treatment. In such a context, the potential gains in information from decentralizing the allocation
of resources to community members could be undermined by rent-seeking behavior (Bardhan
and Mookherjee, 2005).
1.3 The Village Fund committee as a social planner
The central aim of this paper is to evaluate the allocation of resources by community
members. The program’s stated objective was to establish credit funds in order to expand access
to institutional credit and promote career development and income generation (Government
of Thailand, 2004), which suggest that poverty, productivity and repayment were important
dimensions to be considered. For instance, access to institutional credit was particular low among
the poor19, the government claimed publicly that resources were allocated to productive activities
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 2004), and the sustainability of the village funds relies heavily on
repayment. However, there were no explicit guidelines regarding the target population. Thus,
theoretical analysis of the optimal targeting rules will provide insights to understand the different
sources that affect the allocation of credit by community members.
In this section, I sketch a simple theoretical framework characterizing the optimal al-
location of public resources and apply this framework to the context of the MBVF program.
Drawing on the notion that the village fund committee allocates loans in order to maximize
a village welfare function as if the committee was a benevolent social planner, the theoretical
framework sketched in this section expands the work of Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) by
18(Cruz et al., 2017) document that individuals who belong to more central families are more likely to be elected
for office in the Philippines
19Per-capita consumption was 16% lower for households without access to institutional credit at baseline (See
Panel A from Appendix Table A.12.
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allowing villagers to differ in terms of repayment. The insights from the theoretical framework
imply that evaluating the allocation of credit involves considering whether the resources were
provided to poor, high-productivity households.
The general problem of community members in charge of allocating public resources is
represented in (1.1). Community members choose the allocation of resources b = {b∗i }i=Nvi=1 that
maximizes the weighted sum of utilities corresponding to their fellow villagers (Nv) subject to
feasibility, sustainability and other constraints imposed by the central government (F(b)):
max
{b1,...,bNv}
i=Nv
∑
i=1
ψiV (bi)
s.t.
F(b)≤ 0 (1.1)
Political favoritism, social norms, and preferences may determine the weights associated
to each village member (ψi), which I assume are exogenous to the allocation problem. Vi denotes
a household i indirect utility function which is increasing and concave in bi–i.e., the value
function from the corresponding household optimization problem–. Consider the problem of
MBVF committee. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that households repay their loans with
an exogenous probability qi which is known to the committee, and that loans are provided at
a government-imposed interest rate r. In this case, community members solve the problem in
(1.1) facing a sustainability constraint of the form: F(b) =∑i=Nvi=1 bi−∑i=Nvi=1 qi(1+ r)bi. The first
order conditions imply:20
20More generally, the optimal allocation of resources implies that the ratios between the marginal weighted utility
of obtaining public resources and the marginal costs of satisfying allocation constraints are equal across all villagers.
ψi ∂Vi∂bi
∂F
∂bi
=
ψ j
∂V j
∂b j
∂F
∂b j
∀i, j
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ψˆi
∂Vi
∂bi
= ψˆ j
∂Vj
∂b j
(1.2)
ψˆi =
ψi
1−qi(1+ r)
∀i, j (1.3)
where ψ˜i denotes the effective weight after incorporating the potential loss from providing
a loan to a given household (i). In words, MBVF committee members will allocate resources such
that the weighted marginal utilities from receiving extra-liquidity are equal across all villagers.
Note that while committee members will punish households with a low probability of repayment,
they may still deliver credit to risky households if their personal weights ψi are high enough for
a particular households–i.e., a relative–. If the marginal utility of an extra unit of liquidity ∂Vi∂bi
is diminishing with respect to bi, then equation (1.2) implies that, conditional on the effective
weights, it is optimal for MBVF committee members to provide resources to households who
would benefit the most out of the program–i.e., high ∂Vi∂bi –.
The identity of these households depends on the economic context in which they make
their optimal decisions regarding consumption and input use. For instance, in a context of
complete markets, optimal input choice should not depend on household characteristics (i.e.,
wealth) as households behave as unconstrained profit maximizer firms. In that context well
functioning credit markets will deliver resources to all profitable projects, and the marginal utility
from a program loan should not be a function of poverty. However, in contexts of incomplete
credit markets, input use will be a function of household’s characteristics, and the marginal utility
of a household from obtaining a loan from the program will depend on the type of frictions that
characterize rural credit markets.
For ease of exposition I discuss two frictions in credit markets: borrowing constraints
and high borrowing interest rates which would make self-financing a more attractive option for
14
households even in absence of borrowing limits.21 In the case of borrowing constraints, a loan
from the program will relax these constraints by providing access to more liquidity. In the second
case, because the program offered credit at the lowest interest rate in the village, obtaining a loan
for the program would lead to a reduction of the interest rate at which unconstrained households
borrow. The following two propositions characterize the household marginal utility derived from
a program loan in both cases.
Proposition 1: If households face borrowing constraints, the marginal utility of relaxing
this constraint is decreasing in initial wealth. Moreover, the marginal utility of relaxing a house-
hold’s liquidity constraint is an increasing function of household productivity if the distortion in
the optimal choice of inputs is large. Proof: See Appendix section A.4.
Intuitively, as richer households can substitute credit with initial wealth, conditional on
productivity, their optimal choice of inputs will be less likely to be distorted by the presence
of liquidity constraints and the shadow price of relaxing such a constraint will be smaller; this
substitution may not be possible for poor households. In the case of productivity, as liquidity-
constrained households cannot obtain funds to finance their optimal inputs choice, the marginal
product of inputs will exceed the costs of financing inputs. This distortion will be higher for
high-productivity households. As poor, high-productivity households are more likely to face
binding liquidity constraints and experience higher distortions in their optimal choice of inputs,
their marginal utility from a program loan will be higher.
Proposition 2:If households do not face binding borrowing constraints but face high
borrowing interest rates, the marginal utility from a reduction in the interest rate is a decreasing
function of initial wealth and an increasing function of household productivity Proof: See
Appendix section A.4.
Intuitively, conditional on productivity, households with low initial wealth will borrow
more and would benefit from a decrease in the interest rate. In contrast, as optimal input choice is
21Several models could generate such a friction. For instance, the existence of intermediation costs or information
rents would create a gap between the interest rates obtained by deposits and the borrowing interest rates, making
self-financing a cheaper option than borrowing.
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increasing in household productivity, conditional on initial wealth, more productive households
will demand more inputs, will borrow more and hence will benefit the most out of a decrease in
the interest rate.
Propositions 1 and 2 and the first order conditions from the VF committee’s problem (1.2)
imply that if the probability of repayment is constant across households, and committee members
weight all households equally, it is optimal to deliver more resources to poor, high-productivity
households. In practice, any deviations from such behavior should be explained either by
differences in repayment probabilities qi, differences in committee member’s preferences for
a particular household ψi or the inclusion of further restrictions to the committee member’s
problem. In the case of the MBVF program, targeting non-poor, low-productivity households
would be justified if these households had high repayment probability. However, if this was not
the case, then targeting non-poor, low-productivity households should be explained by committee
members preferences weighting other household characteristics unrelated to poverty, productivity
or repayment such as political connections or differences in the cost of obtaining information.
Motivated by the implications of the previous theoretical framework, this paper reports
results from three empirical exercises analyzing the allocation of loans from the program: First, I
test whether village committee members delivered credit to poor, high-productivity households.
Second, I compare the relative performance of the actual allocation in terms of poverty targeting
and productive efficiency with benchmark counterfactual allocation criteria: means testing and
repayment score. The former will test the empirical relevance of a trade-off between poverty and
productivity, while the latter will test the extent to which there is a trade-ff between targeting
high-repayment probability and high-productivity households. Third, I analyze the extent to
which socioeconomic connections with local leaders relate to deviations from the optimal target
population, and the extent to which these deviations are explained by information or favoritism.
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1.4 Data and measurement
This study uses data from 172 waves of the Townsend-Thai Monthly Survey (Townsend,
2014). Starting in September 1998, the survey covers two years prior to and 12 years after the
program’s implementation. The survey follows a sample of 709 households from randomly
selected villages corresponding to four provinces in Central and Northeast Thailand.22 The
dataset provides detailed information regarding transactions among households, the portfolio of
loans held by each household, input use, and household financial statements.
While Kaboski and Townsend (2012) and Kaboski and Townsend (2011) used the Annual
Townsend-Thai dataset to exploit cross-village variation in order to study the effects of the
program on household outcomes, the monthly version of the survey is optimal to analyze how
resources were distributed within a village. The monthly panel provides detailed information
regarding socioeconomic interactions and loan repayment which is not available in the yearly
survey. While the annual survey covers a high number of villages, it includes a small number of
households in each village. In contrast, the monthly survey includes on average 44 households
per village which allows for within-village analysis.
Out of 709 households who were interviewed in the first wave of the survey, 509 house-
holds were interviewed in the subsequent 171 waves, and, on average, 670 households are
interviewed in each wave. As most of the analysis of this paper concerns comparisons of
pre-program characteristics corresponding to the first 40 waves of the survey, I focus on the
unbalanced panel of 671 households for whom data regarding baseline interactions were available
and present robustness checks using the balanced sample for results that are obtained using
variation over time (see Appendix Section A.3.1).
22Provinces: Chachoengsao, Lop Buri, Buri Ram, and Si Sa Ket.
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1.4.1 Measuring poverty
I approximate poverty using the average baseline per-capita consumption corresponding
to the year preceding the program. I focus on per-capita consumption rather than wealth to
capture the short-term component of poverty.
1.4.2 Measuring pre-program productivity
To assess productive efficiency, I focus on household total factor productivity as the main
variable of interest. I exploit a panel data set to estimate the parameters from a production function
which I use to recover pre-program estimates of household total factor productivity. I estimate a
production function corresponding to household aggregate value-added by implementing the
two-stage approach proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996); Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
Ackerberg et al. (2015), using intermediate inputs as the proxy variable. I approximate output
using total revenues from all household economic activities which include agriculture, livestock
farming, fishing and shrimping, off-farm family businesses and wage work outside the household.
Capital is measured as the value of the stock of household fixed assets which include land, value
of livestock, real-state, appliances and agricultural equipment. Labor is measured as total hours
per year of labor provided by household members (on average 85% of total labor) and workers
outside the household. Intermediate inputs are measured as the value of inputs purchased outside
the household which were used in revenue-generating activities.23 I also provide robustness
checks using productivity estimates from a gross-revenue function estimated by GMM following
a dynamic-panel approach.
The choice of the empirical approach implies a series of assumptions which are discussed
in the following paragraphs. First, because there is heterogeneity in the sources of income in
the households in the data and because most households have several sources of income,24 I
23These inputs include fertilizer, seeds, hired labor from other households, feed for cattle, and other tools required
for non-farm family businesses.
24A behavior typical of rural environments in which household manage risk by diversifying their sources of
income (Alderman and Paxson, 1994). Panel C from Appendix Table A.7 shows that on average a household obtains
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aggregate revenues and input use all household’s economic activities. This decision comes at a
cost of interpretation of the elasticities, since a production function is specific to one particular
process. 25 As the goal of this paper is not to compare elasticities across sectors but to quantify
variations in output conditional on input use, the analysis in this paper focuses on productivity
measures from all household activities.
Second, as there is heterogeneity in household economic activities and in the intermediate
inputs contributing to the generation of revenues, I estimate a value-added production function.
26 However, a value-added approach assumes that households can’t produce any output without
intermediate inputs–i.e., the underlying production function is Leontief on intermediate inputs
(Ackerberg et al., 2015; Gandhi et al., 2016)–; which is a strong assumption in the context of
subsistence agriculture but a weak assumption when households have several sources of income
such as off-farm business.27
Third, I choose a choice-based approach (Ackerberg et al., 2015) to recover productivity
estimates over a dynamic-panel approach (i.e., Anderson and Hsiao (1982)). While both rely on
assumptions regarding the timing of capital and labor choices, they differ in the assumptions
regarding the dynamics of unobserved productivity and the way in which households accom-
modate productivity shocks. The former does not impose a functional form in the dynamics
of unobserved productivity but the latter imposes linearity (productivity follows a first-order
autoregressive process). However, the former uses intermediate inputs to proxy for changes in
revenues from 4 different sources: typically cultivation, labor provision, livestock and off-farm family businesses.
25This problem is typically assessed in firm-level analysis by estimating production functions by industries.
However the concept of “industry” is not applicable in the context in which households have several sources of
income and sort in and out a particular type of business. For instance, Nyshadham (2014) documents that households
transition in and out of off-farm businesses fairly often in the Thai villages of this sample. In the data, all households
have at least two sources of revenues.
26There are other reasons for the choice of a value-added function approach as opposed to a revenue function.
The first reason is to minimize the chances of double accounting in cases in which a households uses the output of
one activity as intermediate input for another–i.e, using agricultural output as feed for livestock–. The second reason
follows from the discussions on Ackerberg et al. (2015), and more generally in Gandhi et al. (2016), regarding
the lack of identification of the elasticities corresponding to intermediate inputs in gross revenue functions in
choice-based methods such as the one used in this paper.
27In a nutshell, this assumption means a household can’t produce crops without fertilizer, which may not be true.
However, adoption of fertilizer and seeds is quite high in the data. This assumption is also weak when we think of
households having several sources of income.
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unobserved productivity under the assumption that households can freely adjust intermediate
inputs. This assumption will be violated if there are adjustment frictions. In the context of the
sample villages, while there might be borrowing constraints, households hold large amounts of
inventories which may allow them to adjust intermediate inputs to productivity shocks.28 More
formally, Section 1.4.2 provides results from a graphical test for this assumption proposed by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and from a test for rigidities in input adjustment suggested by
Shenoy (2017).
Identification of the production function
In this section I describe the main behavioral assumptions needed to identify a value-
added production function, and defer a detailed discussion of these assumptions, estimation
details and specification checks to Appendix sections A.2 and A.2.1.29 Formally, the goal is
to recover pre-program estimates for ωit : productivity shocks, observed by the households but
unobserved by the researcher. Let yit denote total value added in logs 30, kit denote log capital, lit
denote log labor, and εit denote unforeseen exogenous shocks to production. The log value-added
production function is:
yit = β0+βllit +βkkit +ωit + εit (1.4)
The empirical challenge is to consistently estimate the parameters from equation (1.4) in
a context in which households choose labor and capital in response to productivity shocks (ω).
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2015) provide a solution by using variation
28See Samphantharak and Townsend (2010) for a detailed description of household financial choices in context
of incomplete credit and insurance markets in these villages. In fact, ongoing work by Kinnan et al. (2017) find
that less central households in the village socioeconomic network have higher levels of inventory to accommodate
production in contexts of idiosyncratic shocks.
29Appendix section A.2 describes the theoretical model consistent with the empirical estimates, the moment
conditions required for estimation, and describes the estimation procedure. Appendix Section A.2.1 provides a test
for over-identifying restrictions and discusses other alternative specifications.
30Value added is computed by subtracting the value of purchased inputs from the gross revenues generated by a
household in a given time period.
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from a proxy variable (mit) that monotonically responds to productivity shocks to control for
variation in productivity, conditional on labor and capital choices.31 I use the value of inputs to
proxy for variation in productivity. Hence, the main identification assumption is that households
flexibly adjust their demand for intermediate inputs in order to accommodate productivity shocks
in a strict monotonic way (mit = ft(ωit ; lit ,kit)), , conditional on capital and labor choices. Strict
monotonicity allows me to model variation in productivity shocks as a function of intermediate
inputs (ωit = f−1t (mit ; lit ,kit)) and use this function to control for variation in productivity.32
Four other assumptions are necessary to recover total factor productivity estimates. First,
I assume that, conditional on village-specific shocks, ωit follows a first-order Markov process.
Second, I assume that the stock of capital is a predetermined with respect to productivity
shocks–i.e., it is a function only of investment and the stock of capital in the previous period
(kt = k(iit−1,kit−1))–. This is operationalized by measuring capital as the stock of fixed assets
at the beginning of each calender year. Third, I allow labor choices to be flexibly adjusted in
response to contemporary productivity shocks, but assume that labor decisions are not correlated
with future shocks to productivity. Finally, as physical measures of output and intermediate
inputs are not available, I include village-year fixed effects, and assume that input and output
prices are common for households in the same village in a given year. 33
Following the estimation process detailed in Appendix Section A.2.1. Appendix table
A.13 presents estimates for the elasticities of labor and capital corresponding to equation (1.4).
Column (3) presents results for my preferred specification which uses 13 years of panel data to
compute production function elasticities which are then used to compute pre-program households
productivity and provides evidence of constant returns to scale. Column (4) reports elasticities
obtained by instrumenting pre-determined capital with its first lag to account for potential
31Most firm-level studies either use investment as the proxy variable (Olley and Pakes, 1996), or intermediate
inputs, such as electricity, as proxy variables (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003).
32This motivates the first stage of the estimation approach. However, as discussed by Ackerberg et al. (2015) and
Gandhi et al. (2016), none of the elasticity estimates are identified from equation (1.4). See Appendix section A.2.1
for a discussion of the moment conditions required for the identification and estimation of the elasticities βl ,βk.
33Accounting for the influence of prices requires incorporating a demand-system to the estimation framework
and exploit variation in aggregate demand which is not available in this context (De Loecker, 2011).
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measurement error. The results are robust to using only data corresponding to pre-program
periods (1999-2001) and a balanced panel of non-attriter households for the estimation (Columns
(5) and (6)).34 Finally, using an overidentified version of the model (see Column(7)), I find that it
is not possible to reject the null that the model’s structural restrictions hold.35 Finally, Appendix
table A.14 shows that results are fairly robust to alternative measurements of capital, labor, and
revenues and to estimating different production functions for households whose primary source
of revenues are related to agriculture (see Panel B).
Validation and discussion of the main identifying assumption
The main assumption of this approach is that, conditional on capital and labor, there is a
strict monotonic relation between intermediate inputs and productivity. Appendix Figure A.6
provides a graphical examination of this assumption by plotting the productivity estimates as a
function of the value of purchased inputs, after partialling out the variation from capital, labor,
and village-year shocks (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). I find evidence of a strict monotonic
relation between productivity and the proxy variable. Table A.15 reports results from the test for
adjustment rigidities suggested by Shenoy (2017) and shows that there is no evidence of rigidities
in the adjustment of intermediate inputs. 36 An alternative way of relaxing this assumption
is to estimate a value-added function using a dynamic-panel approach (Anderson and Hsiao,
1982) through GMM after “ρ-differencing” equation (1.4). Columns(8) and (9) from Appendix
table A.13 reports elasticities from this approach which are similar to the benchmark estimations
obtained following a choice-based model. Columns(10)-(11) relax the value-added assumption
34Production function elasticities using only pre-program data are very similar, almost identical. I base my
conclusions on pre-program productivity measures using elasticities corresponding to 13 years which are more
conservative than results using only pre-program data.
35Note that although an overidentified system would deliver more precisely estimated coefficients, the fact that I
only observe two years of baseline data limits the estimation of TFP precisely for the baseline years, which are the
main input for the analysis in this study. More importantly, consistency of these estimates depends on the correct
specification of the variance-covariance matrix.
36To implement the test, I first regress value added on a flexible third-order polynomial of current choices of
capital, labor and intermediate goods and compute the residuals. Second, I test whether flexible polynomials of
lags for capital, labor and intermediate inputs have explanatory power on the residuals from the first regression.
Rejecting the null of no explanatory power of lagged inputs will be supportive of rigidities in the market for inputs.
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and report factor elasticities from a gross-revenue function estimated through GMM following
a dynamic approach. Identification in this case comes at the cost of assuming that there are
rigidities in the adjustment of intermediate inputs which allow the econometrician to use input
choices in previous periods as instruments for current inputs (see Appendix section A.2.1 for
details). As no approach is perfect, I report results from estimates of total factor productivity
following the dynamic panel approach for all the comparisons in this paper. I also report results
using direct measures of financial profitability following Samphantharak and Townsend (2010),
such as the asset-turnover ratio and profitability margins per unit of revenue.
1.4.3 Measuring repayment behavior
I track the full stream of disbursements and payments associated to each loan reported in
the survey, until a loan is fully paid or defaulted on, and use these data to construct four indicators
of loan performance: First, I count the number of times a borrower failed to make a payment and
construct delinquency rates for each loan. Second, I compute an indicator of whether the loan
experienced any delinquent payment. Third, I identify whether a loan was repaid in a longer
period than its original term. Fourth, I measure returns to the lender using the ex post internal
rate of return on each loan in order to have a common measure of loan profitability that accounts
for loan size and changes in the loan payment schedule. Although default is observed, there is
little variation on this as default rates are mostly zero in the data.
I complement these indicators with information regarding the loans’ initial characteristics
such as size, term, the need for collateral, or a cosigner. Initial interest rates were self-reported
and are converted to yearly values by multiplying them by 12 or 52, in the case of monthly and
weekly rates, respectively. To recover baseline delinquency rates for each household and avoid
sample selection, I take the average over all the loans that were obtained before the program,
including loans from informal lenders.37
37Use of institutional credit was not universal and would limit the ability to use pre-program information for
households without access to institutional credit.
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1.4.4 Measuring connections with local elites
The dataset contains information regarding different types of socioeconomic interactions
between households in the village.38 To prevent potential effects of the program on network
formation, I use only pre-program interactions to identify connections. With the aim of capturing
several dimensions of social interactions, I use information on all types of transactions among
community members.39 Thus, a household is defined as connected with the local political elites
if any of its members reports either being a member of the village council, or a first-degree kin
of a council member, or having engaged in at least one interaction, of any type, with any village
council member during the baseline periods.40
There are two limitations to these connections measures: First, by using the extensive
margin of transactions to define connections, it is possible that a household is identified as
connected because of one isolated interaction. Since the relative salience of each interaction
cannot be identified nor valued, when pertinent I provide robustness checks using an alternative
definition of connectedness based on Principal Component analysis across the different types
of transactions. Second, since only village council members in the sample can be identified,
as opposed to all village council members, there is a potential downward bias in measuring
connections with elites. Thus, the results based on comparisons between connected and uncon-
nected households represent lower bounds of the true differences. However, this bias should
not be strong as village council members represent only 10% of the households and at least one
committee member is observed in each village in the sample.41
38The transactions can be roughly categorized in seven groups: output sales or purchases, asset purchases or
relinquishments, transfers (gifts), borrowing (lending), paid labor provision (demand), unpaid labor exchange, and
other inputs, which include materials purchases (sales) as well as advising and mentorship.
39Summary statistics by interaction type are provided in Appendix Table A.11.
40While other measures–such as geodesic distance (shortest path)–might provide a better approximation of the
distance between a household (node) and the elites in the network, these measures are subject to potentially high
biases arising from the sampled nature of the transaction data. As noted by Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2017) there
is non-classical measurement error when connections are computed using only a sample of the nodes in a network
and the associated bias gets more complicated to tackle when network statistics that involve indirect connections are
employed (e.g., the path length to the closest elite member).
41Appendix Table A.9 shows demographic characteristics by type of connection with the elites. Appendix Table
A.10, complements this information by presenting summary statistics of baseline connections with local elites.
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1.5 Targeting analysis
In this section I analyze first if the program was successful at reaching poor,productive
households, and then I test: i) whether there was a tension between targeting the poor and
delivering credit to high-productivity households and ii) whether allocating resources based on a
repayment-score would have led to a more equitable or productively efficient allocation.
While the program currently operates in several villages, I focus on the first two years of
the program for two reasons.42 First, I compare baseline characteristics between program benefi-
ciaries and non-beneficiaries, and to the extent that consumption and productivity responded to
the program or significantly varied over time, baseline characteristics are more representative of
the context around the rollout of the program. Second, modifications were made to the program
years after its rollout, such as changes in the orientation of the funds to community improvement
projects, sanctions for poorly managed funds, and rewards for successful ones.
1.5.1 Comparisons of program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
I find that the program did not target resources neither following a poverty targeting
nor a productive efficiency criterion. Figure 1.1 depicts the cumulative distribution function of
per-capita consumption and value-added total factor productivity for program beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries. Loans from the program were allocated to richer households; the distribution
of per-capita consumption for program beneficiaries first-order stochastically dominates that of
non-beneficiaries. Regarding productivity, the program on average targeted households from
the middle of the distribution of total factor productivity and was less likely to target high-
productivity households: less than half of high-productivity households (i.e., top 25% of the
distribution of productivity) obtained loans from the program.
Table 1.1 quantifies the extent to which the program misdirected resources in relation
to both the poverty targeting and the productive efficiency. Panel A shows that on average, the
42I choose two years in order to capture households that may not have needed credit during the first year but
obtained credit during the second year.
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program targeted wealthier households and the differences arise at the bottom of the distribution
of per-capita consumption; the 10th percentile is 22% higher for households who had access
to credit from the program. In terms of productivity, the 75th percentile of the distribution of
total factor productivity is 15% lower for program beneficiaries than for non-beneficiaries. This
pattern is similar in the case of complementary measures of productivity and is particularly
stronger in the case of the alternative gross-revenue productivity estimates obtained by the
alternative dynamic panel approach (see bottom panel).
1.5.2 Poverty targeting , productive efficiency and repayment
Basurto et al. (2017) highlight the importance of distinguishing between poverty targeting
and poverty reduction, which may arise in a context in which the poor may not necessarily be
the most productive. To test the salience of this tradeoff, I evaluate the the allocation achieved by
community members in relation to the allocation that would have been observed had loans been
offered according to a pro-poor criterion–i.e., means testing (MT). This criterion aims to capture
the allocation that would have been observed if the Village Fund committee placed a high weight
on delivering resources to the poor.
Similarly, it could be the case that committee members faced a tradeoff between targeting
poor, high-productivity households and households with a high expected repayment rate. To test
the importance of this tradeoff, I compare the the allocation achieved by community members to
the allocation that would have been observed had loans been offered according to a repayment
score based on predicted baseline probability of missing a due payment for institutional loans.
While an allocation based only on a scoring model may not fully reflect the choices that would
be made by a traditional MFI credit officer, it is still policy relevant as it captures information
regarding ex ante risk which might be costly to the lender (Schreiner, 2000) and is informative
regarding the decisions that would have been made by a risk-averse lender.
In order to identify households who would have been targeted by a means-testing criterion,
I compute the average stock of per-capita gross assets over pre-program periods and construct
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within-community wealth rankings.43 Using these rankings, the households with the lowest
positions are classified as the MT target group and are selected into this group until reaching
the uptake rates of the MBVF during the initial two years of the program (avg. 62%). I follow
a similar approach using percentile rankings of predicted delinquency rate giving priority to
households with low predicted delinquency rate.44 This process classifies households into
four groups: households that would have been targeted by both the program and the respective
alternative criterion, households that would have been excluded from both allocations, households
that were reached by the MBVF program but would have been excluded by the alternative
criterion, and households that were excluded from the VF program but would have been targeted
by the alternative criterion (see Appendix Table A.1).
Means testing would have targeted a different set of people: over 40% of households
targeted by the program would have been excluded by the MT criterion. While these households
are by construction richer, they are on average more likely to be low-productivity households
(bottom 25% of the productivity distribution). Table 1.2 compares means and quantiles of
per-capita consumption and productivity between households who would have been targeted
by the program but would not have been eligible under the MT criterion and households who
would have been targeted by the MT criterion but were not program beneficiaries.45 Overall, the
results show that MT outperforms the program under all metrics. Contrary to the program, a
means-testing criterion would have offered credit to the ultra poor and simultaneously would have
43Gross assets data is obtained from the households’ balance sheets compiled by Samphantharak and Townsend
(2010). Gross assets include non-land fixed assets (i.e., household assets, cultivation and family business assets),
livestock and land value.
44To recover baseline credit scores related to loans from institutional lenders, I use a subset of households
with pre-program access to institutional credit (i.e., credit from formal or quasi-formal lenders) to estimate a
model of baseline delinquency rate for institutional loans as a function of household demographic and productive
characteristics. I then use the coefficients of that model to generate predicted delinquency rates for all households
in the sample and construct percentile credit-score rankings in each village assigning a higher credit score to
households with low predicted delinquency. The household characteristics include household head age, gender and
years of education, total land holdings and shares of total revenues by source. All continuous variables are grouped
by quartiles and are interacted with household head gender in the model. The model also includes village fixed
effects and overall explains over one-quarter of the variation in the probability of exhibiting delinquent payments in
the baseline period.
45See Appendix Figure A.1 for an illustration. A characterization of targeted households is presented in Table 1.4
(Columns (6)-(7)).
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excluded households belonging to the bottom 25% of the distribution of total factor productivity.
Over a third of households who obtained credit from the program would have been
excluded by a repayment-score targeting criterion. These households were more likely to be
low productivity households (bottom 25%) though also less likely to belong to the top 25%
of the distribution of per-capita income. Relative to the program, a repayment-score criterion
would have offered credit to a higher share of poor households, a lower share of households in
the middle of the per-capita consumption distribution and a higher share of households from
the top of the distribution. On average, reallocating resources to high-repayment probability
would not be related to a cost in terms of equity with respect to the program. In terms of
productivity, targeting credit following a repayment-score criterion would have delivered credit
to the households with the highest productivity. This differences in terms of efficiency are
sizeable: households who obtained credit from the program but would have been ineligible by a
repayment-score criterion were on average 12% less productive than households who did not
obtain credit from the program but would have been offered credit by the alternative criterion.
The results are driven by differences in the top of the productivity distribution (see Table 1.3).
Again, the same pattern is observed across different proxies for productivity. Overall, reallocating
resources from program borrowers with low repayment probability to high-repayment probability
households who did not obtain program credit would yield an average increase in productivity of
4.5%.46
1.5.3 Discussion
I find that resources from the program were not optimally allocated neither with respect
to poverty targeting, nor with respect to productive efficiency. Moreover, the allocation of
resources is not consistent with an allocation that would have targeted households with the
highest repayment probability measured by a scoring model. Thus, the allocation achieved by
46This result is obtained by simply dividing the productivity gap from reallocating resources (12%) and scaling it
down by the share of program borrowers who would be ineligible under the repayment criterion (0.38).
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the elected Village Fund committee is unlikely to have been motivated by concerns regarding
equity, productive efficiency or risk. These results contrast sharply with experimental evidence
from a NGO-led credit program in Mali in which low-return households self-selected out from
credit (Beaman et al., 2014). The main explanation is the screening mechanism used by each
program. The program in Mali had zero government intervention allowing price to be the main
relevant screening mechanism. Section 1.6 show how the relevant screening mechanism in the
Thai case was related to political connections.
In this paper, I study a government-funded program managed by elected community
members who have full discretion in the application process and in defining loan conditions.
The theoretical framework discussed in Section 1.3 suggest that failure to provide credit to poor,
high-productivity households might be related to Village Fund committee members weighting
their fellow villagers based on different criteria. A compelling hypothesis is that committee
members weighted more households with socioeconomic connections to local leaders. However,
there are other factors that could influence the way in which Village Fund committee members
weight each household such as externalities of financing a particular project or simply lack of
demand for credit; Section 1.6 directly examines the role of connections with local authorities
in the allocation of resources and discuses alternative compelling explanations while Section
1.7 discusses concerns regarding the demand from credit for households with lower chances
of obtaining credit exploiting variation in the supply of credit in the village financial system
induced by the program’s rollout.
1.6 Access to credit from the program, connections with
local elites, and favoritism
A central concern related to efforts to decentralize the allocation and management of
public resources to community members relates to perverse incentives that may lead to favoritism
or resource capture. However, the appeal of decentralized approaches to policy members relies
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on the idea that social connections may transmit information regarding program beneficiaries
which might be costly to obtain by traditional policy makers. In this section I first show that
households with connections to local elites are more likely to obtain credit from the program.
Second, I discuss the extent to which this relation is related to information and/or favoritism.
Figure 1.2 depicts raw averages of the probability of obtaining a loan from the program
for elite members, connected households and disconnected households. Resources from the
program were disproportionately allocated to households with connections with the elites. This
pattern is not explained by differences in baseline repayment history (see Appendix table
A.2). In terms of poverty targeting or productive efficiency, connected households were neither
poorer nor more productive. Panel A from Appendix table A.3 shows that while on average
connected households are similar to unconnected households in terms of per-capita consumption,
among the poorest households, connected households are better off: The 10th percentile in
the distribution of per-capita consumption is 12% larger for connected households. Panel B
shows that connected households were on average as productive as unconnected households;
however the 75th percentile of total factor productivity is 17% lower for connected households.
This pattern is even stronger across other measures of productivity (see panels C-E), and is
precisely observed in the regions of the per-capita consumption and productivity distributions
where program beneficiaries differed from non-beneficiaries (see table 1.1).
To understand the extent to which village fund committee members use connections to
proxy for desirable borrower characteristics, Table 1.4 shows regressions of the probability of
obtaining a loan from the program during the first two years of its implementation on connections
with the elites controlling for the number of links each household has in the socioeconomic
network (degree), a set of baseline demographic characteristics, productive characteristics, credit
history, and village fixed effects.47 Column (1) shows that connected households are 18 percent-
47The baseline delinquency rate is computed as the number of times a household fails to make a loan payment
as a share of all payments due for loans obtained before the introduction of the program. Although only 60%
of households ever reported holding a loan from formal or quasi-formal sources in the baseline periods, most
households reported holding loans from either informal lenders. I use information regarding the history of payments
of each reported loan, regardless the source, to compute delinquency rates and avoid dropping observations from
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age points more likely to obtain credit from the program and that these correlation is reduced to
10 percentage points after controlling for relevant household characteristics (see Column (3)),
baseline access to credit (Column (4)) and productivity (Column (5)). Column (6) decomposes
connections with local leaders by type of connection–i.e., council membership, connection
through transactions, or being a first-degree relative–and shows that the correlation is driven by
council membership and direct transactions with council members. These results suggests that
connections carry important information and are encouraging as community-based approaches
to targeting are suppose to exploit information available to community members. However, the
results suggest that improvements in information do not fully explain the disproportionate allo-
cation of resources towards connected households; even after controlling for relevant borrower
characteristics, connected households are still 10 percentage points more likely to obtain credit
from the program.48 One alternative explanation for this allocation, which could potentially
be consequential for the program’s sustainability, is favoritism. If that were true, connected
households should obtain better loan terms, leading to lower returns for the lender.
1.6.1 Favoritism towards connected households
In order to test for favoritism accounting for unobserved borrower characteristics, I use a
sub-sample of 344 households who have ever borrowed from both the program and other local
credit sources. I compare differences in initial interest rates and ex post returns to the lender for
loans obtained from the program with respect to loans from local credit groups for connected
households to similar differences for unconnected households, controlling for borrower and
lender fixed effects.49
households that, despite not obtaining institutional credit, have credit experience from informal loans.
48Note that the R-squared from column (6) is considerably lower than that of columns (7)-(9), suggesting that
the control variables capture important information explaining the probability of obtaining credit under different
allocation criterion. This pattern suggests that household characteristics could be good predictors of uptake of
credit from pre-existing sources nut they are not as good in the case of program, which suggests that selection in
unobservable characteristics is even more important in the MBVF case.
49Such an approach is common in the literature in the context of credit and political connections Khwaja and
Mian (2005), testing across monitoring models Shaban (1987), and the study of the role of comparative advantages
and taste-based discrimination in agricultural tasks Foster and Rosenzweig (1996).
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Comparison local credit groups include production credit groups (PCGs), women’s
groups, and other village organizations that provide credit. These credit groups and the MBVF
program are managed in similar ways: The allocation of credit is decided by community
members. However, they differ the way they are funded: The MBVF program is fully funded
by the government while local credit groups rely on contributions from group members.50 The
similarities and differences across these sources of credit allow me to focus on two sources
of variation: variation in borrower’s connection status, which captures the potential political
influence; and variation in the origin of the funds, which captures the ability of borrowers to take
advantage of their connections.
I focus on initial loan characteristics such as interest rates, term, and size. As repayment
frequencies vary across loans, I focus on loan outcomes from a cross section of loans that
reached maturity, and were obtained after the implementation of the program. As the recovery
rate of loans from the program is 99% in the sample,51 I measure loan performance as the
probability of a delinquent payment and the delinquency rate of the loan. Since differences in
loan characteristics may affect repayment, and loan size may reduce administrative costs and
interest rates, the main outcome of interest is the ex post internal rate of return.
In order to test for favoritism I use the following specification:
Yki jt = αi+θ j +βConnectedi×MBVF j +δvt + εki jt (1.5)
The unit of observation is a loan k obtained by household i from lender j in year t. Yki jt
denotes the loan outcome or loan characteristic of interest. αi and θ j denote households and
lender fixed effects. While the analysis is in principle cross sectional, I control for village-specific
time-varying shocks by including village-year fixed effects (δvt). Connectedi and MBV Fj are
50These sources of credit have been shown to be helpful in promoting asset growth, consumption smoothing,
and occupational mobility through the provision of cash credit to community members in the context of Thailand
(Kaboski and Townsend, 2005).
51The recovery rate is 96% for local credit groups.
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indicators of whether a borrower has pre-program connections with the elites and whether the loan
was obtained from the MBVF program. The parameter of interest is β which measures relative
performance of loans to connected households from the MBVR program, under the assumption
that there were no unobserved shocks differentially affecting program loans corresponding to
connected households. This concern is partially assessed by including borrower fixed effects, but
this assumption would be violated if, for example, the program modified repayment behavior
specific to a type of lender (MBVF or local credit groups) and a type of borrower (connected or
unconnected). 52
Columns (1) to (4) from Table 1.5 present means of loan characteristics and outcomes
by type of borrower and lender. Column (8) presents estimates of β corresponding to the
specification in equation (1.5), and shows that loans from connected households are relatively
larger (22%) and cheaper: The initial interest rate for program loans to connected households is
1.5 percentage points lower than that for loans from local credit groups to connected households,
while unconnected households borrow at the same rate regardless of the source. To understand
whether better loan conditions relate to favoritism or actually reflect lower risk, Column (8)
in Panel B shows that while connected households were less likely to have had a delinquent
payment on loans obtained through the program, this difference did not compensate for the
preferential interest rates, as delinquency is very low for both sources of credit. As a result, there
is a 2-percentage-points decrease in the ex post internal rate of return to the lender for MBVF
loans to connected households, which accounts for 25% of the average ex post internal rate of
return for loans from self-funded local credit groups. Note that all the differences arise from
differences in loan outcomes for connected households; Columns (5) and (6) show differences in
loan outcomes by type of lender for connected and unconnected households, respectively. No
significant differences, other than loan size, are detected for unconnected households.
52 I provide supporting evidence for this assumption in Appendix Table A.5. Columns (4)-(6) test for differential
short-run effects of the program on borrowing from credit groups using the rollout of the program; there are
no significant effects and the point estimates are not economically meaningful. An explanation of the empirical
approach used to obtain these results is deferred to Section 1.7.
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1.6.2 Discussion
The results in this section support the hypothesis of favoritism towards connected house-
holds in the context of the program in the form of cheaper credit, which is associated with
foregone returns to the program. However, the results do not imply that the repayment rate for
the program was poor or that it was not profitable, overall. The results do suggest that program
loans could have gone to better hands and that the program could have grown faster. For instance,
this behavior may explain why, despite its high repayment rate, the program’s lending portfolio
was not able to grow at the same pace as the Thai economy (Haughton et al., 2014).
Although the evidence in this section is consistent with the notion of costly favoritism,
there are other compelling reasons why connected households obtained more credit from the
program. First, village fund committee members may have tried to increase employment
or stimulate the market for inputs. Second, elected committee members may have different
preferences which not necessarily follow a poverty targeting, productive efficiency or risk
minimizing criteria. I argue that such a large difference in program participation will be harder to
reconcile with alternative preferences other than taste-based discrimination. Third, unobserved
application costs may differentially affect unconnected households. While the program relaxed
the need for collateral, borrowers were still required to obtain two cosigners and finding a
reliable cosigner might be costlier for unconnected households, yet this potential explanation is
supportive of the main implication of the results in this section: a community based approach to
allocating credit imposes higher program participation costs to unconnected households.
The evidence in this section is meaningful to the extent that unconnected households
needed extra-liquidity and selection into the program is mostly explained by supply side con-
straints. Section 1.7 provides evidence supporting this assumption inspired in the following idea:
To the extent that the program favored connected households, other actors in the financial system
should be willing to serve unconnected households who want credit. The following section
provides evidence of how credit markets reacted to an expansion of credit in the village economy
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that targeted connected households.
1.7 Program spillovers to unconnected households
The results from the previous section show that the program favored households with
connections with the elite and might not have directly reached unconnected households. However,
as favoritism is costly, other lenders in the market should be willing to provide loans to disfavored,
unconnected households. In this section, I test the empirical relevance of this argument by
analyzing whether the supply shock generated by the program indirectly increased credit use
by unconnected households. Because institutional lenders are likely to face adjustment costs,
I focus the analysis on informal markets which might be flexible enough to quickly respond
to the increased in credit supply induced by the program.53 Analyzing program spillovers
is important for two reasons. First, it allows for analyzing the extent to which the resulting
program allocation was driven by unconnected households self-excluding from the program
or actually being disfavored by program committee members. Second, testing for program
spillovers is informative about the role of markets in offsetting targeting errors and about the
extent to which resources to improve targeting of social programs may be a first order concern
for policy members.
1.7.1 Empirical strategy
The program represented a sudden increase in total lending in the village economy.
Figure A.2 shows that there was a spike in aggregate lending within the first two months of the
release of the funds from the program which lead to further increase. Following the introduction
of low interest loans from the program, aggregate borrowing increased by 24% in the sample
villages within a year from the rollout of the program. To determine if there were short-term
reactions in credit markets, I exploit monthly variation in the differential rollout of the program
53The literature has documented the importance of informal markets in providing resources to households that
may not have direct access to formal credit (Kinnan and Townsend, 2012), or were not eligible for social programs
(Angelucci and De Giorgi, 2009).
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across villages: The resources were released in June 2001 in the first village in the study sample,
and the rollout continued until February 2002 for the last village in the dataset (nine months).
As this variation is relevant over a short period of time, I restrict the analysis to the 18 months
just before and after the program was introduced in each village, and hence the results are only
informative of the short-run impacts of the release of the program. Identification of the treatment
effects from the rollout of the program is achieved under the assumption that, conditional on
household time-invariant characteristics, the rollout of the program was not related to unobserved
shocks that determined household decisions to obtain credit. A main concern in this context is
the potential coincidence of the program’s rollout with different periods in the agricultural cycle.
Section 1.7.3 and Appendix Section 2.8 develop a framework to directly test for this threat to
identification and discuss other methodological issues.
In order to examine the presence of pre-program trends and the dynamics of the effect of
the program, I compute flexible difference-in-differences estimates of the rollout of the program
on credit using the following empirical specification (1.6):
Yivt = αi+δt +
j=18
∑
j=−18, j 6=−1
β jI[τvt = j]+ εivt (1.6)
where Y denotes total borrowing by household i, in village v, at month t. τvt denotes time
to treatment for each village in a given month. Household fixed effects are denoted by αi, and δt
denotes a set of calendar months and year indicators.54 The coefficients of interest are {β j}18j=−18,
which capture the difference between total average borrowing by households in period τvt = j
relative to the month preceding release of the funds (τvt = −1) compared to the difference in
total borrowing by households in villages where funds were not released by that month. A
54Note that as time to treatment is strongly correlated with survey wave, inclusion of monthly dummies could
lead to multicollinearity and failure to identify any meaningful parameter and inability to test for parallel trends. By
using calendar month and year fixed effects it is possible to construct a survey-wave-specific intercept and weaken
the correlation with the ‘time-to-treatment’ variable. Future versions of the paper will implement the methods
suggested by Borusyak and Jaravel (aper) for this type of problems to test for pre-program trends more formally.
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causal interpretation of these parameters relies on the assumption of parallel pre-treatment trends
between the villages (β j = 0,∀ j < 0) and the absence of post-program, village-specific shocks
that may affect borrowing decisions. To approximate the average treatment effect of the rollout
of the program over the period of analysis, I also estimate:
Yivt = αi+δt +βPostvt + εivt (1.7)
In this equation, Postvt is an indicator that takes the value of 1 in the months following the rollout
of the program in each village. The parameter of interest in equation (1.7) is β , which captures
the average differences in credit uptake before and after the release of program funds across
households from villages that experienced the release of the funds in different periods.
A comment regarding inference should be made: I use mainly variation across 16 villages
in the timing of the rollout of the program to identify intention-to-treat effects of the program,
and the scarce number of villages poses a threat both to power and accurate inference. I present
standard errors clustered at the household level to account for serial correlation. To account
for within village correlation of error terms in the context of a small number of clusters, the
regression tables report p-values from the wild bootstrap-t procedure suggested by Cameron and
Miller (2015) imposing the null hypothesis of no effect. However, this approach tends to have
low power and lead to conservative inference.55
1.7.2 Results
I find that unconnected households indirectly benefited from the program through in-
formal local credit markets, mostly from relatives. Figure 1.3 presents flexible difference-in-
difference estimates corresponding to equation (1.6) and shows that there was an increase in
borrowing from informal lenders by unconnected households, and no effect for connected house-
55As discussed by Cameron and Miller (2015) most available corrections for small number of clusters lead
to appropriate acceptance rates, but they have reduced power. This is a concern in this paper as the number of
cross-section observations is small.
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holds. Figure 1.4 shows that the effect is mostly driven by loans from relatives, usually at null
interest rates–average interest rate is 9%, but median interest rate is 0–.56 Table 1.6 presents
average treatment effects by connections with the elites and shows that the program lead to a
30% increase in informal debt in the case of unconnected households.
The results reported in the previous paragraph are consistent with evidence of re-lending.
Appendix table A.6 shows that the probability of lending to other households increased by 2
percentage points in the case of connected households (12% of pre-program average), as a result
of the rollout of the program. Event-study estimates show that there was a surge in total lending
for connected households within two months of the rollout of the program (see Appendix figure
A.3), yet these effects are imprecisely estimated.
Moreover, kinship networks were not the only margin of adjustment. Appendix Figure
1.5 shows that unconnected households borrowed more from BAAC, the state-owned bank, in
some periods following the rollout of the program. These results constitute only suggestive
evidence of spillovers as the average effect is not significant, though economically meaningful (
See Appendix Table A.5).
Overall, the program had little effect on total borrowing for connected households.
Appendix Table A.4 and Appendix figure A.4 present estimates of the impact of the rollout of the
program on the probability of holding any loan and total debt from any source, by connections
with the elites. The figure shows that the program barely increased access to credit for connected
households despite providing them with over twice as much resources than connected households.
This finding is not surprising as connected households had higher access to credit even before
the program.
Despite spillovers and general equilibrium effects driving increases in non-program
borrowing for unconnected households, the magnitudes are not big enough to fully compensate
the differences in total borrowing form the program. Back-of-the-envelop calculations suggest
that the effects on non-program borrowing for unconnected households only account from one-
56However, interlinked transactions in the kinship network may make up for zero interest rates on loans.
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third of the differences in borrowing from the program between connected and unconnected
households.57 The result shows that unconnected households needed liquidity and suggest that
the allocation of loans from the program was not explained by self-exclusion. Unconnected
households were less likely to obtained credit from the program and when they did, they obtained
less money, suggesting that other lenders in the system were helpful in reallocating the resources
towards disfavored households.
1.7.3 Threats to identification, robustness, and attrition
The assumption that the rollout of the program was exogenous with respect to credit
decisions is central to the identification strategy in the preceding section. While the flexible
difference-in-difference estimates show that there were no differential pre-program trends, it is
not clear that there were no post-program, village-specific shocks that may have affected credit
decisions. Although monthly fixed effects control for seasonality, it could be the case that the
funds were differentially released in periods in which higher activity in the credit market was
expected. For instance, villages with earlier implementation benefited from the program during
planting season, but villages with delayed implementation received the funds at the end of harvest
season. If households decided to finance operations in a particular season, the estimates from
the preceding difference-in-difference approach could also capture the effect of the agricultural
cycle on credit. In Appendix Section A.3, I discuss in detail a placebo exercise designed to test if
the results were driven by village-specific, seasonal patterns confounded with the rollout of the
program. Concretely, I use observations corresponding to survey waves up to a year before the
program was implemented in the first village (τv,t ∈ [−36,−6)), and normalize τ , the variable
representing time-to-treatment, to be between -12 and 17 (the base category is -1), such that the
calendar months in which the funds were actually released coincide with the ones in the placebo
exercise. I then estimate equation (1.6) in this sample and compare the results from the placebo
57This result is obtained from adding the effect on borrowing from relatives (THB 416) and from BAAC (1,018)
for unconnected households and dividing it by the difference between the effect of the rollout of the program on
program borrowing for connected households (THB 7,092) and unconnected households (THB 2,583)
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sample to those reported in this paper. There are no significant effects in the placebo exercise.
Regarding attrition, I provide replications of the main difference-in-difference results
presented in this paper for the 509 households that were interviewed in all 172 rounds of the
survey. Results are not sensitive to attrition (See Appendix Section A.3). Regarding potential
noise in the measure of connections, I replicate the main tables of the paper using an index of
connection with the elites, the computation of which is based on the first principal component of
the correlation matrix of connection with elites through all possible socioeconomic interactions.
All results hold under both approaches (see Appendix Tables A.18 and A.19).
1.8 Concluding remarks and discussion
Community-based approaches to targeting public resources are increasingly popular in
the policy world. Despite that, little is known regarding the performance of these approaches in
market-driven environments such as credit. This paper brings together two central debates in
development economics: the delivery of public resources through local democratic organizations
and the provision of affordable credit to poor, high-productivity households. The results in this
paper highlight the limitations of a subsidized community-based credit program to deliver credit
to poor, high productivity households. Consistent with the traditional concern of resource capture
in the literature that studies the decentralization of public programs to community members
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005), resources from the program were disproportionately allocated
to households with baseline business connections with local elites.
These results are partially explained by the role of information. After controlling for
demographic and productive characteristics as well as credit history, the correlation between
connections and program participation reduces, yet it is still strong. This result suggests that
the cost of obtaining relevant borrower information was higher for unconnected households and
has important policy implications in contexts in which attributes for beneficiaries are hard to
observe. The extent to which community-based targeting approaches lead to better targeting
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will depend on how connected are potential beneficiaries. Concretely, if poor,high-productivity
households are socioeconomically isolated, even in the absence of rent-seeking behavior they
may be less likely to be targeted. This result complements evidence showing how village network
characteristics explain heterogeneity in targeting errors from a community-based cash transfer
program(Alatas et al., 2012).
This paper also documents evidence of favoritism in a context of transparent elections
of village fund committee members and speaks to the debate regarding the delivery of public
resources through local democratic organizations. While the expectation was that transparent
elections would ensure accountability, the results in this paper suggests that elections politicized
the allocation of resources. The results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that decen-
tralization may lead to regressive allocations when policies are financed through government
grants instead of user contributions (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006a), as is the case of the
MBVF program, and with cross-village studies documenting favoritism and clientelism (Asher
and Novosad, 2017; Anderson et al., 2015). Overall, the results suggest that differences in
connections to the local elite across households capture different in costs of accessing to public
resources. These costs are related to information transmission but also to favoritism and are
consequential in terms of equity, productive efficiency and program sustainability.
The results contrasts sharply with evidence in the context of community-based targeting
of cash-transfer programs (Alatas et al., 2012) but is consistent with evidence of favoritism
towards politically connected firms and credit from state-owned banks (Khwaja and Mian, 2005).
The intuition for this result is that, as opposed to targeting cash transfers, the allocation of
credit not only involves information regarding poverty but also productivity and repayment.
Information regarding poverty is more likely to be objective and common knowledge to the
community as a whole. Community members may use observable characteristics that describe
a poor household and may not need to interact directly in order to figure out who is poor. In
contrast, information regarding productivity and repayment requires direct economic interactions
and thus may increase the incentives for moral hazard behavior.
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A first order concern is that of how to effectively use the information available to
community members and simultaneously prevent rent-seeking behavior in community-based
approaches. One way could be by fostering self-funded credit groups, as opposed to creating
village funds with subsidized resources. This is already a popular policy approach backed
with encouraging evidence of its effects both on household productive behavior (Kaboski and
Townsend, 2005; Deininger, 2013) and in relieving households from usurers (Hoffmann et al.,
2017). Research testing whether there are social barriers preventing poor, high-productivity
households from participating in these groups would shed light regarding the effectiveness of
this approach to alleviate poverty. Moreover a more careful comparison of the mechanisms
driving selection into credit across different policy-relevant implementation approaches –i.e.,
CBT, self-help groups and traditional microfinance– would provide insights towards future
policy directions. An alternative way is to provide monetary incentives for accurate information
(Hussam et al., 2017), however the implementation of these incentives may require bureaucracy
which is precisely what CBT approaches are trying to avoid.
This study also speaks to the importance of understanding the interactions of public
policy efforts with markets, and political economy factors in a general equilibrium framework.
In particular, this paper contributes with novel evidence showing that credit markets may offset
potential targeting errors. While evidence of spillovers from large scale programs towards
mistargeted households may suggest that targeting should not be a first order concern as markets
may deliver resources to the intended destination, the relevant question is the price mistargeted
households have to pay in order to benefit from public resources. This study finds that other
lenders in the village financial system and kinship networks are important in indirectly delivering
results to households lacking of connections with local leaders. While the former involved
higher interest rates than those from loans from the program, the latter may imply interlinked
transactions which may be costly for either the borrower or the lender. These costs may ultimately
determine if targeting should be a first or second order issue in public policy.
Finally, this paper provides evidence that aids in interpreting the results from the impact
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evaluation of the MBVF program. First, Kaboski and Townsend (2012) find increases in
consumption and income growth with no effect on investment. Ongoing work by Breza et al.
(2017) document heterogeneous effects of credit from the MBVF on investment, driven by
heterogeneity in productivity. My results provide a bridge between these studies by showing that
credit was inefficiently allocated and documenting the mechanisms leading to that allocation.
Second, other studies analyzing whether the program reached poor households suggest that
resources were directed towards the poor, based on inter-village comparisons (Haughton et al.,
2014; Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011). By using socioeconomic networks data, the results
from this paper suggest that cross-village comparisons hide substantial asymmetries in access to
resources from the program, which only a detailed intra-village analysis is able to capture.
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Figure 1.1. Cumulative Distribution Function of Baseline Per-capita Consumption and Produc-
tivity
Note: The top figure plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of log per-capita consumption, measured at baseline, for households with access to credit from the program (62%)
and households who didn’t obtain credit from the program (38%) during the first two years of its implementation. The bottom figure plots a similar comparison for the CDF of log total
factor productivity. Both variables are centered with respect to the village mean in order to perform within village comparisons. Per-capita consumption is measured as the total per-capita
expenditure in consumption goods for the 12 months preceding the introduction of the program. Baseline total factor productivity is estimated using capital and labor elasticities corresponding
to a value-added production function estimated as in Ackerberg et al. (2015).
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Figure 1.2. Access to Credit and Connections with the Elites
Note: The figure depicts the probability of holding an outstanding loan from the the Village Fund program ((top panel) and the average gross stock of debt from the program (bottom panel) for
the 12 months preceding and following the implementation of the program. Each symbol denotes the mean for each category in a given month. The dotted line denotes the period preceding
the release of the program’s funds τv,t =−1. Village council member: .households in which at least one member is either the village head or on the village council during pre-program periods.
Connected to council members: households who reported having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey waves preceding the release of
the funds from the program. Unconnected: households without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Figure 1.3. Short-term Effects of on Credit From Informal Lenders
Note: The figure depicts OLS point estimates from a flexible difference-in-difference model following equation 1.6. Each dependent variable was regressed on household fixed effects, calendar
month and year fixed effects, an a set of indicators that denote time to treatment. Each dot represents the coefficient associated with each of these indicators. The base category corresponds
to the period preceding the first month of operation of the fund: τvt = −1. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the household level, to account for serial
correlation. Informal lenders include both relative and non-relative personal lenders.
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Figure 1.4. Short-term Effects on Credit From Relatives for Unconnected Households
Note: The figure depicts OLS point estimates from a flexible difference-in-difference model following equation 1.6. The left-hand panel presents estimates for loans from relatives, while the
right-hand panel shows estimates for loans from local non-relative lenders. Each dependent variable was regressed on household fixed effects, calendar month and year fixed effects, and a
set of indicators that denote time to treatment. Each dot represents the coefficient associated with each of these indicators. The base category corresponds to the period preceding the first
month of operation of the fund: τvt =−1. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the household level, to account for serial correlation. The estimating sample
includes only unconnected households.
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Figure 1.5. Short-term Effects on Non-program Institutional Credit (BAAC)
Note: The figure depicts OLS point estimates from a flexible difference-in-difference model following equation 1.6. The top panel reports coefficients for the probability of holding any
outstanding loan from the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). The bottom panel presents results for the stock of outstanding debt with BAAC. Each dependent
variable was regressed on household fixed effects, calendar month and year fixed effects, and a set of indicators that denote time to treatment. Each dot represents the coefficient associated
with each of these indicators. The base category corresponds to the period preceding the first month of operation of the fund: τvt = −1. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard
errors clustered at the household level, to account for serial correlation.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1. Program Participation, Poverty and Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log per-capita consumption (N=660)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Any MBVF loan 0.135** 0.218* 0.116** 0.108* 0.057 0.012
(0.056) (0.124) (0.049) (0.057) (0.068) (0.094)
Panel B: Total factor productivity (logs) (N=637)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Any MBVF loan -0.052 0.099** 0.050 -0.029 -0.152*** -0.083
(0.044) (0.048) (0.034) (0.048) (0.042) (0.068)
Panel C: Asset turnover (log revenues/assets) (N=666)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Any MBVF loan 0.182 0.645*** 0.287 0.027 -0.105 -0.081
(0.122) (0.179) (0.176) (0.115) (0.137) (0.128)
Panel D: Profitability margin (profits/revenues) (N=674)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Any MBVF loan -0.049** -0.076 -0.044 -0.055*** -0.032*** -0.009
(0.021) (0.046) (0.028) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006)
Panel E: Total factor productivity (logs)-only baseline data (N=637)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Any MBVF loan -0.001 0.117** 0.046 -0.005 -0.070* -0.036
(0.036) (0.051) (0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.067)
Panel F: Total factor productivity (logs)-Dynamic Panel (N=629)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Any MBVF loan -0.110* 0.141** 0.025 -0.093* -0.150 -0.277***
(0.065) (0.069) (0.045) (0.052) (0.092) (0.101)
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents within-village comparisons of program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Column (1) presents coefficients corresponding to regressions of baseline characteristics
on an indicator of whether a household obtained a loan from the program during the first two years following the program implementation in each village, and village fixed effects. Columns
(2)-(6) present results for equivalent quantile regressions. The bandwidth used for the estimation of quantile regressions was selected using Hall-Sheather’s method. Robust standard errors
are presented in parentheses. Panel A reports results for baseline per-capita consumption (in logs). Baseline per-capita consumption is measured as total expenditures during the 12 months
preceding the implementation of the program. Panel B reports results for baseline log total factor productivity estimates recovered using capital and labor elasticities corresponding to a
value-added production function estimated as in Ackerberg et al. (2015). Panel C presents results for baseline asset turnover ratio (in logs) computed as the average ratio of total revenues
over a calendar year divided by the average stock of fixed assets in each household, over the two calendar years preceding the program’s rollout (1999-2000). Panel D presents estimates
for baseline profitability margins measured as the average ratio of net revenues (net of costs of purchased inputs outside the household) to gross revenues in a given year. Panel E presents
results for baseline log total factor productivity estimates recovered using capital, labor elasticities corresponding to a model estimated using only pre-program data. Panel F presents results
for productivity computed using a dynamic panel estimation approach corresponding to a gross-revenue function.
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Table 1.2. Difference with Means-Testing Criterion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log per-capita consumption (N=311)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by MT 0.499*** 0.477*** 0.377*** 0.411*** 0.484*** 0.490***
(0.065) (0.156) (0.044) (0.074) (0.057) (0.094)
Panel B: Total factor productivity (logs) (N=309)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by MT -0.037 -0.108* -0.089** -0.039 -0.024 -0.012
(0.055) (0.065) (0.038) (0.065) (0.068) (0.094)
Panel C: Asset turnover (log revenues/assets) (N=327)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by MT -0.941*** -0.597* -0.785*** -1.161*** -1.074*** -1.193***
(0.186) (0.323) (0.166) (0.121) (0.146) (0.245)
Panel D: Profitability margin (profits/revenues) (N=329)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by MT -0.146*** -0.226*** -0.166*** -0.160*** -0.083*** -0.010
(0.039) (0.041) (0.045) (0.024) (0.026) (0.014)
Panel E: Total factor productivity (logs)-Revenue function dynamic panel (N=305)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by MT -0.233** -0.085 -0.075 -0.207*** -0.367*** -0.411***
(0.091) (0.085) (0.053) (0.060) (0.119) (0.079)
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents within village comparisons between households who obtained loans from the program during the first two years of its implementation but would have been excluded
according to a means-testing criterion and households who were excluded from the program but would have been offered a loan by a means-testing criterion. Column(1) presents coefficients
corresponding to regressions of baseline characteristics on an indicator of whether a household was reached by the Village Fund, but would have been excluded by a MT criterion, and village
fixed effects. The omitted category (comparison group) is comprised of the households who would have been included by MT but were excluded from the program. Columns (2)-(6) present
results for equivalent quantile regressions. The bandwidth used for the estimation was selected using Hall-Sheather’s method. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Panel A
reports results for baseline per-capita consumption (in logs). Baseline per-capita consumption is measured as total expenditures during the 12 months preceding the implementation of the
program. Panel B reports results for baseline log total factor productivity estimates recovered using capital and labor elasticities corresponding to a value-added production function estimated
as in Ackerberg et al. (2015). Panel C presents results for baseline asset turnover ratio (in logs) computed as the average ratio of total revenues over a calendar year divided by the average
stock of fixed assets in each household, over the two calendar years preceding the program’s rollout (1999-2000). Panel D presents estimates for baseline profitability margins measured as
the average ratio of net revenues (net of costs of purchased inputs outside the household) to gross revenues in a given year. Panel E presents results for baseline log total factor productivity
estimates recovered using capital, labor, and intermediate inputs elasticities corresponding to a gross-revenue function estimated using a dynamic panel estimation approach.
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Table 1.3. Differences with Credit-Scoring Criterion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log per-capita consumption (N=273)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by a credit score criterion 0.052 0.317 0.092 -0.083 -0.191** -0.341**
(0.103) (0.212) (0.076) (0.071) (0.086) (0.142)
Panel B: Total factor productivity (logs) (N=276)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by a credit score criterion -0.116* 0.070* 0.022 -0.138* -0.172*** -0.152***
(0.060) (0.039) (0.043) (0.075) (0.037) (0.050)
Panel C: Asset turnover (log revenues/assets) (N=285)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by a credit score criterion -0.021 0.127 -0.039 -0.230 -0.300* -0.318***
(0.176) (0.285) (0.193) (0.155) (0.153) (0.093)
Panel D: Profitability margin (profits/revenues) (N=290)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by a credit score criterion 0.016 0.024 -0.039 -0.004 -0.013* -0.009**
(0.030) (0.081) (0.036) (0.023) (0.006) (0.004)
Panel E: Total factor productivity (logs)- Revenue function dynamic panel (N=305)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Targeted by the program and excluded by a credit score criterion -0.164 0.202** 0.038 -0.117 -0.229* -0.522***
(0.100) (0.093) (0.090) (0.092) (0.137) (0.133)
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents within village comparisons between households who obtained loans from the program during the first two years of its implementation but would have been excluded
according to a credit score (CS) criterion and households who were excluded from the program but would have been offered a loan by a CS criterion. Column(1) presents coefficients
corresponding to regressions of baseline characteristics on an indicator of whether a household was reached by the Village Fund, but would have been excluded by a CS criterion, and village
fixed effects. The omitted category (comparison group) is comprised of the households who would have been included by CS but were excluded from the program. Columns (2)-(6) present
results for equivalent quantile regressions. The bandwidth used for the estimation was selected using Hall-Sheather’s method. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Panel A
reports results for baseline per-capita consumption (in logs). Baseline per-capita consumption is measured as total expenditures during the 12 months preceding the implementation of the
program. Panel B reports results for baseline log total factor productivity estimates recovered using capital and labor elasticities corresponding to a value-added production function estimated
as in Ackerberg et al. (2015). Panel C presents results for baseline asset turnover ratio (in logs) computed as the average ratio of total revenues over a calendar year divided by the average
stock of fixed assets in each household, over the two calendar years preceding the program’s rollout (1999-2000). Panel D presents estimates for baseline profitability margins measured as
the average ratio of net revenues (net of costs of purchased inputs outside the household) to gross revenues in a given year. Panel E presents results for baseline log total factor productivity
estimates recovered using capital, labor, and intermediate inputs elasticities corresponding to a gross-revenue function estimated using a dynamic panel estimation approach.
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Table 1.4. Access to Credit, Connections, and Borrower Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES DV: Household obtained at least one loan from the MBVF Any formal loan MT CS
Relationship with village council members
Connected through socioeconomic interactions 0.185*** 0.141*** 0.111** 0.097** 0.092* 0.085** 0.074 -0.009
(0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.038) (0.047) (0.045)
Village council member 0.164**
(0.070)
Directly connected to a council member (interactions) 0.079
(0.050)
First-degree relative of council member 0.061
(0.057)
Network centrality
Degree (# of links) 0.010*** 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.010*** -0.015*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Household demographic characteristics
Number of males (15-64) -0.054 -0.059* -0.065* -0.064* 0.026 -0.000 0.001
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.029) (0.034) (0.033)
Number of females (15-64) -0.053 -0.051 -0.077** -0.079** -0.019 0.035 0.054
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.028) (0.038) (0.039)
Number of household members 0.046*** 0.043** 0.045** 0.045** 0.017 0.004 -0.016
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Average years of schooling 0.023* 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.042*** -0.090*** 0.059***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Household head’s age -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005* -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Average age -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household head is a male 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.027 0.023 0.031 0.167***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.036) (0.046) (0.048)
Sources of revenue (share of total)
Wage labor 0.265** 0.210 0.164 0.151 0.262** 0.238 0.073
(0.128) (0.128) (0.142) (0.143) (0.118) (0.148) (0.147)
Family business 0.258** 0.225* 0.209 0.196 0.217* 0.005 0.038
(0.130) (0.130) (0.142) (0.142) (0.114) (0.149) (0.148)
Fishing/shrimping 0.427* 0.356 0.428* 0.410 0.503** -0.222 0.496*
(0.244) (0.244) (0.253) (0.251) (0.196) (0.240) (0.260)
Livestock 0.252* 0.176 0.174 0.177 0.431*** 0.106 0.446***
(0.142) (0.142) (0.155) (0.155) (0.130) (0.164) (0.159)
Agriculture 0.442*** 0.333* 0.258 0.254 0.549*** -0.168 -0.068
(0.167) (0.171) (0.185) (0.186) (0.151) (0.191) (0.186)
Credit history
Avg. baseline delinquency -1.008*** -1.040*** -1.009*** -1.001*** 0.206 0.096
(0.293) (0.304) (0.317) (0.312) (0.251) (0.211)
Avg. baseline income volatility 0.038* 0.029 0.039 0.037 0.052*** -0.062**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.026)
Pre-program access to institutional credit 0.182*** 0.152** 0.146** 0.016
(0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058)
Household productivity
Estimated household total factor productivity -0.088* -0.084* -0.092** 0.095* 0.030
(0.049) (0.049) (0.038) (0.049) (0.047)
Observations 649 649 616 616 587 587 587 587 608
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.39 0.23 0.19
Within R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.10
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: MT: Means testing. CS: Credit Score. The table presents within-village comparisons of the probability of obtaining a MBVF loan between connected households and unconnected
households under several specifications (Columns (1) to (3)). Column(1) presents OLS coefficients from cross-section regressions of an indicator of whether a household obtained a loan from
the program within two years of its implementation, controlling for village fixed effects. Column(2) controls for degree centrality in the socioeconomic network. Column(3) includes baseline
household characteristics and Column (4) controls for baseline access to credit and Column(5) includes estimated productivity. Column (6) replicates the approach in Column (3) breaking
down connections with the elite by type of connection. Columns(7) to (9) replicate the estimations for the probability of having held any institutional loan before the program (Column (7)),
the probability of being targeted by the means-testing criterion (Column (8)), and the probability of being targeted by the credit-score criterion (Column (9)). Baseline access to institutional
credit is an indicator of whether a household had any loan from either formal lenders or quasi-formal lenders. The delinquency rate is computed as the share of loans in which a household
held any delinquent payments, and is computed based on repay information regarding loans from all type of lenders, including loans from relatives and informal lenders. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Income volatility: log of the coefficient of variation of monthly income computed over all the survey waves preceding the program. Connected to council
members: households who reported having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey waves preceding the release of the funds from the
program. Unconnected households: households without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Table 1.5. Differences in Loan Outcomes by Connections with the Elites
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Table 1.6. Short-run Program Effects on Credit from Informal Lenders
Panel A: Any loan from informal lenders
Connected Unconnected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Any informal Relatives Non-relatives Any informal Relatives Non-relatives
Postvt -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 0.047** 0.051*** 0.002
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.022) (0.019) (0.012)
[0.796] [0.664] [0.824] [0.168] [0.020] [0.936]
Observations 13,212 13,212 13,212 6,948 6,948 6,948
R-squared 0.665 0.667 0.637 0.575 0.539 0.601
Baseline DV mean 0.150 0.0680 0.111 0.0815 0.0507 0.0498
Clusters 367 367 367 193 193 193
Panel B: Gross stock of debt with informal lenders
Connected Unconnected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any informal Relatives Non-relatives Any informal Relatives Non-relatives
Postvt 336.651* 124.218 240.688* 655.017*** 555.634*** 108.889
(195.463) (111.706) (141.390) (230.061) (204.585) (110.267)
[0.116] [0.196] [0.172] [0.120] [0.008] [0.816]
Observations 13,212 13,116 13,075 6,948 6,868 6,948
R-squared 0.672 0.669 0.702 0.607 0.604 0.597
Baseline DV mean 1540 554.8 998.5 865.2 398.1 472.3
Clusters 367 367 366 193 193 193
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on borrowing from informal lenders, by connectedness with the local elites.
Informal lenders include personal money lenders and relatives in the village. The reported coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the
resources from the program were released in village v in month t, controlling for household fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects ( see equation (1.7)). Estimations were
performed using all the available observations for the 18 months before and after the rollout of the program in each village. Panel A reports results for probability of holding a loan and Panel
B shows results for the gross stock of debt (winsorizing the top 1% of observations). Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible serial
correlation. P-values that account for potential within village correlation are presented in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for a reduced number of
clusters (16) as in Cameron and Miller (2015). Connected: households who reported having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey
waves preceding the release of the funds from the program. Unconnected: households without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Chapter 2
Dependence or Constraints? Cash Trans-
fers and Female Labor Supply
Abstract
In this paper I examine the extent to which cash-transfer programs may unintendedly
boost female employment. Using quasi-experimental variation in the eligibility for a conditional
cash transfer program in Bolivian public schools, I study the effects of the program on labor
supply for adults from households of eligible children. In a context of high pre-program school
attendance and massive gender disparities in adult labor-force participation, I find that the
program increased work hours by 8% in the case of adult females from households of eligible
children. Three pieces of evidence suggest this increase is explained by fixed costs to work and
limited access to institutional credit. First, estimating treatment effects along the distribution of
work hours, I find that effects are concentrated on the extensive margin of work. Second, using
cross-municipality variation in the pre-program number of branches of financial institutions,
I find that the effect is higher for adult females in municipalities with a lower number of per-
capita branches. Finally, the program stimulated entrance into self-employment. The results
suggest that in a context of fixed costs to work and limited access to credit, two characteristics of
developing countries, even small transfers can increase labor force participation.
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2.1 Introduction
Cash transfers are common tools for tackling poverty, both in developed and developing
countries. While these programs show welfare-increasing effects in many dimensions (Fiszbein
et al., 2009), a main concern is whether these types of programs can have negative effects on labor
supply and create dependence, leading to a trade-off between immediate poverty alleviation and
long-term poverty reduction. Studies from cash welfare programs in developed countries suggest
that there is a negative effect on labor supply (Hoynes (1996) and Hoynes and Schanzenbach
(2012)), consistent with a neoclassical model of labor supply. However, the literature analyzing
the effects of cash transfer programs on labor supply in developing countries systematically fails
to find significant treatment effects (Skoufias and Maro (2008), Alzua et al. (2013), Banerjee et al.
(2015) and, de Brauw et al. (2015)). Moreover, recent evidence on unconditional cash transfers
to groups of young potential entrepreneurs finds increases in work hours due to the program
Blattman et al. (2014). Understanding which features of the process of development explain the
divergence in results will reconcile the empirical evidence and shed light on the salience of the
poverty alleviation-dependence trade-off.
This paper uses the staggered timing and eligibility criteria of a conditional cash transfer
program (CCT) in Bolivia to estimate the causal impact of a positive income shock on adults’
labor supply through a difference-in-difference approach. The program provided 200 Bolivianos
(approximately 25 U.S. dollars) per year to children in Bolivian public schools conditional on
80% attendance during the school year. Using 8 years of Bolivian household surveys, I construct
a pooled cross-section dataset of children in public schools in Bolivia1. Exploiting the variation
in eligibility across school grades and the rollout of the program, I compare changes in work
outcomes before and after introduction of the program for adults whose children were enrolled in
eligible grades with changes in work outcomes for adults whose children were not beneficiaries
of the program.
1This represents 90% of children enrolled in school during the year preceding the program.
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I find that the program increased the probability of working by 4 percentage points and
increased work hours by 2.5 units for adult females (heads of households or their spouses). These
effects are small; they represent increases of 6% and 9% with respect to the baseline mean2,
respectively. I find that 90% of this effect comes from adult females whose children were likely
to attend to school even in the absence of the program and were not affected by the condition
component of the program. This result suggests that a shift in the budget set induced by an
income shock dominates potential increases in the availability of time induced by the condition
component of the CCT3. The results are robust to a variety of specifications and are consistent
with an economy characterized by a large, stagnant gender gap in employment4
To understand why these apparently unusual positive elasticities appear in the context of
a developing country, I outline a simple theoretical framework which predicts the result found
in my empirical approach and derive additional predictions which I then take to the data. I
do so by drawing on a traditional idea behind the process of development: “in a context of
capital markets imperfections, economic performance, either prosperity or stagnation, depends
on the initial wealth distribution” (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). I sketch a stylized model for
labor force participation that includes heterogeneous fixed costs to enter the labor force and
frictions in credit markets5. In this environment, there is selection into employment based on
the initial household wealth; fixed costs generate the need for funds and credit market frictions
create difficulties in getting these funds. As a result, households have lower consumption levels
because they can’t work and they can’t work because they are too poor–a poverty trap. The main
empirical implication of this model is that an income shock can push people into the labor force,
at least for agents who are close to being able to cover their fixed costs.
2The effects on work hours represent 6% of the baseline mean, conditional on working.
3These results also complement existing evidence regarding the role of the condition component (Baird et al.
(2011), Benhassine et al. (2015),Filmer and Schady (2011),de Brauw and Hoddinott (2011)).
4In Bolivia, for every 10 male household heads who work, there are only 7 female household heads or spouses
of household heads working. This gap has remained constant over the last decade, according to data from Bolivian
household surveys.
5I allow these frictions to arise either due to high intermediation costs that result in higher borrowing rates, or
simply through constraints in the maximum amount each household can borrow.
59
To test the importance of these two features of the process of development, I derive two
additional predictions from the model and take them to the data. First, because of the fixed costs
to enter the labor force, the effects of the income shock should affect the decision to enter the
labor force but should not affect the intensive margin of labor supply. Estimating treatment
effects along the cumulative density function of weekly work hours, I find that the effects on
labor supply come from the extensive margin rather than the intensive margin, supporting the
fixed-costs hypothesis. Moreover, if the fixed costs are salient, then the results should come from
activities that require a fixed cost to work. I find that the effect on employment comes from
people shifting from unemployment to self-employment. Second, the effects of an income shock
should be stronger when capital market frictions are more salient. Using baseline data for the
supply of financial services at the municipality level as a third difference, and controlling for
potential treatment effect heterogeneity across urban and rural areas, I find that the effects on
labor supply are higher for women from more credit-constrained areas.
Why would agents respond to positive income shocks by increasing labor supply? The
evidence provided in this study shows that two particular features of the process of development–
fixed costs to work and imperfections in credit markets–explain why the labor supply responds
differently to income shocks in developed countries than in developing countries: In developed
countries, capital market frictions and labor market frictions are smaller and households behave
as in the neoclassical model. In developing countries, households live in an environment of
liquidity constraints and fixed costs, and this explains why dependence on cash transfers might
be less likely. Moreover, if the process of development is about occupational choice, the evidence
in this study suggests that escaping involuntary unemployment is the first step in this process.
To understand the extent to which other mechanisms could lead to the same empirical
results, I compare the empirical evidence and the implications of the theoretical framework
with compelling alternative explanations in this context. In particular, I discuss two relevant
mechanisms: relaxed time constraints and aggregate demand changes due to the program. First,
I analyze whether increases in labor supply may be driven by a relief in the mother’s time
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constraints by the program. Since the program provides resources conditional on attendance at
school, it might be the case that the observed treatment effects arise because mothers simply
reallocate time from child care to productive activities. Three facts rule out that mechanism.
First, the program was implemented in a baseline context of high attendance and enrollment and
low dropout rates 6. Moreover, this mechanism would imply that the treatment effects should
come from adults whose children are more likely to be affected by the condition component
(marginal children). I find that the responses in labor supply are driven primarily by mothers of
children who would have attended school even in the absence of the program. Finally, consistent
with the latter facts, I find no evidence of effects of the program on enrollment nor on child labor.
Another possible explanation for the positive effects on labor supply could arise from
shifts in aggregate demand at the local (municipality) level 7. Although the transfers were small,
the program reached a large share of the households with school-age children. This cash inflow
could modify the business environment, favoring self-employment, or it could increase wages,
thereby inducing households to work. Two arguments rule out this potential mechanism. First, if
local demand were driving the results, the treatment effects should be a function of the ability of
households to take advantage of the new context, and therefore the treatment effects should be
higher for households in areas that have better access to credit; I find the opposite. Second, in this
study, treatment effects are identified from individual variation within clusters (municipalities)
since entry into treatment is orthogonal to locations and is a function of individual characteristics
only (years of schooling for children of school age). This design provides a way of replicating the
natural experiment in each cluster; if either the economic conditions changed or wages increased,
they did so similarly for treatment and control groups.
6Reports from the Ministry of Education (Zambrana et al., 2004) show that before the program was implemented,
the national attendance rate was above 80%, enrollment was above 90% and the dropout rate was below 10%.
7One particular challenge in interpreting the reduced form treatment effects from large-scale cash transfer
programs is the presence of general equilibrium effects that are confounded with direct income shocks on treatment
units (Acemoglu, 2010). Studies such as (Kaboski and Townsend, 2012) and (Muralidharan et al., 2017) analyzing
large-scale programs that imply a significant injection of liquidity into the local economy find evidence of general
equilibrium effects manifested through wages, in the case of micro-credit in Thailand and a reduction in leakage of
resources from a workfare program in India, respectively.
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This paper reconciles evidence regarding labor supply responses to income shocks from
developed and developing countries using a basic idea: the interaction of frictions in labor and
credit markets, which is core to development economics (Banerjee and Newman, 1993) (Lewis,
1954) (Gollin, 2014). The evidence provided by this study contributes to four strands of the liter-
ature. First, it provides novel evidence regarding positive income-elasticities of work outcomes,
suggesting that a trade-off between short-run poverty alleviation and dependence may not be
salient in developing economies (Banerjee et al. (2015),Skoufias and Maro (2008),de Brauw
et al. (2015), Alzua et al. (2013) and Fiszbein et al. (2009)), suggesting a win-win scenario
for long-run poverty alleviation consistent with Gertler et al. (2012). In particular this paper
complements evidence and key insights from Blattman et al. (2014) who also find positive effects
on work hours after a randomly assigned cash grant to groups of young entrepreneurs in Uganda.
Although the fixed-costs and credit-constraints hypotheses are discussed in that paper, because
the study focuses on a particular sample of credit-constrained beneficiaries there is little variation
in the sample to test empirically for treatment-effect heterogeneity in that dimension. In this
paper I exploit a large-scale nationwide program that captures enough regional variation in credit
market imperfections.
Second, the theoretical framework proposed and tested in this paper and the design of
the program provide insights for understanding why other studies were not able to find positive
responses. Successful, emblematic CCT programs are means-tested and therefore affect a
particularly disadvantaged share of the population. If the households that can take advantage of
the income shock are only those who are close to covering their fixed costs, as the theoretical
framework suggests, programs that focus exclusively on the most disadvantaged agents will fail
to capture agents who would potentially use the extra resources as a tool to escape involuntary
unemployment. The Bolivian program studied in this paper is not means-tested and reaches
around 90% of school-age children, capturing the entire distribution of fixed costs and credit
constraints and providing the empirical approach with enough power to capture positive responses
in labor supply due to the program.
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Third, through having an empirical design that minimizes the role of changes in local de-
mand as drivers of the effects on labor supply8, this paper focuses on household-level shocks and
is related to recent literature providing evidence of the salience of micro-level rather than macro
poverty traps(Kraay and McKenzie, 2014). Recent literature regarding low-cost interventions
aiming to break these vicious circles focuses on the role of reducing fixed costs that generate
low uptake of profitable investments (Bryan et al. (2014),de Mel et al. (2008), Field (2007) and
Cascio (2009)). This paper identifies a complementary comparative statics exercise; instead of
reducing fixed costs, it modifies non-labor wealth, reducing the salience of these fixed costs. The
evidence suggests that when fixed costs are heterogeneous and hard for policy makers to identify,
as is most likely the case for large-scale anti-poverty programs, cash transfers are a powerful
option that complements other interventions aimed at reducing fixed costs.
Finally, the results complement evidence regarding the importance of credit constraints
and capital markets in developing countries. Interventions that attempt to expand credit markets
have delivered modest results overall Banerjee et al. (2015), however the results of this program
suggest that these interventions can be effectively complemented by small grants in areas that
are subject to high intermediation costs that result in credit market frictions.
2.2 The setting
The Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP) program was first announced in October 2006. The
program provided a cash transfer (CCT) of 200 bolivianos (approximately 25 U.S. dollars)
conditional on 80% school attendance for every child enrolled in public school.9 As opposed
to most programs in the region, this program was not means-tested and the eligibility criterion
was based on the grade the child was enrolled in, regardless of their socioeconomic status. This
8The design of the program is different from previous experimental evidence from emblematic programs in
which random assignment of CCTs is conducted at the cluster level, such as Shultz (2004) in the case of PROGRESA
or the studies reviewed by Banerjee et al. (2015), and contributes to the literature with elasticities coming exclusively
from increases in the budget sets.
9In the baseline year, this accounts for 90% of children enrolled in either private or public schools.
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transfer represents around one-third of the monthly minimum wage for the baseline year, 4% of
average per capita yearly consumption, around 53% of the yearly per capita education spending
in urban areas and more than 100% in rural areas.10 As of 2005, the school enrollment rate was
already high, at 90%. Moreover, dropout and non-passing rates were below 10% before the
program was implemented11
In the first stage, the potential beneficiaries were children enrolled in first to fifth grades;
children who met the attendance threshold and fulfilled additional documentation requirements
received the transfer at the end of the school year (November).12 The resources were disbursed
by personnel from the Armed Forces in each school, leaving very little room for leakage or
implementation failures.13 In October 2007, the program was extended to children in sixth grade,
again with disbursement of the funds at the end of the school year. The set of beneficiaries was
expanded to children in seventh and eighth grades in July 2008, but the disbursement schedule
was changed to two payments in July and November 2008. Although the funds were disbursed
in two payments, the total amount given to each student did not change.
The program was implemented in a context in which employment for adult females
is significantly lower than that of males. Figure 2.1 shows that for male household heads or
male spouses of household heads, the share of individuals that report having worked, performed
remunerated activities or tasks for a family business during the week preceding the data collection
date is around 95%. On the other hand, the ratio is around 70% for female household heads
or female spouses of household heads. Two main lessons are suggested by these results. First,
the high employment rates for males suggest that job opportunities exists in this economy.
Second, despite job availability, the broad gender gap in employment suggests that women face
constraints to entering the labor force. This feature of the Bolivian economy motivates the main
10Source: Own calculations based on Household Surveys (2005-06) from the National Bureau of Statistics (INE).
11Source: Ministry of Education, see Zambrana et al. (2004).
12A birth certificate or ID were required; in addition, children had to be accompanied by a parent or guardian to
receive the money, generally the mother. After the second round of the program, children who did not possess a
birth certificate or an ID could receive the money if they presented two witnesses who testified to their identity.
13Self-reported data from national household surveys show that 90% of eligible children report receiving the
transfer during the first year of implementation
64
question of this paper: Can income shocks mitigate some constraints agents face when deciding
whether to work?
2.3 Data
The data for this study come from national household surveys conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics (INE) for the years 2002-2009. I constructed a pooled cross-section data set
based on 8 waves of household surveys. These surveys are independent cross-section samples of
individuals drawn from a common sample frame based on the 2001 population census. Surveys
for the years 2002 and 2005 to 2009 were conducted between late November and December of
each year. The 2003-2004 survey is a continuous survey applied to different households in two
rounds: November 2003-April 2004 (2003 round) and May-October 2004 (2004 round).
In this study, I use a sample of children between 7 and 17 years old who have completed at
most eighth grade and who do not report being enrolled in a private school; the sample accounts
for 90% of the children of school age. For each child, I compute information regarding the adults
living in each child’s household and labor market variables for the head of household and the
head of household’s spouse. I focus on household heads and heads’ spouses as, on average,
they represent most of each household’s income. I use two main measures of employment: The
first is an indicator of whether the interviewee reports having worked or performed remunerated
activities or tasks for a family business during the week preceding the survey. The second
measure refers to the average hours worked per week. To construct this measure I use self-
reported information regarding the average number of hours worked per day and the number of
days worked in the week preceding the interview. In the case of unemployed people, the number
of hours is 0. I focus on these two measures as they are the standard measures used in studies
analyzing responses of labor supply to cash transfers in developing countries such as (Alzua et al.
(2013) and Banerjee et al. (2015)).
I complement this dataset with information regarding the number of branches of financial
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institutions and population at the municipality level. Information regarding the number of
branches of financial institutions comes from the national regulator, the Authority of Supervision
for Financial Institutions (ASFI), and only covers municipalities that are also provincial capitals
(112 of 339 municipalities), which account for two-thirds of the observations in my sample.
Population data come from the 2001 National Population Census conducted by INE. Summary
statistics for 2005, the year preceding the implementation of the program, are presented in Table
3.1.
2.4 Identification strategy
I take advantage of the design of the BJP program to estimate its causal effects on adult
employment. I use the staggered timing and eligibility criteria of the program as the identifying
sources of variation. Although the program was implemented in all regions of the country at the
same time, children were included as beneficiaries of the program gradually, based on years of
schooling. Thus, the design provides variation over time and across individuals in a given year,
suggesting a difference-in-difference approach. The program’s design is presented in Table 2.1.
In order to identify the causal effects of the program on work measures, I use the timing
of the program’s announcements, which is arguably exogenous to households’ decisions, as
a first source of variation. The program includes the entire public-school system. Recall that
the program was first announced in October 2006, while two expansions were announced later,
in October 2007 and July 2008. These dynamics are represented in the columns of Table 2.1
14. Cash was disbursed at the end of the 2006 and 2007 school years (November) and in two
payments in July and November of 2008.
Second, the design of the program provides cross-sectional variation at each year based
on the program’s eligibility criterion. This variation is summarized in the columns from Table
2.1. In the first round of the program, children from first to fifth grade were eligible (children
14The program was first announced in the first year of the administration elected in November 2005, which
suggests that the announcement was unexpected with respect to the set of information the population had in 2005.
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Table 2.1. Program Design
Years of Schooling 2002-2005 2006 2007 ≥2008
1 C T T T
2 C T T T
3 C T T T
4 C T T T
5 C T T T
6 C C T T
7 C C C T
8 C C C T
>8 C C C C
Note: Columns report the year in which the information was collected. Rows report the grades in which
children can be enrolled. The entries in the table represent the treatment status of each group at each
moment in time. “C” denotes groups that belong to the control group in a particular year, that is, groups
that are not beneficiaries of the program at that moment in time. “T” denotes groups that belong to the
treatment group in a given year; that is, children who, given their years of schooling (grades completed)
are treated or not in a particular year. Bold letters denote the groups that are included in the main analysis
in this study.
with 1 to 5 years of schooling in the sample15), thus they constitute the treatment group for the
first round (2006). The control group are children from sixth to eighth grade (6 to 8 years of
schooling). Due to the program’s expansion, in the second round children in sixth grade enter
the treatment group and in the third round, children in seventh and eighth grades are added to
the treatment group. These variations suggest a difference-in-difference approach that compares
changes over time in the employment rates for parents of children in the treatment group before
and after the program with changes over time in the employment rates for parents of children in
the control group before and after the program.
In Section 2.8, I discuss two potential problems with my empirical approach. First, as
younger children are more likely to induce different opportunity costs for parents’ time than older
children, I restrict the sample used in the main analysis to children between fourth and eighth
grade. This sample selection is represented in bold letters in the entries in Table 2.1. Results
using the whole sample (first-eighth grade) are presented in Appendix Table 9; these results
15For this study, preschool is not considered in the computation of years of schooling.
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do not differ from the main results of the paper. Second, the units of observation are children
as treatment assignment is at that level. However, note that among the sample of students, it
is possible that some treatment children have siblings in the control group; this implies a 40%
reduction of the sample and therefore a loss of statistical power. I present the results for the entire
sample, acknowledging that my estimates are likely to represent a lower bound. In Appendix
Table B.3 I indeed show that the estimates are higher but noisier once I exclude children whose
siblings are in a different treatment group.
2.5 Labor supply responses and the CCT program
In this section I provide evidence of positive treatment effects of the program on female
employment through an event-study approach and a difference-in-difference approach. I interpret
the result from both approaches as reduced form effects (intention-to-treat effects). Figure 2.2
shows cash reception rates after the program announcement. Compliance is high in this context
for all the policy years.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that there was an increase in the total number of hours/week
dedicated to work by adults right after their children entered the treatment group. A similar
pattern is observed for the total number of adults who report working during the week before
the interview. Figure 2.5 shows that the hours dedicated to work and the proportion of adult
females (heads of household or spouses) who report working during the week preceding the
interview jump abruptly during the first period in which their children enter the treatment group.
Work outcomes for adult males (heads of household or spouses) exhibit a smooth trajectory
over time. These results suggest that there were increases in work outcomes for adult females
as a consequence of the program. To test this hypothesis more rigorously, I estimate a flexible
difference-in-difference model using the following specification:
Yismt = α0+µm+δt +θs+
j=−2
∑
j=−6
β j1[τst = j]+
k=4
∑
k=0
βk1[τst = k]+ εismt (2.1)
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Yismt represents the work outcome of interest for the head of household or head’s spouse
from child i’s household. θs denotes child i’s years of schooling fixed effects, µm denotes
municipality fixed effects and δt denotes year fixed effects. Time to treatment is denoted by τst .
The omitted category is τst =−1 which denotes the year before a child with s years of schooling
enters the treatment group. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 plot the point estimates for β j and their respective confidence intervals
for work outcomes. Again, Figure 2.7 shows that there is a significant jump in the hours/week
worked and employment status for adult females.
To assess the validity of the common trends assumption, I test two null hypotheses. First,
I test whether the sum of the difference-in-difference coefficients β j for the periods preceding the
program is different than zero. Panel A in Table 2.3 shows that it is not possible to reject the null
hypothesis of β−6+ ...+β−2 = 0 for all the work outcomes. Complementarily, Panel B in Table
2.3 shows that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that all the difference-in-difference
coefficients for periods preceding the program are jointly zero (β−6 = ...= β−2 = 0).
To capture the average impact of the program for all the periods following the intervention
and to increase statistical power, I estimate treatment effects following a standard difference-in-
difference approach:
Yismt = α0+µm+δt +θs+βTst +Xismtγ+ εismt (2.2)
Again Yismt denotes the outcome of interest. Tst is an indicator that takes the value of 1
for the periods in which children with s years of schooling enter the treatment group (i.e.τst ≥ 0).
Table 2.4 presents treatment effects for working outcomes; the results are robust even
after including group-specific linear time trends. Considering suggestive evidence of differential
shocks between the treatment and control group in period τst =−5, depicted in Figures 2.6 and
2.7), it is important to know that if anything these pre-trends bias the estimates towards zero.
69
Two results are worth considering: first, there is no evidence of negative effects on work
outcomes. In most specifications it is possible to reject the null of negative treatment effects
β < 0 at 10%. In the case of work outcomes for adult males, the point estimates are precisely
estimated zeros. These results confirm evidence from previous studies of CCT programs (Alzua
et al. (2013), Banerjee et al. (2015) and Skoufias and Maro (2008)).
More importantly, there is evidence of positive treatment effects for females both at the
extensive and intensive margins. I find that the program increases the number of hours/week
that female household heads report by 2.5 units and it induces an increase of 4 percentage
points in the probability of being employed for female heads. These effects represent 9% of the
baseline mean in the case of work hours (6% conditional on working) and 6% in the case of
employment. The effects are small, and consistent with a small income shock induced by the
CCT program. These results are also consistent with previous evidence found by Alzua et al.
(2013) and Skoufias and Maro (2008) in the context of the PROGRESA program in Mexico for
work hours for females. The results also complement suggestive evidence of positive effects on
employment from the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil (de Brauw et al., 2015)16. Consistent
with a context in which there is a large, stagnant gender gap in employment, the positive effect
of the cash transfer program manifests in the most disadvantaged population: adult females who
are household heads or heads’ spouses.
2.5.1 Cash or condition?
To have a better understanding of the nature of the shock and analyze the extent to which
the increase in labor supply was driven by either the cash or condition component of the program,
I test for heterogeneity in treatment effects based on how binding the condition component of
the program was. Understanding which feature of the program induced the treatment effects
observed in the previous section will shed light on the interpretation of the program as either an
16de Brauw et al. (2015) use a propensity score re-weighting approach that relies on selection on observable
characteristics. The empirical approach in this study contributes with novel evidence from a natural experiment.
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income shock (cash) or a relief of adult females’ time constraint (condition). Evidence regarding
the role of condition in CCT programs is mixed: de Brauw and Hoddinott (2011) and Filmer and
Schady (2011) provide evidence of a stronger role of the condition component of these programs.
Yet Baird et al. (2011) show that even an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) can induce changes
in behavior in the direction intended by the condition component of CCT programs; Benhassine
et al. (2015) show that simply labeling a UCT as a CCT is enough to encourage the intended
behavior. In order to provide a deeper understanding of the type of shock induced by the program,
I test whether the impact comes from parents of children for whom the condition component was
binding or from parents of children who didn’t modify behavior in order to receive the transfer.
The condition component of the program required that children attend 80% of school
days during the school year in order to receive the transfer. To test whether the treatment effect
comes from marginal or inframarginal agents, it would be ideal to compute treatment effects for
children whose baseline attendance rate is below 80% (marginal agents) and for those whose
baseline attendance rate is above 80%. Since the dataset in this study does not follow children
over time, I do not observe the attendance rate in the absence of the program or at baseline.
Nevertheless, I use the 2004 round of the household surveys, a baseline year, to estimate a probit
model for attendance using demographic characteristics. I then use the coefficients to predict
the 2004 attendance rate for all the children in the study sample 17.I interpret this predicted
attendance rate as the average attendance rate a child would have, had the child been observed in
the 2004 sample; this is a counterfactual baseline attendance rate.
The 2004 round of the survey is particularly useful for two reasons. First, the information
was collected during the months of May to November of 2004, covering most of the school
year. In other years, the household survey data was collected in December, once the school year
had ended. Since the period of reference in the surveys is the week before the survey interview,
17The probit model was estimated using a full set of dummy variables regarding age and years of schooling;
household indicators, including indicators for whether the household is located in a rural or urban area, the number
of people in the household, and whether the head of household is male; children’s characteristics such as gender; and
indicators for speaking Spanish as a first language and whether the survey respondent self-identified as indigenous.
Appendix Figure B.4 shows that the model has good out-of-sample prediction power across all the age categories.
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most interviewees respond that children didn’t attend school because of summer vacation.18.
However, this is not the case in the 2004 wave as it covers a period that coincides with the school
year. Second, the 2004 wave provides information regarding school attendance based on several
months rather than just a single month as opposed to the rest of the surveys. As the sample
is random, for each child interviewed in month m of the 2004 wave, there is another similar
child interviewed in the upcoming months; this means that this attendance rate also captures
variation across months within the school year. Figure 2.8 depicts the distribution of the baseline
counterfactual attendance rate. Note that around 80% of the sample corresponds to children with
an attendance rate above the condition.
Table 2.6 reports triple differences estimates using the predicted baseline attendance rate
as a third difference (columns (1) and (4)). I interpret this third difference as a measure of the
salience of the condition component in the program. For children with a low baseline attendance
rate, the shock induced by the program is interpreted as a mix between cash and condition; for
children with a high baseline attendance rate, the shock induced by the program is interpreted as
a pure income shock as these children would have attended school in the absence of the program.
The results suggest that the treatment effects on work outcomes are an increasing function of
the baseline attendance rate. The treatment effects evaluated at the 90th percentile of attendance
rate are 3.4 hours (p-value=0.002) and 0.05 percentage points (p-value=0.001) for hours and the
probability of work respectively. Estimates at the 10th percentile are very small and statistically
not different from zero in both cases (see bottom panel of Table 2.6).
To test this hypothesis with higher power, I estimate a triple-difference model using an
indicator of whether child i’s attendance rate is below the condition threshold (0.8, see columns
(2) and (5)) and whether child i’s attendance rate is below the median (columns (3) and (6)).
Results show that work outcomes for adults related to inframarginal children are higher. The
effects for marginal children are even null in the case of hours/week and not significant in the
case of employment. In general, the positive impact on employment for adult females related to
18For those children not on vacation, the average attendance rate is 98%.
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inframarginal children accounts for 90% of the overall treatment effect computed in Table 2.4.
This result is not surprising as schooling outcomes were already high before the program was
implemented. Moreover, the announcements of the implementation and expansion of the program
were made once the school year was close to its end; for example, the first announcement was
made in October 2006, a month before the school year was over, leaving reduced scope for
behavior adjustment in order to meet the conditions. Appendix Table B.4 shows that there
were no overall effects on employment for children and small effects on enrollment that vanish
once I allow for group-specific trends. All together, the evidence suggests that the effects of the
program on labor supply come mostly from an income shock.
2.6 Dependence or constraints?
The results from the preceding sections contradict evidence from developed countries
showing small negative responses in labor supply after exposure to cash welfare programs
(Hoynes (1996) and Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012)) and are consistent with evidence from
developing countries that fails to find negative effects of cash transfer on adults’ labor supply
(Alzua et al. (2013),Banerjee et al. (2015)). In this section, I outline a simple framework that
unifies these divergent results. I do so by referring to a traditional idea behind the process of
development: In a context of imperfections in capital markets, economic performance (either
prosperity or stagnation) depends on the initial wealth distribution (Banerjee and Newman, 1993).
I sketch a stylized model for labor force participation that includes fixed costs to enter the labor
force and frictions in capital markets. In this environment, there is selection into employment
based on initial wealth. The model suggests three testable implications: i) an income shock can
push people into the labor force, consistent with the evidence presented in the previous section;
ii) the effects of an income shock should be bigger when capital market frictions are more salient;
and, iii) the effects of an income shock should affect the decision to work and not the intensive
margin of labor supply.
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Consider a household composed of one individual deriving utility u from consumption
ci. For simplicity, let the utility function be u(c) = ci. The household is endowed with initial
wealth vi and allocates hours of labor inelastically to the only possible job always available in
this economy, receiving earnings equal to w. There is a cost pi of entering the labor force. The
timing is as follows: In period t = 0 the household decides whether to cover the fixed cost using
its initial wealth vi or borrowing ai, using funds available in complete financial markets at a
zero real interest rate. In period t = 1, conditional on its decision in period t = 0, the household
maximizes utility subject to its budget constraint. I assume that if a household decides to cover
the fixed cost, the household finds a job instantaneously. For example, this can be the case
of self-employment. Let λi ∈ {0,1} denote the decision of investing in the fixed cost. If the
household decides to invest, then λi = 1; if the household doesn’t invest then λi = 0; in the latter
case, the household member stays outside the labor force.
This framework is consistent with several fixed costs or frictions discussed in the devel-
opment economics literature and tries to capture heterogeneity in fixed costs over households.
In some cases pi can be the market value of the minimum caloric intake necessary to conduct
a task and be chosen by employers as in Dasgupta and Ray (1986). Alternatively, pi could
represent the cost of attaining the minimum consumption of comfort goods that are necessary
for women to focus on working rather than exclusively on household chores as in Banerjee and
Mullainathan (2008). Alternatively, pi could represent the cost of sending children to preschool
and therefore free up time to be allocated to labor (Cascio, 2009). In contexts of high salience of
self-employment, pi could represent the value of capital necessary for agriculture or a family
business as in de Mel et al. (2008) or Blattman et al. (2014). Fixed costs can also be present
outside self-employment; pi could represent the price of a bus ticket in the context of seasonal
migration (Bryan et al., 2014). Fixed costs can be nonpecuniary: pi could represent the cost of
paperwork to obtain land/house titles, as the absence of title could result in lack of labor force
participation (Field, 2007).
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The household maximizes:
max
c,a,λ
u(ci) = ci
s. t.
ci = w−ai if λ = 1 and t = 1
ci = vi if λ = 0 and t = 1
vi+ai = pi if t = 0
ci ≥ 0
Using backward induction, the household will decide to invest in the fixed cost and
therefore work if and only if w ≥ pi. In this setting, even with frictions in the labor market,
working decisions do not depend on initial wealth. Note, however, that with heterogeneity in
fixed costs, households that face higher fixed costs will only work if wages are high enough to
make it profitable. For instance, in an economy with higher fixed costs for females, there would
be a higher employment rate for males at the same market wage. This is consistent with the
Bolivian gender gap in employment as discussed in Section 2.2 (see Figure 2.1).
Consider now an environment in which there are intermediation costs for the lender that
lead to a risk premium over the interest rate that the household head would earn when depositing
her money in a savings account or investing in a risk-free asset. Denote this premium as r. Note
that now the household can either decide to self-finance the fixed cost and invest the remaining
funds in a zero-real-interest-rate, riskless asset or borrow some money from either a bank or an
informal lender at rate r > 0. There are no exogenous credit constraints in this economy but
there is a spread between lending and saving interest rates that reflects potential frictions in the
credit market. In period t = 0 the household faces the same budget constraint but depending on
whether ai > 0 or not, the household member will face different budget constraints in period
t = 1.
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ci = w−ai(1+ r) if λi = 1 , t = 1 and ai > 0
ci = w− (vi− pi) if λi = 1 , t = 1 and ai ≤ 0
ci = vi if λi = 0 and t = 1
vi+a = pi if t = 0
Suppose household i faces fixed costs pi < w and is endowed with an initial wealth
vi ≥ pi. As borrowing and self-financing are perfect substitutes, this household picks the least
expensive option: self-financing. On the other hand, if vi < p the household can only cover the
fixed cost by borrowing at rate r in an amount equal to ai = pi− vi. Consider now a household
with a high initial wealth vH such that vH ≥ p˜. This household enters the labor force if and
only if w≥ p˜. Thus, this household lives in a context where financial market frictions are not
salient. However, the story is different for a household facing the same wages (w) and fixed
costs (p˜) but with low initial wealth vL such that vL < p˜. In order to work, this household has to
finance the fixed cost by borrowing at a rate r. This means that this household will only work if
w≥ p˜+(p˜− vL)r.
Let w¯H = p˜ and w¯L = p˜+ (p˜− vL)r denote the reservation wage corresponding to
households with high and low income, respectively. Since p˜− vL > 0, we have that w¯L > w¯H .
This means that households with lower wealth need a higher market wage in order to decide to
work. This difference arises because of the interaction of frictions in the labor market (fixed
costs p) and frictions in the financial market r > 0. In this case poor households have low
consumption levels because they can’t work, and they can’t work because they are simply too
poor. Minimal assumptions were needed to generate the possibility of a poverty trap: as in
Banerjee and Newman (1993), economic performance, either prosperity or stagnation, depends
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on where in the distribution of initial wealth a household is located. In this environment, there
are three testable predictions from the model.
Prediction 1: A positive income shock can increase the probability of working. Con-
sider a shock εi such that εi ≥ pi− vL. This income shock pushes the new income v′i = vL+ εi
above the fixed cost. In this case, poor agents can self-finance its entrance to the work force and
will work as long as the market wage w is greater than the fixed cost. This income shock pushes
the household from an equilibrium of involuntary unemployment to one with employment. This
prediction is consistent with the results found in Section 2.5: An income shock can push people
into the labor force. However, note that this effect has a local nature as only the households
for whom the income shock is large enough to cover the gap between their fixed costs and
wealth endowments will be pushed into the labor force (individuals at the margin); less fortunate
households will face binding constraints even after the shock.
Heterogeneity in wealth and fixed costs could explain some stylized facts in the empirical
literature on CCTs. Emblematic CCT programs aim to help the most disadvantaged part of the
population. In particular, means-testing or proxy-means-testing mechanisms are popular targeting
tools.19To the extent that these programs effectively target the least advantaged population (i.e.,
the ones with higher pi− vi) it could be the case that studies of the impact of CCT programs
on labor supply fail to find effects on employment as, given an income shock, the gap between
wealth and fixed costs is simply too large. In this study, eligibility for the program is fairly
orthogonal to wealth and fixed costs as its design does not involve a means-tested targeting
mechanism; therefore the evaluation captures the entire distribution of pi− vi.
Prediction 2: The effect of an income shock εi should be higher when there are
borrowing constraints. Consider the case of a household with non-labor income vL such that
vL < pi. This household would borrow from the bank or informal lender if w¯L = pi+(pi− vL)r.
Let a¯ > 0 denote the maximum amount a household can get from the informal lender. This
19Fiszbein et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive summary of targeting mechanisms for CCT programs. Large-
scale programs such as PROGRESA and BOLSA FAMILIA follow this approach.
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household solves:
max
c,a,λ
u(c) = ci
s. t.
ci = w−ai(1+ r) if λ = 1 , t = 1
ci = vL if λ = 0 and t = 1
vL+ai = pi if t = 0
a≤ a¯i
c≤ 0
In the interior solution, when the credit constraint is not binding, this household uses
the same decision rule as in the unconstrained case and there is still selection into employment
arising from the interaction of fixed costs and other frictions in capital markets. Moreover, when
credit constraints bind, although it is profitable to work, the household member won’t be able
to work because of her inability to cover the fixed cost. In a context of credit constraints the
problem households face is even more complicated: Even if r is small, households that would
like to borrow at the current rate wouldn’t be able to borrow optimally; those households facing
a credit constraint a¯i such that vL+ a¯i < pi will not work. However, note that an income shock εi
such that vL+ εi+ a¯i = pi will push households into the labor force. In this model, both types of
financial frictions interact with labor market frictions and yield a result in which households sort
into the labor force based on their initial wealth. The increase in the effect of an income shock
comes from households who find it profitable to borrow at rate r but can’t borrow as much as
they would like.
Prediction 3: Income shocks should affect labor supply positively only at the exten-
sive margin. So far, the model sketched in this section doesn’t consider labor supply at the
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intensive margin. This approach was chosen in order to focus only on corner solutions. Interior
solutions in a model with a trade-off between consumption and leisure should behave as in the
neoclassical model once the agent decides to work; conditional on working, a household chooses
how many hours to work, equalizing marginal rates of substitution between consumption and
leisure with the real market wage. In this context, an income shock has non-increasing effects on
hours worked. Note, however, that a positive effect on hours worked can be observed in a richer
model in which time off work can be productive for household consumption as in Becker (1965);
in this case, the positive effect requires that households substitute away from time-intensive
goods.
2.6.1 Testing the implications of the model
Labor supply and fixed costs to work
In this section, I test for the salience of fixed costs to enter the labor force. I do this in
two steps. First, I show that despite finding effects at both the intensive and extensive margin of
work for adult females, the effects come mainly from responses at the extensive margin. Second,
I show that these effects are associated with increases in the probability of being self-employed
due to the program, suggesting that the responses in employment come from small businesses, a
sector that faces small but salient fixed costs.
The theoretical framework sketched in this paper suggests that the impacts of an income
shock should be related to the extensive margin of labor supply rather than the intensive margin,
as I assume that once the decision to work is taken, the agents behave according to a neoclassical
model. So far, the results presented in Table 2.5 show significant impacts on hours/week worked
by females. Yet the measure of work hours includes zeros for females who do not work. Although
fixed costs are unobserved and heterogeneous, if they are salient they should manifest in the
labor supply responses to an income shock only at the bottom of the distribution of work hours.
To empirically test this hypothesis, I estimate treatment effects along the cumulative distribution
function of work hours.
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Let Hi denote the hours worked weekly by child i’s mother. Let Y xi be an indicator
function Y xi = 1[hi > x] denoting whether child i’s mother reported working more than x hours
the week before the interview (x ∈ [0, h¯]).
Y xismt = α+µm+δt +θs+β (x)Tst +Xismtγ+ eismt (2.3)
The parameter of interest is β (x), which represents the difference-in-difference estimate for the
ITT effect on the cumulative density function of hours/week worked evaluated at x. If there
are fixed costs to enter the labor force, then treatment effects should only manifest through
the extensive margin. Formally, this means that β (x) is a non-increasing function of x with
β (0) as intercept. Figure 2.9 plots the estimated coefficients βˆ (x) from (2.3) against x for the
case of adult females. Note that the treatment effects, for most values of x, are significant and
constant at ˆβ (0). Although there are some increases around x = 20 20, the biggest jump in
the treatment effects comes at the bottom of the distribution of working hours, confirming the
fixed-cost hypothesis. This result complements evidence from recent literature that analyzes
variation in particularly salient fixed costs to work such as Bryan et al. (2014) and Field (2007).
This paper identifies a complementary comparative statics exercise; instead of reducing fixed
costs, it modifies non-labor wealth and reduces the salience of these fixed costs.
The fixed-costs to work hypothesis suggests that the positive effects on work outcomes
should come from a measure of labor markets deeply related to entrepreneurship. Table 2.5
provides evidence of positive treatment effects of the program on self-employment for adult
females (heads of household or head’s spouse). These effects are not related with work inside
the household. The dependent variable is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 for
self-employed females and 0 for unemployed females; it measures the transition from unem-
ployment to self-employment. As the cash transfer relieves liquidity constraints, this finding
20These extra increases at x = 20 are consistent with a context of under-employment or agents overcoming fixed
costs for a second occupation.
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complements mild positive results on self-employment and business start-up from interventions
expanding the supply of microcredit (Banerjee et al., 2015) (Kaboski and Townsend, 2012).
Moreover, previous evidence from Mexico (Gertler et al., 2012) shows that the long-term gains
in consumption due to the OPORTUNIDADES program can be explained by an increase in
productive investment induced by the program. The increases in employment for females mostly
related to self-employment complements these long-term results with short-term responses in
labor supply. Overall, if the process of development is about a reallocation of resources from
subsistence agricultural production to entrepreneurship, moving people from unemployment to
self-employment could be the first step in that process.
Labor supply responses and credit markets
To test whether the impact of the program is higher for individuals who are either more
credit-constrained or face stronger credit market imperfections, I estimate a triple-difference
model that extends the difference-in-difference model from equation (2.2) by including a third
source of variation: the number of financial institution branches per 100,000 individuals in each
municipality at baseline. These data are only available for municipalities that are provincial
capitals (112 out of 339 municipalities), however two-thirds of my sample belong to these
localities. I interpret this cross-municipality variation as a shift in credit market imperfections:
Areas with low supply of financial services have a limited set of financing options for local
households, leading to higher credit constraints; they also exhibit less competition for informal
lenders, allowing repayment rates to be potentially higher. Columns (1) and (4) from Table
2.7 report triple-difference estimates for hours/week and the probability of working the week
prior to the interview. The results show that the effect is higher for females in areas with high
credit-market imperfections.
To show that heterogeneity in treatment effects does not come from the fact that rural
areas are more credit-constrained than urban areas, I estimate a model that includes a full set
of interactions between rural-urban dummies, years of schooling and years fixed effects: a
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triple-difference coefficient using urban-rural dummies. Columns (3) and (6) show that even
accounting for potential treatment-effect heterogeneity across urban and rural areas, the negative
slope with respect to access to financial services remains strong and hence the results are not
simply driven by treatment-effect heterogeneity due to geography. The results in this paper
suggest that the cash transfers were more salient for households that were more likely to face
credit constraints.
2.7 Potential alternative mechanisms
In this section I discuss alternative mechanisms that could explain the positive labor
supply responses to the program; I also discuss the plausibility of these channels given the
evidence found in the empirical exercises presented in this study. I present two alternative
explanations: an aggregate demand mechanism induced by the injection of cash into the local
economy and the relaxation of adult females’ time constraints due to the condition component of
the program.
One particular challenge in interpreting the reduced-form treatment effects from studies
that evaluate the impact of large-scale cash transfer programs is the presence of general equilib-
rium effects that are confounded with direct income shocks on treatment units (Acemoglu, 2010).
The Bolivian program, despite providing a small transfer to each beneficiary child, injected
money into the local economy in a short period of time. If this transfer increased aggregate
demand in the local economy and hence wages, then it could be the case that some agents
decided to work at that higher wage. This mechanism has been documented in the development
economics literature that analyzes general equilibrium effects after large-scale interventions21.
However, the nature of the shock studied in this paper differs from the shocks induced by other
CCT interventions analyzed by Alzua et al. (2013) and Banerjee et al. (2015): in those studies
21Alzua et al. (2013) find positive effects of the PROGRESA CCT program on wages for males. Similarly,
Kaboski and Townsend (2012) and Muralidharan et al. (2017) find increases on wages after the implementation of
the Million Baht Fund program in Thailand and a large-scale public works program (NREG) in Andha Pradesh,
India, respectively.
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the treatment is randomly assigned across clusters and their estimates are based on cross-cluster
comparisons. In this study, the treatment effects are identified using arguably exogenous indi-
vidual and time series variation within clusters, as both specifications in equations (2.1) and
(2.2) include municipality fixed effects. This means that potential effects through prices are
isolated as comparisons are performed within clusters. If there was an increase in wages, this
increase affected the treatment and control groups similarly. Moreover, if the effects were driven
by increases in wages, then households who are less exposed to credit-market imperfections
should be better able to respond as they can borrow to cover the fixed cost of working. The
evidence found in Section 2.6.1 (see Table 2.7) suggests the opposite, as the treatment effect is a
decreasing function of the degree of credit-market imperfections.
Second, since the program’s main objective was to increase attendance and enrollment
among the children who were the beneficiaries, the increase in labor supply for adult females
could be explained by the relief of a time constraint rather than an income shock. Two pieces
of evidence from this study suggest that this may not be the case. First, the positive treatment
effects are driven by beneficiaries who would have attended school even in the absence of the
program as discussed in Section 2.5.1. Second, after controlling for differential trends, I can’t
find evidence supporting increases in enrollment due to the program. Appendix Table B.4 shows
difference-in-difference estimates of the program on the probability of enrolling in school the
year after each cohort was exposed and the probability of working the year the transfer was
disbursed. The evidence suggests that there were not effects on outcomes for children.
2.8 Robustness checks and methodological issues
In this section I discuss two empirical challenges and conduct two robustness checks that
rule out potential threats to my identification strategy and my results. First, the main analysis
includes children from fourth to eighth grade only, excluding younger children as they may have
differential trends arising from differential opportunity costs for parents’ time. In Section B
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of the appendix, I replicate the main graphical evidence from this study but including younger
children (see figures B.1 and B.2). Regression results using the whole sample (first-eighth grade)
are presented on Appendix Table B.1. The results are fairly similar in all of the specifications.
Note that in this case, I am able to detect significant increases in total household labor supply,
measured by the total number of work hours for all adults in the household (See panel A in
Appendix Table B.1).
Second, since treatment assignment is at the child level, the units of observation in my
dataset are children. However, note that among the sample of students, it is possible that some
treatment children have siblings in the control group; this would imply that data for their parents
is counted both in the treatment and control group. This could be a source of downward bias of
the estimates. Since excluding children with siblings with differential treatment status implies
reducing the sample by 40% with the resulting loss of statistical power, I present the results for
the entire sample, acknowledging that my estimates are likely to be a lower bound. In Section
B.1.1 of the Appendix (Table B.3) I show that the estimates are higher but noisier once I exclude
children whose siblings are in a different treatment group.
2.9 Concluding remarks and discussion
This paper analyzes whether positive income shocks can cause increases in labor supply
using a large-scale conditional cash transfer program implemented through Bolivia’s public
schools. Contrary to predictions from the neoclassical model and the evidence from cash welfare
programs in developed economies, I find that an income shock can push people into the labor
force. In particular, I find that this is so for adult females, either household heads or heads’
spouses. This result is consistent with systematic evidence from CCT programs in developing
countries of non-negative income labor supply elasticities (Alzua et al. (2013) and Banerjee et al.
(2015)). I also find evidence that the positive impact of the program on adult females’ labor
supply comes from women whose children would have attended school in the absence of the
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program, suggesting that the cash rather than the condition component of the program explains
the effects. This result rules out responses in labor markets due to the relief of time constraints
for adults.
To understand the economics behind these results, I provide a simple explanation that
unifies the results from developed and developing countries. Once I introduce fixed costs to
enter the labor force and credit-market imperfections that lead to either high repayment interest
rates or borrowing constraints into a stylized labor-force participation model, selection into
employment is based on initial wealth. In this environment, two equilibria are present in the
economy: one in which agents are rich enough to self-finance the fixed costs to work and another
in which the agents are simply too poor to work–a poverty trap. In this context, an income shock
can move agents from an equilibrium with involuntary unemployment to one with employment,
consistent with the main result of this paper. I find that the program increased the probability of
working by 4 percentage points and the weekly hours worked by 2.5 hours for female household
heads. These effects are associated with similar impacts on self-employment, a sector with fixed
costs. The effects are small as the income shock is small, and are consistent with the theoretical
approach in this paper suggesting that the effects come from agents at the margin.
Why do labor supply studies in developed countries find negative income elasticities, but
this is not the case for developing countries? The theoretical framework developed in this study
suggests that if agents don’t face fixed costs and credit constraints, then their behavior should be
consistent with the neoclassical model. This should be the case for countries that are far along
in the process of development. However, the reality may be quite different in countries that are
further down the ladder in this process. Underdevelopment comes with strong barriers to work
and credit markets that are far from perfect. When cash aid reaches agents in this environment,
some agents may use that money to cover basic needs, while others will find the extra liquidity
needed to begin moving out of poverty. As discussed in the theoretical framework, those agents
who are lucky enough to be close to covering their fixed costs will exhibit positive labor supply
responses.
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Why then have other studies in developing countries not found positive effects of income
on labor supply? The theoretical framework proposed and tested in this paper and the design
of the program provide insights for understanding why other studies were not able to find
positive responses. Successful, emblematic CCT programs are means-tested and therefore affect
a particularly disadvantaged share of the population. If the households that can take advantage
of the income shock are only those that are close to covering their fixed costs, as the theoretical
framework suggests, programs that focus exclusively on the most disadvantaged agents will fail
to capture agents who would potentially use the extra resources as a tool to escape involuntary
unemployment. Studies such as Alzua et al. (2013) and Banerjee et al. (2015) focus on contexts
in which the program beneficiaries are simply too poor to take advantage of the shock. The
Bolivian program studied in this paper is not means-tested and reaches around 90% of children
of school age, capturing the entire distribution of fixed costs and credit constraints. This provides
an empirical approach with enough power to capture positive responses in labor supply due to
the program.
Altogether, the results suggests that an apparent trade-off between immediate poverty
reductions and long-term poverty alleviation might not be salient in contexts of fixed costs to work
and credit constraints, two key features of developing economies. This potential trade-off would
arise from dependence generated by these income transfers; nonetheless, the results suggest that
constraints rather than dependence may explain vicious circles of poverty. Consistent with recent
evidence regarding investments in human capital and skills after winning cash grants (Blattman
et al., 2014)and long-term improvements in consumption driven by agricultural investment in
Mexico (Gertler et al., 2012), the results suggest that the first step to climbing the ladder of
development is overcoming the barriers households face to simply start working.
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2.10 Figures
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Figure 2.1. Gender Disparities in Employment
The figure depicts employment rates for female and male heads of household or heads’ spouses, on the left axis. Employment rate is measured as the share of people of working age who
report having worked the week prior to the survey interview.
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Figure 2.2. Cash Reception
The figure shows the proportion of beneficiary children who report having received the transfer for each year before and after the exposure of child i to the program. Time to treatment is equal
to 0 in the first period in which treatment kicks in. Uptake rates are computed based on self-reported information regarding the year preceding the survey interview.
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Figure 2.3. Total Hours Worked (per week) - Household Adults
The figure depicts means for the total weekly hours worked by adults in child i’s household before and after child i is exposed to treatment. Time to treatment is equal to 0 in the first period
in which treatment kicks in.
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Figure 2.4. Number of Adults Working
The figure depicts means for the number of employed adults in child i’s household before and after child i is exposed to treatment. Time to treatment is equal to 0 in the first period in which
treatment kicks in.
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Figure 2.5. Employment and Hours Worked (weekly) for Adults
The top panels depict employment rate for adult males (heads of household or spouses) and adult females (heads of household or spouses) in child i’s household before and after child i is
exposed to treatment. The bottom panel depicts weekly hours for both adult males and females. Time to treatment is equal to 0 in the first period in which treatment kicks in.
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Figure 2.6. Treatment Effects on Total Household Labor Supply (Adults): Total Weekly Hours
Worked (left) and Number of Adults Working
The figure depicts OLS coefficients from equation (2.1). Left-hand panel: Ech coefficient estimates differences in differences on hours worked by adults between the treatment and control
group with respect to the period just before the program was implemented (τ = −1). The dependent variable measures the total number of hours worked by adults in child i’s household.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Right-hand panel: Each coefficient estimates differences in differences on adult employment between the treatment and control group
with respect to the period just before the program was implemented (τ = −1). The dependent variable measures the number of adults employed in child i’s household. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level.
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Figure 2.7. Treatment Effects on Employment and Hours for Adults
The figure depicts OLS coefficients from equation (2.1). Each coefficient estimates differences in differences on the relevant measure of labor supply between the treatment and control group
with respect to the period just before the program was implemented (τ = −1) . The top panel depicts effects on the probability of working, the bottom panel depicts effects on weekly work
hours. The plots on the left are the results for adult males while those on the right are results for adult females. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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Figure 2.8. CDF of Predicted Attendance Rate
The figure plots the cumulative probability function for the counterfactual attendance rate. The vertical line denotes the cutoff determined by the condition component of the CCT program,
while the horizontal line denotes the proportion of the sample located below the condition cutoff.
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Figure 2.9. Treatment Effects Along the Distribution of Weekly Work Hours for Adult Females
The figure depicts treatment effects estimated through OLS based on (2.3). Each coefficient estimates differences in differences on the probability of working at least x hours between adult
females belonging to households from treated children and control children, before and after the program. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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2.11 Tables
Table 2.2. Summary Baseline Statistics
N Mean Std.Dev Min Max
Panel A: Work Outcomes (Adults - Household)
Total hours/week 2520 76.51 46.68 0 211
Number of adults who worked last week 2556 1.69 0.89 0 4
Number of self-employed adults 2536 0.69 0.64 0 2
Number of adults working at home 2534 0.05 0.22 0 1
Panel B: Work Outcomes (Female household heads / heads’ spouses)
Total hours/week 2397 26.27 25.54 0 84
Total hours/week (conditional on working) 1566 40.20 20.92 1 84
Worked last week 2417 0.66 0.48 0 1
Self-employed 2417 0.29 0.45 0 1
Works at home 2417 0.05 0.22 0 1
Panel C: Work Outcomes (Male household heads / heads’ spouses)
Total hours/week 2090 47.35 21.41 0 91
Total hours/week (conditional on working) 1977 50.06 18.69 2 91
Worked last week 2119 0.95 0.22 0 1
Self-employed 2119 0.47 0.50 0 1
Works at home 2119 0.02 0.14 0 1
Panel D: Work/Schooling Outcomes (children - 7-18 years old)
Total hours/week 2560 6.88 14.27 0 60
Total hours/week (conditional on working) 729 24.15 17.28 2 60
Worked last week 2560 0.28 0.45 0 1
Enrolled in school 2560 0.91 0.28 0 1
Panel E: Household Characteristics
Urban Area 2560 0.51 0.50 0 1
Self-identified as Indigenous 2560 0.63 0.48 0 1
Spanish as first language 2119 0.54 0.50 0 1
Number of household members 2560 5.93 2.12 1 18
Number of adults in household 2560 2.27 1.06 0 9
Number of children under 5 in household 2560 0.62 0.85 0 5
Note: The table presents summary statistics for children with 4 to 8 years of schooling as of 2005, the year preceding the program. Panel A presents statistics regarding aggregate data at the
household level for household members older than 18. Panels B and C present statistics for the household head or spouse in the case of adult females and males, respectively. Panel D reports
information regarding children between 7 and 18 years old. The variables regarding employment are computed based on indicators of whether or not each person in the household reported
working in the week before the interview. Hours worked are computed with self-reported information regarding the average number of working hours per day and the average number of days
worked in the week before the interview.
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Table 2.3. Testing for Parallel Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Adults Adult Females -hh heads Adult Males - hh heads
Hours Works Hours Works Hours Works
Panel A: H0 : β−6+β−5+ ...+β−2 = 0
βˆ−6+ βˆ−5+ ...+ βˆ−2 -4.50 0.03 -0.47 0.15 -4.84 -0.02
F-stat 0.27 0.03 0.01 3.02 2.43 0.16
P-val 0.61 0.86 0.93 0.18 0.30 0.69
Panel B: H0 : β−6 = ...= β−2 = 0
F-stat 2.00 1.46 1.26 1.54 1.22 1.05
P-val 0.08 0.20 0.28 0.08 0.12 0.39
Note: The table presents tests for common pre-trends between treatment and control groups based on the flexible difference-in-difference model described in (2.1). Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. Panel A tests the null hypothesis that the sum of all the coefficients capturing differential trajectories between the control and treatment groups from each
year preceding the implementation of the program with respect to the year preceding entrance to treatment. Panel B, tests the null hypothesis that all pre-trend coefficients are jointly equal to
zero.
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Table 2.4. Effects on Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Work Outcomes (Adults - Household)
Total hours/week Total working adults
TE (DD) 1.938 1.950 2.200 0.019 0.013 0.012
(1.732) (1.533) (1.638) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032)
Observations 18,194 17,434 17,434 18,309 17,543 17,543
R-squared 0.008 0.160 0.161 0.006 0.250 0.250
Mean DV 79.37 79.37 79.37 1.732 1.732 1.732
Panel B: Work Outcomes (Female household heads / heads’ spouses)
Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) 2.591*** 2.507*** 2.336*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.034**
(0.751) (0.715) (0.804) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Observations 17,459 17,450 17,450 17,687 17,678 17,678
R-squared 0.011 0.095 0.095 0.004 0.094 0.095
Mean DV 27.39 27.39 27.39 0.662 0.662 0.662
Panel C: Work Outcomes (Males household heads / heads’ spouses)
Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) 0.738 1.147 1.369* -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.759) (0.783) (0.753) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 15,505 14,747 14,747 15,777 15,010 15,010
R-squared 0.006 0.092 0.092 0.002 0.074 0.075
Mean DV 47.86 47.86 47.86 0.949 0.949 0.949
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Municipality FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Group Trend NO NO YES NO NO YES
Clusters 290 290 290 290 290 290
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents OLS estimates for a difference-in-difference model. The coefficients represent differential changes in labor supply before and after the program between exposed and
non-exposed children. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Panel A presents treatment effects concerning aggregate data at the household level.
Panels B and C, present treatment effects regarding employment for females heads of household or spouses and males heads of household or spouses, respectively.
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Table 2.5. Effects on Self-employment: Adult Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed Works at home
TE (DD) 0.046** 0.042** 0.034* 0.022 0.020 0.004
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 11,117 11,116 11,116 6,723 6,723 6,723
R-squared 0.004 0.121 0.121 0.015 0.130 0.132
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Municipality FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Group Trend NO NO YES NO NO YES
Clusters 279 279 279 254 254 254
Mean DV 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.123 0.123 0.123
*** p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents OLS estimates for a difference-in-difference model. The coefficients represent differential changes in self-employment rate before and after the program between
female head of households from exposed and non-exposed children. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are presented in parentheses for adult females. The dependent variable
is denoted as 1 if the head of household is self-employed and 0 if they did not report working the week preceding the survey.
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Table 2.6. Adult Females: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Counterfactual Attendance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) -5.684 3.156*** 4.117*** -0.089 0.043*** 0.043**
(5.083) (0.744) (0.930) (0.101) (0.016) (0.019)
TE x Attendance rate (DDD) 9.471 0.150
(5.755) (0.114)
TE x 1[Attendance rate<0.8] (DDD) -4.120* -0.028
(2.339) (0.045)
TE x 1[Attendance rate<median] (DDD) -4.153** -0.012
(1.697) (0.034)
Observations 14,563 17,450 17,450 14,750 17,678 17,678
R-squared 0.113 0.096 0.098 0.111 0.096 0.097
Clusters 288 289 289 289 290 290
Mean DV 27.39 27.39 27.39 0.662 0.662 0.662
Mean Covariate 0.853 0.154 0.423 0.853 0.154 0.423
1st Decile Covariate 0.659 0.659
9th Decile Covariate 0.964 0.964
TE at Percentile 10 0.561 0.0102
p-val 0.714 0.737
TE at Percentile 90 3.443*** 0.056***
p-val 0.002 0.007
TE at CV=1 -0.964 -0.0357 0.0155 0.0305
p-val 0.664 0.978 0.706 0.247
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents OLS estimates for a triple-difference model. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The coefficients in the first row
represent treatment effects when the relevant covariate equals 0 (DD). Interactions, located in the second, third and fourth rows denote differential treatment effects with respect to the TE
presented in row 1 (DDD). Columns (1) and (4) report heterogeneity by counterfactual predicted attendance rate based on a probit model estimated for the 2004 sample. Columns (2) and (5)
report heterogeneity for adult females belonging to households from inframarginal (1[Attendance < 0.8] = 0) and marginal (1[Attendance < 0.8] = 1) children. Columns (3) and (7) report
heterogeneity for adult females belonging to households with children whose attendance rate is above the median (1[Attendance < median] = 0) and below the median.
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Table 2.7. Adult Females: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Access to Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) 4.074*** 3.485*** 3.839 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.083*
(1.335) (1.249) (2.368) (0.025) (0.027) (0.045)
TE x # branches per 100000 people (DDD) -0.073 -0.052 -0.078 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004**
(0.109) (0.111) (0.116) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 12,818 12,809 12,809 13,011 13,002 13,002
R-squared 0.007 0.045 0.051 0.003 0.049 0.057
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Municipality FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Group Trend NO YES NO NO YES NO
Area-cohort-year FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98 98
Mean DV 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662
Mean # branches per 100000 people 9.341 9.341 9.341 9.341 9.341 9.341
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates (DD) and triple-difference estimates (DDD) in the first and second row, respectively. The number of financial branches per 100,000
individuals in each municipality is used as a third source of variation. Data regarding financial branches corresponds to 2005, the year before the program’s implementation, and is only
available for the municipalities that are province capitals. The sample for these regressions accounts for one-third of the clusters’ sample but two-thirds of the total observations. Standard
errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the municipality level.
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Chapter 3
Access to Credit and Productivity
Abstract
Recent research estimating the causal impacts of microfinance finds modest population-
level effects but highlights the presence of heterogeneous effects. We develop an empirical
framework to analyze heterogeneity in the effects of micro-credit, which we implement in the
context of one of the largest micro-credit programs in developing countries. We argue that in
the case of credit-constrained households, cross-household variation in the marginal returns to
capital –i.e., the shadow price from relaxing the budget constraint– is mainly driven by variation
in total factor productivity (TFP). We modify standard control-function methods for estimating
production functions by using household beliefs about future profits to proxy for unobserved
productivity, instead of traditional proxy variables which may not be valid in the context of
constrained households. Using five years of pre-program data, we apply our framework to
recover TFP for all potential borrowers, and exploit quasi-experimental variation in the timing
and size of the program to show that high-productivity households benefited the most from
the credit-supply expansion: annual profits substantially increased (between TBH 0.7-2 with
respect to one additional TBH of total credit), mostly driven by non-agricultural businesses. In
contrast, we find no detectable impacts on profits for low-productivity households. Heterogeneity
is even stronger among households with pre-existing non-agricultural businesses: We document
increases in profits of TBH 1.8-4.1 per one additional TBH of total credit for high-productivity
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households, which appear to be driven by increases in business assets. The findings suggest that
improved screening and targeting could greatly magnify the impacts of credit expansions.
3.1 Introduction
Research from a range of contexts documents that small businesses in developing coun-
tries have high returns to capital grants ( de Mel et al. (2008), McKenzie and Woodruff (2008),
Kremer et al. (2010), Fafchamps et al. (2014), Blattman et al. (2014), McKenzie (2017), and
Hussam et al. (2017)), and that programs involving transfers of productive assets to ultra-poor
households are promising tools for poverty alleviation (Bandiera et al., 2017; Banerjee et al.,
2015). Given such high returns, it is natural to conclude that financial frictions might pose signif-
icant barriers to entrepreneurship and firm growth. However, it has been harder to find broad
empirical support for credit interventions such as microfinance catalyzing transformative busi-
ness growth (Banerjee et al. (2015) and Meager (2016)). While the typical borrower’s business
appears not to grow more profitable in response to credit, this may hide substantial heterogeneity
in the business returns to credit. Research has shown, for example, that entrepreneurs with
pre-existing businesses do indeed experience sustained growth (Banerjee et al., 2015), and that
the effects of credit are concentrated on the right tail of the distribution of profits (Banerjee et al.,
2015; Crpon et al., 2015). Whether these businesses belong to highly productive households, has
not yet been examined.
In this paper we develop an empirical framework to investigate heterogeneous returns to
credit. Specifically, we ask whether cross-sectional heterogeneity in productivity predicts the
returns to credit. We begin by developing a simple model of constrained households to show that
the shadow price of capital is an increasing function of household productivity (TFP). We then
apply our framework to the context of Thailand to assess the extent to which high-productivity
households are more likely to increase profits and use program resources to boost business
investment.
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Our analysis requires three crucial components. First, we require quasi-exogenous
variation in access to credit. For this, we use exposure to the Million Baht Program, one of
the largest credit-expansion program of its kind, which began in Thailand in 2001.1 We follow
Kaboski and Townsend (2012), who exploit the fact that each program village received the same
amount of funds from the central government to lend to local households, independent of village
size. Thus we can compare villages before versus after the implementation of the program,
by inverse village size. Second, we require detailed household panel data with enough pre-
intervention observations to estimate TFP. Here, we also follow (Kaboski and Townsend, 2012)
and use an unusually long panel, the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 2007b,a), which follows
960 households from 64 villages. Importantly, the data includes information on assets, inputs,
revenues and profits for all household businesses, with five pre-intervention observations per
household from the years 1997-2001. Finally, we require a credible way to measure household
TFP. One problem when estimating production function that is well-known in the literature is
that a household’s investment decisions may be affected by time-varying shocks to productivity
that are unobservable to the econometrician (Olley and Pakes, 1996). We propose a novel method
in which we use data on household beliefs about future business conditions to proxy for the
household’s productivity shock. Our beliefs-based method is particularly attractive for settings
like ours where households may be credit constrained (Shenoy, 2017).
Armed with these three tools, we first use the pre-program data to recover estimates
of household productivity for all potential borrowers. We then combine the cross-household
variation in productivity with the cross-village variation in the size and rollout of the program to
test for productivity-based heterogeneity in the effects of the credit expansion.
Consistent with Kaboski and Townsend (2012), we find that indeed, villages with large
inverse village sizes experience a large increase in short term credit following the implementation
1Concretely, the Thai government disbursed approximately USD 1.8 billion to 77,000 villages which represented
over 95% of the total villages in Thailand. Because of its scale and policy relevance, a large body of research has
analyzed different dimensions of the program. Kaboski and Townsend (2012) and Kaboski and Townsend (2011)
provide reduced form and structural assessments of the impact of the program, respectively.
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of the program, relatively to the baseline periods. Interestingly, the effects on program credit are
not different for high versus low productivity households. This suggests that the village fund
committees who decided how to allocate the credit did not direct more credit to higher productiv-
ity households, which is consistent with evidence of misallocation based on connections with
local leaders (Vera-Cossio, 2018). One implication of this result is that potential heterogeneity in
downstream outcomes is unlikely to be explained by differential access to program credit.
Turning to the reduced-form estimates of the effects of the program, we find strong
patterns of heterogeneity by baseline productivity. First, we find no detectable impacts of the
program on household income or business profits for low productivity households. However, the
picture is quite different for high productivity households – they experience increases in total
household income, coming largely from household enterprise profits. Moreover, the increase
in profitability is driven almost entirely by non-agricultural businesses rather than farm profits.
One interpretation of this result is that in the Thai context, credit constraints aren’t as binding for
agricultural businesses, perhaps due to differences in collateralizability of farm versus non-farm
assets or due to pre-existing targeted agricultural lending programs.2
Next, we show that household TFP predicts larger treatment effects, restricting to the
subsample of households with a pre-period non-agricultural business. We find evidence that for
high-productivity households, village fund credit crowds in other types of borrowing. While
high and low productivity households obtain similar amounts of village fund credit, total short-
term borrowing increased more for high-productivity households relative to low-productivity
households. Consequently, we find that among pre-program business owners, high-productivity
households are better able to use the village credit to increase profits. This increase in profitability
appears to be driven by an immediate increase in assets, rather than increased inventories and
wage expenses.
In order to interpret the magnitude of these effects, we use the quasi-experimental
2Agriculture-oriented lenders are prominent in the context of rural Thailand. For instance, before the program’s
implementation, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives(BAAC) provided agricultural loans in all
the sample villages.
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variation in program exposure to instrument for total short-term credit. We find that high-
productivity business owners exhibit annual returns to credit of the order of TBH 1.8-4 per one
additional TBH of credit. Our estimates are consistent with evidence of high returns to credit in
Morocco (Crpon et al., 2015), large annual returns to cash/asset grants in Mexico (McKenzie
and Woodruff, 2008) and high returns to cash grants for entrepreneurs with high business growth
potential in India (Hussam et al., 2017). These returns coincide with increases in assets of the
order of TBH 4-7 per one additional TBH of credit. Back of the envelop calculations suggests
that the implied annual rate of return of such investments ranges between 48-58%, way above
the average annual interest rate associated to program loans (7%). These rate of returns are
consistent with other estimates provided in the literature such as 39.6% annual for pre-existing
firms winning a business plan competition in Nigeria (McKenzie, 2017), or estimates as large as
66-70% annual for the case of SMEs in Sri-Lanka (de Mel et al., 2008).3
We show that these results are robust in two ways. First, we use an alternate fixed effects-
based approach to estimate pre-period household TFP and show that the results are qualitatively
quite similar. Second, we present several approaches to impute total labor inputs to use in our
estimation of household TFP.4 We show that our main findings are robust to the inclusion of
number of workers as a measure of labor in the production function estimation, and to estimating
a production function in per-capita terms.
Our results contribute to the literature measuring the effects of credit supply expansions in
developing countries ((Karlan and Zinman, 2010)- The Philippines, India (Banerjee et al., 2015),
Morocco (Crpon et al., 2015), Mongolia (Attanasio et al., 2015), Bosnia (Augsburg et al., 2015),
Mexico (Angelucci et al., 2015), Ethiopia (Tarozzi et al., 2015)). We document a new empirical
result – that the most-productive households benefit the most from a credit expansion program.
These findings complement previous studies which have documented evidence of heterogeneity
3We obtain these values by multiplying the monthly returns reported in the papers by 12.
4Unfortunately, the Townsend Thai Project annual data does not track total labor inputs in household businesses
(i.e., time use by business activity). It only contains measures of the number of workers hired for non-agricultural
businesses and the number of households members whose main occupation is to work in household businesses.
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based on observable characteristics such as pre-period business ownership. We also show
that household TFP is predictive of larger treatment effects even within these subpopulations.
However, we find no correlation between credit supply and household TFP in our setting. One
implication is that improved screening and targeting could greatly magnify the impacts of credit
expansions. This could potentially entail improvements in externally identifying entrepreneurs
(see Fafchamps and Woodruff (2017), Hussam et al. (2017), and Mckenzie and Sansone (2017)).
Alternatively, financial institutions could try to design better screening mechanisms for self-
targeting (Beaman et al., 2014).
Finally, our paper is related to the large body of literature aiming to estimate production
function parameters and TFP (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg
et al., 2015; Shenoy, 2017).Shenoy (2017) argues that the assumptions typically made in the
literature are likely unsuitable under credit constraints. We propose a novel implementation of
the control-function approach using beliefs about future profits as a proxy variable, rather than
intermediate inputs which require assuming frictionless adjustment in order to appropriately
proxy for productivity. By using beliefs, we do not have to assume that households are not
constrained and we do not have to impose a functional form for the process through which
productivity evolves, as is usually the case in dynamic-panel approaches (Blundell and Bond,
2000).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides and overview of the
empirical context and the data. Section 3.3 presents a simple framework of credit supply expan-
sions under credit constraints and also outlines our production function estimation methodology.
Section 3.5 presents the core first stage and reduced form results, while Section 3.6 presents IV
estimates. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Context and Data
We study the heterogeneous household impacts of the Million Baht Program in the 64
villages of the Townsend Thai Project (Townsend, 2007b,a). Under the Million Baht program,
the Thai government disbursed approximately USD 1.8 billion to 77,000 villages starting in
2001.5 Our empirical strategy is based on the work of Kaboski and Townsend (2012), hereinafter
KT, and exploits the unique implementation of the program to facilitate identification of its causal
effects. Notably, the government disbursed exactly TBH 1,000,000 to each village regardless
of size, wealth or location.6 As such, inhabitants of small villages stood to receive more credit,
on average, than residents of larger villages. In general, most of the credit was lent on a short-
term (less than or equal to 12 months) basis, and because any funds repaid to the village fund
committees were meant to be used to finance follow-on lending activities, the program could be
viewed as a permanent supply shock to local short-term credit.7
Kaboski and Townsend (2012) provide quasi-experimental evidence of the effects of
the program on household consumption and productive activities. Concretely, they document
that short-term borrowing increased on the order of 1-for-1 with respect to the size of credit
injection induced by the program, leading to even larger effects on consumption (increases
of 1.7 TBH per TBH injected by the program). While most models of credit frictions would
predict an increase in business investment and profits, the average effects of the program on
productive activities are rather small. Other studies finding a similar pattern suggest that there
is important heterogeneity based on observable characteristics (Banerjee et al., 2015). Yet, an
empirical assessment of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity –i.e., managerial ability,
or, more generally, productivity– has not been provided. In this paper we build on previous
work by analyzing heterogeneity in the effects of the program on productive activities based on
5See Kaboski and Townsend (2012) for a detailed description of the program.
6Subject to each village successfully forming a village fund committee, the body which would ultimately manage
the funds and make credit decisions along with loan collections.
7However, by 2004 several village fund committees had gone bankrupt due to mismanagement or default
outbreaks, spurred by powerful members of the village.
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pre-program household productivity.
We focus on the Thai context for three reasons: First, the Thai context provides arguably
exogenous variation in the timing and size of the program to identify the effects of the program
on household outcomes. Second, cross-village variation in the size of the program allows us to
capture enough heterogeneity in household productive characteristics among program borrowers;
in small villages which receive large per-capita program funds, both high and low productivity
households may borrow. Third, the implementation of the program overlaps with the availability
of a long panel dataset, the Townsend Thai Project, which records extremely detailed household
records for 960 households from 64 villages in 4 Thai provinces. The nature of the data is unique
in its comprehensiveness and panel length, which allows us to exploit the detailed, repeated
nature of the household observations to implement modern panel-data methods to characterize
households in terms of pre-program productivity and other productive characteristics.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the study sample. Two important characteristics
are worth emphasizing. First, household economic performance involves a variety of economic
activities. While on average, higher shares of household operating income correspond to farming
and wage work outside the household, 35% of households have an operating off-farm business.
Second, even before the program, access to credit was common. Over two-thirds of households
borrowed either from institutional or informal lenders. Moreover, 50% of households report
having an outstanding loan with institutional lenders such as the state-owned Bank of Agriculture
and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), commercial banks and other local cooperatives or village
organizations.
3.3 A simple theoretical framework
In this section we propose a simple theoretical framework to characterize the households
who are able to best convert increased credit supply into business profits. We argue that in the
presence of credit constraints, cross-household variation in the marginal return to capital –i.e.,
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the shadow price from relaxing the budget constraint– is mainly driven by variation in total
factor productivity (TFP). In order to illustrate this point, we start by analyzing a simple static
profit-maximizing problem of a household or business facing a credit constraint.
Households are different in terms of total factor productivity (T FP = Ai), and combine
fixed capital K, intermediate inputs or working capital M and labor L to produce output Y .
Consider a Cobb-Douglas production function (Y = AiKαK MαM LαL),8 then each household
maximizes profits subject to a budget constraint:
max
K,M,L
AiK
αK
i M
αM
i L
αL
i − pKKi− pMMi− pLLi (3.1)
subject to
pKKi+ pMMi+ pLLi ≤ Bi (3.2)
Where Bi denotes the total budget available to household i, and includes both wealth and credit.
We allow heterogeneity in this dimension to capture differences in wealth as well as access to
credit across households. Input prices (pK, pM, pL) are normalized with respect to the price of
output. Let λi denote the LaGrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint (3.2). Thus, λi
represents the shadow value of a marginal increase in household i’s budget (Bi): the marginal
return to capital. Thus, if credit expansion programs effectively modify the availability of
resources Bi, then heterogeneity in λi captures heterogeneity in the ability of a household to
benefit from increases in the supply of credit.
Combining the first order conditions corresponding to the choice of each input, it is
possible to show that an optimal solution implies:
AiB
αK+αM+αL−1
i κ = 1+λi (3.3)
8The theoretical predictions highlighted in this sections do not depend on the number of inputs and hold for
concave production functions.
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As κ is strictly positive, λi is an increasing function of total factor productivity (Ai).9 Moreover,
with decreasing returns to scale (αK +αM+αL < 1), λi is decreasing in Bi. In words, households
benefit more from relaxing the budget constraint if productivity is high and if wealth or credit
availability are low. In the context of a technology with constant returns to scale, the budget
constraint is irrelevant, and only heterogeneity in TFP drives heterogeneity in the shadow value
of capital.
3.4 Empirical strategy
Kaboski and Townsend (2012) exploit variation in the timing and size of the program
to estimate its causal effects on productive outcomes. In particular, they compare changes in
outcomes before and after 2001 corresponding to villages with high per-capita expected credit
supply (or high inverse village size, invHH) to those with low per-capita expected credit supply
(or low inverse village size). This approach would lead to causal identification of the effects of
the program under the assumption that there were not time-varying shocks that differentially
affected small and large villages, and could potentially be related to outcomes. The authors
argue that the spatial distribution of village size is as if random and validate the identification
assumptions with several robustness checks. We build on their empirical approach by analyzing
the heterogeneous effects of the program motivated by our theoretical framework.
Our aim is to understand if households with higher λi do in fact benefit more from the
increase in the supply of credit induced by the Million Baht Village Fund program. Let λi,n
be the household’s shadow value of capital for household i in village n, corresponding to the
baseline periods. While we do not observe λi,n, our theoretical framework suggests that baseline
productivity Ai,n,t captures important variation in the returns to capital. Thus, in our empirical
9κ =
(
1
αK+αM+αL
)αK+αM+αL−1(αK
pK
)αK (αM
pM
)αM (αL
pL
)αL
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analysis we aim to estimate the heterogeneous reduced-form effects of the program following:
yi,n,t =δ1invHHn×Postt +δ2invHHn×Postt×High Ai,n+Xi,n,tΓ
+δ3High Ai,n+θt×High Ai,n+θt +θn+ en,t (3.4)
Here, n indexes the village, t indexes the year, and i indexes households. High Ai,n
is an indicator that identifies households in the top-third of the TFP distribution, within each
village. We mainly focuss on rankings rather than levels to attenuate potential measurement
error as we estimate Ai,n ( see Section 3.4.1) Postt is an indicator that identifies post-program
years. We allow for TFP-specific time trends and include a 1× I vector of covariates Xi,n,t
(including household composition, age, and education), village (θn) and year fixed effects (θt).
The coefficients of interest are δ1, δ1+δ2, and δ2, they represent the reduced-form effects of
the program for low productivity households, high-productivity households, and the differential
effect for high-productivity households, respectively.
Note that while identification of the average treatment effect relies on parallel trends
between large and small villages, the identification of heterogeneous effects based on productivity
requires that the parallel trends assumption holds for both high and low productivity households.
In order to test the validity of such assumption and provide dynamic assessment of the program
effects, we report estimates corresponding to a flexible-difference in difference specification
which is separately estimated for high and low productivity households:
yi,n,t =
τ=2006
∑
τ=1997,τ 6=2001
δτ invHHn× I[t = τ]+Xi,n,tΓ+θt +θn+ en,t (3.5)
While the reduced-form estimates are important to test the presence of productivity-based
heterogeneity, we also provide IV estimates of the local average treatment effect (LATE) of an
additional TBH of credit on profits corresponding to households who were induced to borrow
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more due to the program. We report estimates of the following structural specification which is
based on the work of Kaboski and Townsend (2012):
yi,n,t =β1STCRi,n,t +β2High Ai,n×STCRi,n,t +Xi,n,tΓ
+β3High Ai,n+θt×High Ai,n+φn+φt + εi,n,t (3.6)
with first stage:
STCRi,n,t =
τ=2006
∑
τ=2002
δτ invHHn× I[t = τ]+Xi,n,tΣ+θt +θn+ en,t (3.7)
Here, the parameters of interest are β1, which captures the LATE of short-term credit
on business profits for low-productivity households, β2 which captures the differential effect of
credit between high and low productivity households, and β1+β2 which captures the LATE for
high-productivity households. Note that we also need to instrument for High Ai,n×STCRi,n,t .
Because High Ai,n is predetermined, we simply construct the first stage by pre-multiplying
all terms in the standard first stage by High Ai,n. In the structural equation, this yields two
endogenous regressors, ( STCRi,n,t and High Ai,n×STCRi,n,t) and two sets of instruments.
Two important issues should be noted. First, we use the variation induced by the timing
and relative size of the program to instrument for total short-term credit as opposed to program
credit only. We do so to allow for potential responses in local credit markets that are likely to
occur in this setting. 10 Second, our estimates provide an approximation to the financial returns
to short-term credit only under the assumptions of no general equilibrium effects. We argue that
while this assumption is strong,11 the presence of general equilibrium effects would imply that
10 For instance, (Vera-Cossio, 2018) shows that there is redistribution of program resources through informal
credit markets.(Kinnan and Townsend, 2012) show that households rely on indirect access to formal credit to smooth
consumption and investment decisions.
11For instance, households may consider the program as a permanent increase in the availability of credit in
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households who did not borrow would still benefit from the program and hence our estimates
would provide lower-bounds of the returns to credit.
3.4.1 Production function estimation
Central to our analysis is the measurement of productivity Ai,n for each potential borrower,
which typically requires the estimation of a production function. We model log value added
(vai,t), aggregated across all household productive activities,12 as a function the stock of fixed
capital ki,t ,13 productivity shocks which are observed by the household but not by the researcher
ωit = log(Ait), and un-expected production shocks εi,t which are neither known by the household
nor by the researcher.14
vai,t = β0+βkki,t +ωit + εi,t (3.8)
We are interested on estimating ωit for each household, which represents variation in
value-added conditional on capital.15 That is, we aim to capture differences across households in
their ability to generate value added. We allow productivity to evolve following two sources of
variation: foreseen variation based on previous realizations (e.g., ωi,t−1) and unforeseen shocks
to productivity ζi,t . The empirical challenge is to consistently estimate βk, which is essential to
back out ωit . In order to do so, we need to tackle two potential problems. First, households may
the local economy (Kaboski and Townsend, 2011) or there could be general equilibrium effects affecting wages
Kaboski and Townsend (2012).
12They include cultivation, livestock, production of livestock produce and off-farm family business. Value added
is measured as total revenues net of costs from using inputs, other than capital and labor. For instance, we subtract
the value of fertilizer, seeds, feed, merchandise and fuel (among others) from total gross household revenues.
13The stock of capital is measured as the stock of fixed assets corresponding to farm and non-farm businesses.
14We do not have detailed data regarding labor hours, so we focus on the relation between value-added and
capital. However, we present robustness checks based on estimations that use the number of workers hired for
off-farm businesses and the number of adults in the households as a proxy for potential labor.
15We use a value-added function over a gross revenue function as households may have different sources of
income and use output from one occupation to obtain outcome for another. For instance, a farmer may produce
some crops for sale but may use part of the harvest for feed for its livestock. Without a systematic accounting
process, a gross revenue approach could lead to double accounting.
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respond to unexpected production shocks εi,t and productivity shocks ζi,t by adjusting capital.
Second, households may optimally decide their investment decisions in order to accommodate
foreseen variation in productivity ωit (Olley and Pakes, 1996). Both sources of endogeneity may
lead to biased OLS estimates of βk. Ideally, we would rely on household-level experimental
variation in the stock of fixed capital to compute βk. While such a source of variation is not
available in our context, the richness and length of our panel dataset allow us to go a long way in
reducing these concerns.
In order to tackle the first problem, we use the first lag of capital as a proxy for the
stock of capital available to the household before experiencing unforeseen production and
productivity shocks. By doing so, we prevent capital from responding to current shocks such
that E[ki,t ,εi,t ] = 0 and (E[ki,t ,ζi,t ]). This approach is consistent with models in which there is
time to build related to productive capital (Kydland and Prescott, 1982), and is consistent with
evidence of lumpy investments in Thai villages (Samphantharak and Townsend, 2010). Tackling
the second problem requires controlling for unobserved variation in ω which is correlated with
capital choices. We propose two approaches that rely on different identification assumptions to
overcome this issue.
Fixed-effects approach
A first approach would be to impose some structure in the process through which ωit
evolves over time. In order to do so, we assume that variation in productivity is explained by
a time-invariant component which is correlated with capital decisions, year-specific aggregate
shocks, and a time-variant unforeseen shock which is experienced after households chose capital
–i.e., ωit = ω¯i +ωt + ζit , with E[ω¯i,kit ] 6= 0 and E[ζit ,kit ] = 0. This specification allows us to
estimate (3.8) through a fixed-effects approach using the 5 years preceding the program, and use
within-village rankings of the estimated ˆ¯ωi to estimate equations (3.4) and (3.6).
While simple, this approach has two limitations. First, by not allowing the foreseen
part of productivity to evolve over time, the fixed-effects approach rules out models in which
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households may accumulate knowledge or develop abilities which may allow them to more
efficiently use capital in future periods. If the latter models are the main drivers of households
behavior, then the fixed-effects approach may fail to fully account for the relation between
capital and productivity. Second, even if a fixed-effects model is a good description of the true
data-generating process, the identification of βk will rely on within household variation in capital,
which may be troublesome in contexts in which investment is lumpy and there is measurement
error in capital. In such cases, fixed-effects estimates of productivity may end up absorbing most
of the variation in the stock of capital.
Control function approach
A less restrictive approach for estimating βk relies on the use of proxy-variables in order
to control for variation in productivity (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003;
Ackerberg et al., 2015). By doing so, these approaches allow productivity ωit to evolve following
less restrictive processes. Typically, the control function approaches use variation in the demand
for intermediate inputs to proxy for variation in productivity, and assume that firms accommodate
productivity shocks by freely adjusting these inputs.16 While appealing, the use of this approach
seems limited in the context of constrained households in developing countries. Shenoy (2017)
shows that, in the context of liquidity constraints, households/firms may not be able to freely
adjust intermediate inputs in order to accommodate productivity shocks, and thus variation in
intermediate inputs may not fully capture variation in productivity.17 In this paper, we propose a
simple modification to the control-function approach in which we use household beliefs about
future business conditions to proxy for variation in foreseen productivity.
16Traditional proxy variables are materials or electricity. The control function approach observes, that demand
for intermediate goods, mit , can be expressed as a function of the current capital stock and productivity, mit =
mit(Kit ,ωit). Under some assumptions, mainly a strictly monotonic relation between m and ω , the demand function
can be inverted yielding ωit = ω(Ki,t ,mi,t) (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003).
17Shenoy (2017) proposes the use of dynamic panel methods that would be based on weaker assumptions
regarding optimal household/firm behavior. However, relaxing such assumptions as in Blundell and Bond (2000),
comes at the cost of imposing functional forms to the productivity process (typically, assuming that productivity
follows an AR(1) process). Moreover, the implementation of such models requires long time series in order to avoid
problems with precision. See Vera-Cossio (2018) for an empirical application of dynamic panel methods in rural
Thailand.
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We postulate that household’s beliefs about business conditions in period t (bi,t) are a
function of capital and productivity shocks: bi,t = b(Ki,t ,ωi,t). Thus, our ability to effectively
use variation in bi,t to proxy for variation in ωi,t relies on the idea that if we observed different
beliefs across households with similar capital, it should be the case that households with higher
beliefs are households with higher productivity. To the extent that households incorporate
variation in productivity into their beliefs in a frictionless way, it would be possible to invert the
relation between beliefs and productivity and write down ω as function of household beliefs
and capital (ωi,t = ω(Ki,t ,bi,t)). Note that while this approach is inconsistent with models of
cognitive rigidities in the formation in beliefs (Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018), our approach
does not assume frictionless adjustment of inputs and provides a novel alternative for the use of
choice-based models in the contexts of credit constrained households.
Under these assumptions, our estimation procedure is similar to the two-stage approach
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). First, we use third-order polynomials of ki,t and bi,t to
recover variation in value added that is explained by capital, and household beliefs:
vˆi,t = δˆ0+
3
∑
j=0
3
∑
l=0
δˆ jlk
j
i,tb
l
i,t (3.9)
Second, for a given value of βk, we can recover estimates of productivity shocks:
ωˆi,t(βk) = vˆi,t−βkki,t
Next, we allow non-parametric persistence in productivity by assuming ω follows a
first-order Markov process (ωit = E[ωi,t |ωi,t−1]+ζi,t), and estimate E[ωˆi,t |ωˆi,t−1] by regressing
ωˆi,t(βk) on a third-order polynomial of the previous realization of the shock (ωˆi,t−1(βk)). Finally,
β ∗k is is chosen to minimize the sum of squared residuals:
min
β ∗k
∑
t
∑
i
(vit−β ∗k kit−E [ωˆit |ωˆit−1])2 (3.10)
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At the end of the procedure, we average the estimates ωˆi,t over the pre-intervention periods and
generate within-village rankings of household productivity.18. We then use these rankings to
analyze heterogeneity in the effects of the program.
We implement our empirical strategy using household projections of income at time
t, which were measured in t − 1 and are highly predictive of value-added (See Appendix
Table C.1).19 Note that, in our setting, while lagged beliefs only capture variation in foreseen
productivity shocks, there is no need to impose additional assumptions regarding the timing
of capital other than being predetermined with respect to ζi,t .20 Table 3.2 reports estimates
of βk under different methods and provides summary statistics of ωˆ averaged across the 5
pre-program periods, which are our main proxies for household productivity A. While the
fixed-effects approach achieves low estimates of βk and larger estimates of productivity than the
control-function approach, the implied within-village productivity rankings are similar across
both methods (see Appendix Table C.2). To test the extent to which our productivity estimates
capture meaningful information, Appendix Table C.3 shows that our estimates of productivity
correlate with household characteristics that are usually associated with higher productivity,
such as education. This pattern holds for both estimates of productivity: the fixed-effects and
proxy-variable approach. Through the rest of the paper, we present evidence based on estimates
from both approaches and rely on results that are robust across empirical strategies with different
identification assumptions.
18Note that because we assume that capital is predetermined with respect to production shocks (εi,t) and to
unforeseen innovations in productivity ζi,t , identification is achieved under the following moment condition
E[ζi,t + εi,t |ki,t ,ki,t−1,bi,t−1] = 0 which is approximated by its sample analog corresponding to equation (3.10)
19The survey obtains information regarding income projections in a) a regular scenario, b) an adverse scenario
and c) a good scenario. To account for differences in scale and volatility, we construct a measure of beliefs by
dividing the difference in projected income between a regular and a bad scenario by the difference in projected
income between the good and bad scenario.
20However, it is worth noting that in a more complicated model with flexible inputs such as labor, our approach
would require using measures of beliefs that are based on information available to households after ωi,t is realized,
but before the final allocation of value-added and other flexible inputs are observed.
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3.5 Reduced-form results
3.5.1 Effects on program and total short-term credit
We begin by analyzing the extent to which baseline productivity is captures heterogeneity
in program borrowing and total short-term borrowing. For the sake of consistency with previous
studies (KT), we focus our analysis on observations from 1997 to 2006, covering 5 years of pre
and post program data. Figure 3.1 presents flexible difference-in-differences estimates of the
effect of the rollout of the program on program (Panel A) and total short-term credit, for high and
low productivity households (based on the proxy-variable approach). Consistent with Kaboski
and Townsend (2012), we find that indeed, villages with large inverse village sizes experience a
large increase in short-term credit following the implementation of the program, relatively to
the baseline years. These increases are associated to an average loan size of TBH 16,000 for
compliers (USD 360 at 2001 exchange rate).
We also find that baseline productivity in not predictive of program borrowing. Panel
A from Figure 3.1 shows that differences in program participation in small villages (more per-
capita resources) with respect to large villages (less per-capita program resources) are orthogonal
to productivity. This pattern suggest that there was some degree of misallocation in terms
of providing resources to the most productive households, and is consistent with evidence
documenting targeting frictions in the program (Vera-Cossio, 2018). Interestingly, this result
highlights a key feature of our research design: because identification comes from the relative
size of the shock, we are able to observe high-and-low productivity households among program
compliers. This strong “first-stage” for both high and low productivity households suggests
that potential heterogeneity in downstream outcomes is unlikely to be driven by selection into
the program. Results are similar in the case of productivity rankings based on the fixed-effects
method (see Panel B from Table 3.3).
To analyze the extent to which program resources crowded in or crowded out other
sources of credit, Panel B shows the reduced form effects of the program for high and low
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productivity households. Rather than crowding out other sources of credit, the program appears
to have promoted complementarities across sources of credit. The figure shows point estimates
that are larger than those associated to program credit (Panel A). While this result holds for high
and low productivity households, the point estimates are larger in the case of high-productivity
as the rollout of the program might have encouraged high-productivity households to borrow
more from other sources of credit. However, these differences are not significant on average (see
Column 2 from Table 3.3).
3.5.2 Effects on household income
While there are not differential effects in program credit, we document strong hetero-
geneity in household income. The top-left panel of Figure 3.2 shows that while total income does
not seem to change for lower-productivity households, income increases for high-productivity
households due to the program. In order to analyze the main source of this increase, we look at
the effects of the program on wage income, farm profits and non-agricultural business profits.
We find no evidence of differential effects on farm profits or wage income (see bottom panel).
However, the picture is quite different when we focus on non-agricultural businesses. We find
that business profits increased for high productivity households, and we fail to find responses in
the case of low-productivity households (see top-right panel of Figure 3.2). Note that although
the differences in the effects between high and low productivity households seem to slowly decay
over time, they are quite strong and precise during the first two years of the program. This pattern
is not surprising since baseline productivity may lose some predicting power as time passes.
These patterns are qualitatively similar if we use a fixed-effects approach to recover baseline
household productivity (see Appendix Figure C.1).
Panel A from Table 3.3 presents reduced-form estimates corresponding to the speci-
fication in equation (3.4), which capture the effect of an extra per-capita TBH of credit in a
given village on household outcomes.21 In terms of magnitudes, on average high-productivity
21We divided the point estimates from equation (3.4) by 1,000,000 to provide a TBH-to-TBH interpretation.
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households experienced income increases of 2.4 TBH per additional per-capita TBH available
in the village (p < 0.10). These results coincide with an increase in off-farm profits of similar
magnitude, which is significantly different to the reduced-form effects for low-productivity
households (p < 0.05). Panel B in Table 3.3 shows that the same patterns are observed when
productivity is measured using the fixed-effects approach.
The former set of results show that non-agricultural family business drive the effects of
the program on household profits. This result is consistent with evidence from India documenting
sustained increase in profits for pre-exisiting businesses (Banerjee et al., 2015). One interpretation
is that in the rural Thai context, credit constraints are not as binding for agricultural businesses,
perhaps due to differences in collateralizability of farm versus non-farm assets or due to a pre-
existing credit options targeting agricultural businesses. Indeed, over one-half of the households
in the sample had access to institutional credit at baseline (see Table 3.1), mainly through the
Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) but also through other agriculture-
oriented lenders such as production credit groups (PCGs), and cooperatives. The results suggest
that in the Thai context, a targeted policy oriented at alleviating constraints for non-agricultural
businesses would have complemented the existing government-led agricultural programs.
3.5.3 Effects for owners of pre-existing businesses
While our results are consistent with previous evidence showing that pre-business owner-
ship is a relevant source of heterogeneity (Banerjee et al., 2015), we document a novel result:
there is meaningful heterogeneity based on productivity even among pre-existing business own-
ers.22 Figure 3.3 documents that business profits increased substantially for high-productivity
households with preexisting businesses and not so for low-productivity households who were also
business owners. Column 3 from Table 3.4 complements the graphical evidence by showing that
there is significant productivity-based heterogeneity in the program effects on profits (p < 0.05).
Consistent with our theoretical framework, the results show that there is a sizeable degree of
22We define business owners as households who hold business assets in the period preceding the program.
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heterogeneity among entrepreneurs. Our results are consistent with previous evidence of het-
erogeneity based on observable characteristics in credit-expansion programs (Banerjee et al.,
2015; Crpon et al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2015). However, we build on the existing literature by
showing that unobservable characteristics that are captured by productivity are highly predictive
of business success in the aftermath of a credit expansion program.
Two complementary results are related to the differential effects on profits among busi-
ness owners. First, high-productivity business owners increased total short-term credit differ-
entially.This result is mainly explained by the program crowding in other types of credit since
there is no productivity-based heterogeneity in program borrowing for this sub-sample (see
Columns 1 and 2 from Table 3.4). Second, heterogeneity in the effects of profits seems to be
mainly related to differential increases in business assets between high and low productivity
households (p < 0.10) and not to wage spending or inventories. These results are robust to
estimating productivity following the fixed-effects approach (see Panel B from Table 3.4), and to
the exclusion of potential outliers.23
In order to understand the dynamics of the reduced-form effects on business assets,
Figure 3.4 plots flexible difference-in-difference estimates for high and low productivity owners
of pre-existing businesses. While low-productivity households do not increase business assets
due to the program, high-productivity households start scaling up their businesses as early as
2001. One interpretation is related to expectations about future increases in the supply of credit
that triggered early investments following the announcement of the program, which was one of
the flagship policies of the incoming Government elected on January of 2001. Alternatively, a
rapid adjustment to the new economic conditions induced by the program may allow to capture
very short term effects.24 Overall, the results suggest that high-productivity business owners
were able to increase their profits by scaling up their businesses and complementing the resources
23We top coded the dependent variables with respect to the 99th percentile. Appendix Table C.4 shows that while
the point estimates decrease after truncating the dependent variables, they are more precisely estimated.
24Since the annual resurveys are conducted starting on May of each year over a period of 6 weeks, it is likely that
they are able to capture immediate responses in investments for villages with early program rollout.
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obtained from the program with loans from other type of lenders.
3.5.4 Robustness
One limitation of our empirical analysis is that, due to data limitations, our productivity
estimates do not account for the role of labor, and only capture variation in output conditional on
the stock of capital. As a result, high-productivity households (HighA) are the ones that would
generate more value added given a certain amount of productive capital, but may not be the
ones that would generate more value added holding constant both capital and labor. However,
our estimates of productivity would still capture economically meaningful and policy-relevant
variation in contexts in which the effects of micro-credit programs on household profits are not
likely to be driven by adjustments in labor markets. Our results suggests that such an scenario is
likely to fit the Thai context.25
We report two robustness analyses that try to account for labor using rather rough
proxies.26 First, we replicate the control-function approach including the number of household
members who reported working in household production as their main occupation plus the
number of hired workers as a proxy for labor.27. Second, we replicate our analysis estimating the
production function in per-capita values in order to account for household size which could be
correlated with labor. Appendix Figure C.2 replicates our main results through these approaches.
Though noisier, the patterns are still similar to those corresponding to our main empirical
approach.
25Kaboski and Townsend (2012) fail to find average effects on household spending in labor and provide suggestive
evidence of impacts on the probability of investment in agricultural assets.
26Ideally, we would want to observe information regarding time use. In particular, we would need information of
the amount of hours allocated to household production by household members and the number of work hours by
hired labor.
27We estimate a slightly modified version of our main approach using the two-stage procedure described by
Ackerberg et al. (2015)
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3.6 IV estimates of the returns to credit
In order to provide an approximation of the baht-to-baht relation between total short-term
credit and household productive outcomes for program borrowers, we use the rollout of the
program interacted with the program’s size in each village to estimate the specification from
equation (3.6). We emphasize that results corresponding to IV estimates are only suggestive;
while the reduced-form effects are internally valid and provide estimates of the effects of
the program on household outcomes, the instrumental-variable estimates only deliver causal
estimates under additional assumptions. However, we argue that to the extent that general
equilibrium effects affected borrowers and non-borrowers similarly within a village, our IV
estimates provide us with a tool to compare the approximated financial returns to an extra unit of
credit with other estimates in the literature.
We find that our IV estimates imply sizeable returns to credit for high-productivity
households. First, we focus on the full sample. Table 3.5 reports LATE estimates of an additional
TBH of credit on household income and profits. Columns (1) and (2) from Panel A show that
for each additional TBH of short-term credit induced by the credit expansion program, high
productivity households were able to generate between 1.6-2.3 additional TBH of income on a
given year relative to low-productivity households, using truncated data (top 1%) and raw data
respectively. These estimates imply annual returns to credit of 68-136% for high-productivity
households (See bottom rows form Panel A) and rather small and insignificant negative returns
for low-productivity households.
Second, we find even higher returns to credit when we focus on high-productivity business
owners. The bottom panel of Table 3.6 shows that the effects on business profits are on the order
of TBH 1.8-4 per additional TBH of credit on a given year. These effects are similar to the
effects found by Crpon et al. (2015) in Morocco (2.4) and Banerjee and Duflo (2014) in the case
of a targeted program for medium and large firms in India. Relative to the literature estimating
the returns to cash grants, the returns to credit for Thai high-productivity business owners are as
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high as those of entrepreneurs who were identified as being of “high-growth potential” by their
fellow villagers in India (330% annual, Hussam et al. (2017)).28 and for returns to capital grants
in Mexico of over 700% annual for firms which report being credit constrained (70% monthly,
McKenzie and Woodruff (2008)). Table 3.6 also shows that there are neither meaningful effects
on inventories nor expenditures on wage work, but that there are substantial increases in business
assets in the order of TBH 3.7 to 7.1 per additional TBH of credit, in the case of high-productivity
households. One potential explanation to such magnitudes is that, consistent with the idea of the
program crowding in other sources of credit, the results suggest that households may have also
used cash holdings to complement credit in financing a lumpy investment.
3.6.1 Implied rates of return to investments on business assets
Despite capturing the average annual increase in profits due to an extra unit of credit, our
LATE estimates are not necessarily informative about the rate of return of household projects
which, according to our results, imply expanding pre-existing businesses by acquiring non-
agricultural business assets. The rate of return is an intrinsically policy-relevant parameter as
household may ultimately evaluate the return of their projects against the cost of financing them.
In order to provide an approximation we simply re-scale our estimates of the effect of
credit on profits, by dividing them by our estimates of the effect of credit on business assets (See
the bottom panel in Table 3.6). The implied rates of returns range between 48% to 58% per
annum, depending on whether we use the estimates using truncated data or raw data, respectively.
Such magnitudes are smaller than the LATE estimates, yet substantially higher than the interest
rates charged by the existing lenders in the Thai context: 7% per annum in the case of program
loans, 12% for loans from BAAC bank and 22% for loans from informal lenders. The implied
returns are consistent with other estimates provided in the literature such as 39.6% annual for
pre-existing firms winning a business plan competition in Nigeria (McKenzie, 2017), or estimates
28Hussam et al. (2017) document returns to capital grants as high as 28% monthly
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as large as 66-70% annual for the case of SMEs in Sri-Lanka (de Mel et al., 2008).29
While we find evidence of high rates of return to household investments for the most
productive households, we also found that program borrowing seems orthogonal to productivity,
suggesting misallocation. One implication of these results is that improved screening and
targeting could greatly magnify the impacts of credit expansions. This could potentially entail
improvements in externally identifying high-return entrepreneurs (see Hussam et al. (2017) and
Mckenzie and Sansone (2017)). Alternatively, financial institutions could try to design better
screening mechanisms for self-targeting (Beaman et al., 2014).
3.7 Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this paper we show that cross-household variation in productivity is an important
predictor of heterogeneity in the effects of credit-expansion programs. Our empirical strategy
relies on the unusual availability of three important pieces. First, we needed arguably exogenous
variation in the supply of credit to identify causal effects. The Thai context provided us with
variation from one of the largest credit-expansion programs ever implemented in developing
countries: the Million Baht Village Fund Program (Kaboski and Townsend, 2012, 2011). The
program’s scale also provided us with enough power to conduct heterogeneity analyses. Second,
we needed a rich dataset that allowed us to fully characterize potential borrowers in terms of
pre-program productivity. The Townsend-Thai project (Townsend, 2007a,b) provided us with five
years of pre-program data, which we exploited to implement panel-data econometric methods
to back out estimates of household productivity. At the same time, it provided us with five
post-program years which we use to analyze dynamics, and assess the predictive power of our
productivity estimates and theoretical insights.
The third piece involves a suitable method to estimate household productivity. Popular
methods for estimating production functions generally use variation in investment or intermediate
inputs to non-parametrically control for unobserved productivity shocks (Olley and Pakes, 1996;
29We obtain these values by multiplying the monthly returns reported in the papers by 12.
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Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al., 2015). However, these methods assume frictionless
adjustment of the proxy variables, which is unlikely to hold in the case of credit-constrained
households (Shenoy, 2017). We propose a novel implementation of the control-function approach
using beliefs about future profits as a proxy variable, which makes no assumptions regarding
how investment and inputs are adjusted and allows for the presence of credit constraints.
Our approach is not perfect, yet our main results are robust to alternative approaches with
different assumptions. For instance, our approach does assume that beliefs are updated without
systematic frictions We show that our results are similar when we measure productivity using a
fixed-effects approach that does not rely on beliefs. Second, due to our inability to use time-use
information to proxy for labor, our measures of productivity may capture also variation in labor.
We propose two alternative approaches to incorporate rather imperfect measures of labor, and
show that our main results are robust to these specifications.
Overall, our research design is quite unique in the literature and allows us to uncover a
novel piece of evidence: that high-productivity households are best able to convert increased
credit supply into profits and boost investment. This result is driven by heterogeneous increases in
profits for non-agricultural businesses. Moreover, we also find that even among households with
pre-existing non-agricultural businesses, there is a great deal of productivity-based heterogeneity
in the returns to credit. In the case of high baseline productivity business owners, we document
high returns to credit consistent with high-returns to capital grants in developing countries
(de Mel et al., 2008; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; Hussam et al., 2017). We also find that these
high returns coincide with households scaling up their non-agricultural businesses. Business
assets increased almost immediately after program funds were first dispensed, and imply internal
rate of returns in the range of 48 to 58% over a five-year period, which are consistent with
estimates from cash-grant studies (de Mel et al., 2008; McKenzie, 2017).
Our results highlight two important policy implications. First, our results suggests that
large-scale credit interventions may provide resources to sectors facing stronger credit constraints.
In our setting, we find evidence of high marginal returns to credit for high-productivity non-
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agricultural businesses and not so for farm businesses. Non-agricultural businesses were not the
target of pre-existing agriculture-oriented lenders such as the state-owned Bank for Agriculture
and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). While our results speak directly to the context of rural
and peri-urban Thailand, the lessons may still apply to settings in which policy efforts to alleviate
financial frictions are mostly focussed in one particular sector.
Second, our results imply that improved screening and targeting could greatly magnify
the impacts of credit expansions. While we document high-returns to credit for high productivity
households, we also find that program borrowing was orthogonal to baseline productivity. Thus
the policy challenge involves effectively targeting high-productivity entrepreneurs. This could
potentially entail improvements in externally identifying entrepreneurs (see Fafchamps and
Woodruff (2017), Hussam et al. (2017), and Mckenzie and Sansone (2017)). Alternatively,
financial institutions could try to design better screening mechanisms for self-targeting (Beaman
et al., 2014). From an academic perspective, more evidence regarding the extent to which
different screening mechanisms or lending schemes prevent high-productivity households from
obtaining credit is needed. For instance, using the context of the Million Baht program, Vera-
Cossio (2018) shows that government-funded programs with a community-based approach can
be vulnerable to resource capture leading to misallocation. In contrast, Beaman et al. (2014) show
that, in absence of government intervention, interest rates may allow high-return households to
self-select into credit. Yet, it is not clear how tools intended to screen low-risk clients such as
peer referrals, group lending, scoring models, or alternative lending schemes such as self-help
groups, promote or preclude the provision of credit to high-return clients.
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3.8 Figures
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Figure 3.1. Effects of the program rollout on short-term credit
Note: The figure depicts flexible estimates corresponding to the specification in (3.5). Each dot represents differences in program borrowing between households from villages with high and
low per-capita program funds, for each year with respect to the year of the announcement of the program (2001). Each coefficient has been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the
effect of an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. High A: household belongs to the top-third of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Low
A: households belongs to the bottom two-thirds of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Productivity estimates correspond to the control function approach using household
beliefs about profits as a proxy variable. 95 % confidence intervals are computed based on standard errors, which are clustered at the village level to account for the empirical design.
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Figure 3.2. Reduced-form effects on household income - Proxy-variable approach
Note: The figure depicts flexible estimates corresponding to the specification in (3.5).Each dot represents differences in income between households from villages with high and low per-capita
program funds, for each year with respect to the year of the announcement of the program (2001). Each coefficient has been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the effect of
an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. High A: household belongs to the top-third of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Low A:
households belongs to the bottom two-thirds of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Productivity estimates correspond to the control function approach using household
beliefs about profits as a proxy variable. 95 % confidence intervals are computed based on standard errors, which are clustered at the village level to account for the empirical design.
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Figure 3.3. Reduced-form effects on business profits - Business owners only
Note: The figure depicts flexible estimates corresponding to the specification in (3.5).Each dot represents differences in program borrowing between households from villages with high and
low per-capita program funds, for each year with respect to the year of the announcement of the program (2001). Each coefficient has been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the
effect of an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. The effects are estimated over a sample of 230 households who reported holding business assets during
the year preceding the rollout of the program. High A: household belongs to the top-third of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Low A: households belongs to the bottom
two-thirds of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Productivity estimates correspond to the control function approach using household beliefs about profits as a proxy variable.
95 % confidence intervals are computed based on standard errors, which are clustered at the village level to account for the empirical design. The dependent variable is winsorized with respect
to the top and bottom 1% of the distribution.
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Figure 3.4. Reduced-form effects on business assets for owners of pre-existing businesses
Note: The figure depicts flexible estimates corresponding to the specification in (3.5). Each dot represents differences in program borrowing between households from villages with high and
low per-capita program funds, for each year with respect to the year of the announcement of the program (2001). Each coefficient has been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the
effect of an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. The effects are estimated over a sample of 230 households who reported holding business assets during
the year preceding the rollout of the program. High A: household belongs to the top-third of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Low A: households belongs to the bottom
two-thirds of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Productivity estimates correspond to the control function approach using household beliefs about profits as a proxy variable.
95 % confidence intervals are computed based on standard errors, which are clustered at the village level to account for the empirical design. The dependent variable is winsorized with respect
to the top and bottom 1% of the distribution.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1. Baseline Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD
Household head is a male 4423 0.74 0.44
Age (household head) 4423 52.85 13.43
Years of schooling (household head) 4343 6.04 3.18
Number of household members 4603 4.44 2.06
Farm (share of net operating income) 4291 0.5 2.29
Fish/shrimp (share of net operating income) 4291 -0.03 2.4
Off-farm business (share of net operating income) 4291 0.1 0.82
Wage income (share of net operating income) 4291 0.43 1.88
Number of household off-farm businesses 4423 0.35 0.55
Household opened a new business (past 12 months) 4603 0.04 0.2
Net per-capita income (TBH) 4423 21299.6 34592.26
Per-capita consumption spending (TBH) 4423 12046.87 35602.31
Household borrows (institution or informal) 4603 0.78 0.41
Household borrows from formal/quasi-formal sources of credit 4603 0.56 0.5
Household borrows from informal sources of credit 4603 0.49 0.5
Note: The table presents summary statistics corresponding to the study sample and survey waves preceding the program (1997-2001). Farm activities includes cultivation of several crops
as well as livestock produce. Institutional credit includes credit from commercial banks, BAAC (the state-owned bank) and other quasi-formal sources of credit such as cooperatives, and
village-credit groups.
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Table 3.2. Estimates of Value-added Production Functions
(1) (2) (3)
Log Value Added
OLS FE Control function
βk 0.360*** 0.015 0.380***
(0.025) (0.036) (0.050)
Observations 2,622 2,622 2,622
R-squared 0.137 0.004
# of Households 835 835 835
Persistance ω 0.238***
(0.032)
Mean ω 5.15 9.67 4.98
SD ω 1.02 1.17 0.06
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents estimates of the elasticity of value-added with respect to capital βk obtained using the 5 survey waves preceding the program (1997-2001). Column (1) presents OLS
estimates for reference, columns (2)-(3) present estimates computed through the fixed-effects approach and the control-function approach, respectively. The bottom panel presents summary
statistics for the estimates of log-productivity (ω = log(A)). Standard errors corresponding to the control-function approach are computed using block bootstrap with 1000 iterations.
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Table 3.3. Reduced-form Effects of the Program on Household Profits
136
Pa
ne
lA
:P
ro
xy
-v
ar
ia
bl
e
ap
pr
oa
ch
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
V
F
sh
or
t-
te
rm
C
re
di
t
Sh
or
t-
te
rm
C
re
di
t
H
ou
se
ho
ld
In
co
m
e
W
ag
e
In
co
m
e
Pr
ofi
ts
Fa
rm
Pr
ofi
ts
Sh
ri
m
p/
Fi
sh
Pr
ofi
ts
B
us
in
es
s
Pr
ofi
ts
Po
st
X
In
v
H
H
X
H
ig
h
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
0.
03
14
0.
64
3
3.
30
9*
*
0.
47
1
3.
28
6*
*
0.
57
9
-0
.1
09
2.
81
6*
*
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.3
83
)
(1
.6
42
)
(0
.3
93
)
(1
.2
74
)
(0
.4
37
)
(0
.1
33
)
(1
.2
25
)
[0
.0
77
]
[0
.4
73
]
[1
.6
21
]
[0
.4
51
]
[1
.5
03
]
[0
.4
57
]
[0
.1
79
]
[1
.4
26
]
Po
st
X
In
v
H
H
0.
61
2*
**
0.
78
1*
*
-0
.8
30
0.
10
6
-0
.6
01
-0
.2
27
-0
.0
39
1
-0
.3
35
(0
.1
24
)
(0
.2
82
)
(0
.5
41
)
(0
.2
09
)
(0
.4
65
)
(0
.2
87
)
(0
.0
84
5)
(0
.4
31
)
[0
.1
10
]
[0
.3
66
]
[0
.5
86
]
[0
.2
30
]
[0
.5
60
]
[0
.3
26
]
[0
.0
90
]
[0
.4
76
]
E
ff
ec
tf
or
H
ig
h
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
0.
64
4*
**
1.
42
4*
*
2.
47
8*
0.
57
7
2.
68
5*
0.
35
2
-0
.1
48
2.
48
1*
SE
0.
06
71
0.
48
5
1.
42
1
0.
32
9
1.
30
1
0.
45
9
0.
18
9
1.
12
2
SE
(b
oo
ts
tr
ap
)
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.6
17
]
[1
.4
39
]
[0
.3
69
]
[1
.5
03
]
[0
.5
19
]
[0
.2
55
]
[1
.2
99
]
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
N
um
be
ro
fh
ou
se
ho
ld
s
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
R
-S
qu
ar
ed
0.
58
6
0.
38
3
0.
51
6
0.
72
9
0.
47
9
0.
25
2
0.
30
1
0.
42
5
Pa
ne
lB
:F
ix
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
ap
pr
oa
ch
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
V
F
sh
or
t-
te
rm
C
re
di
t
Sh
or
t-
te
rm
C
re
di
t
H
ou
se
ho
ld
In
co
m
e
W
ag
e
In
co
m
e
Pr
ofi
ts
Fa
rm
Pr
ofi
ts
Sh
ri
m
p/
Fi
sh
Pr
ofi
ts
B
us
in
es
s
Pr
ofi
ts
Po
st
X
In
v
H
H
X
H
ig
h
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
-0
.2
39
**
*
0.
02
43
3.
28
2*
0.
56
8
2.
67
8*
0.
32
8
-0
.1
72
2.
52
1
(0
.0
69
7)
(0
.5
09
)
(1
.7
82
)
(0
.3
81
)
(1
.5
28
)
(0
.6
07
)
(0
.2
05
)
(1
.5
28
)
Po
st
X
In
v
H
H
0.
69
6*
**
0.
98
3*
**
-0
.5
55
0.
11
4
-0
.1
49
-0
.0
67
6
-0
.0
14
7
-0
.0
67
2
(0
.0
82
7)
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.4
26
)
(0
.2
27
)
(0
.3
82
)
(0
.2
56
)
(0
.0
69
1)
(0
.3
41
)
E
ff
ec
tf
or
H
ig
h
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
0.
45
7
1.
00
7
2.
72
7
0.
68
2
2.
52
9
0.
26
1
-0
.1
86
2.
45
4
SE
0.
10
1
0.
62
4
1.
68
3
0.
30
0
1.
59
4
0.
64
1
0.
23
8
1.
46
2
B
as
el
in
e
m
ea
n
(D
V
)
31
.6
2
16
59
6.
5
98
84
5.
5
33
45
8.
4
41
84
4.
6
25
41
4.
5
11
14
.5
15
31
5.
7
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
86
59
N
um
be
ro
fh
ou
se
ho
ld
s
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
92
2
R
-S
qu
ar
ed
0.
58
8
0.
38
7
0.
51
6
0.
72
9
0.
47
9
0.
25
2
0.
30
2
0.
42
6
∗∗
∗p
<
0.
01
,∗
∗p
<
0.
05
,∗
p
<
0.
1
N
ot
e:
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
re
du
ce
d-
fo
rm
es
tim
at
es
of
th
e
ef
fe
ct
s
of
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
as
a
fu
nc
tio
n
of
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
es
tim
at
ed
th
ro
ug
h
th
e
pr
ox
y-
va
ri
ab
le
ap
pr
oa
ch
(P
an
el
A
)a
nd
th
e
fix
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
ap
pr
oa
ch
(P
an
el
B
).
T
he
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
ha
ve
be
en
sc
al
ed
do
w
n
by
1,
00
0,
00
0
in
or
de
r
to
ca
pt
ur
e
th
e
ef
fe
ct
of
an
ad
di
tio
na
lp
er
-c
ap
ita
T
B
H
in
ea
ch
vi
lla
ge
on
th
e
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
ou
tc
om
e.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
vi
lla
ge
le
ve
l(
64
cl
us
te
rs
)
to
ac
co
un
tf
or
th
e
qu
as
i-
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ta
ld
es
ig
n.
Pa
ne
lA
al
so
pr
es
en
ts
bo
ot
st
ra
p
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
,w
hi
ch
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
us
in
g
50
0
bo
ot
st
ra
p
sa
m
pl
es
an
d
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
vi
lla
ge
le
ve
l.
Sh
or
t-
te
rm
cr
ed
it
in
vo
lv
es
lo
an
s
w
ith
a
te
rm
sh
or
te
r
th
an
a
ye
ar
.
H
ou
se
ho
ld
pr
ofi
ts
in
cl
ud
e
fa
rm
,fi
sh
in
g
an
d
sh
ri
m
pi
ng
an
d
of
f-
fa
rm
bu
si
ne
ss
pr
ofi
ts
.
Fa
rm
pr
ofi
ts
in
cl
ud
e
pr
ofi
ts
fr
om
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
an
d
liv
es
to
ck
.
137
Table 3.4. Reduced-form Effects of the Program on Off-farm Business Activities
Panel A: Proxy-variable approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VF short-term credit Total short-term credit Profits Non-wage Expenses Wage Expenses Assets
Post X Inv HH X High Productivity -0.00998 2.148* 11.21** 1.138 0.480 16.35*
(0.167) (0.990) (4.401) (5.938) (0.352) (8.814)
[0.165] [1.135] [5.069] [5.506] [0.365] [8.972]
Post X Inv HH 0.577*** 0.606 -0.487 -3.751 -0.0840 -0.304
(0.194) (0.516) (1.403) (2.424) (0.120) (1.144)
[0.220] [0.689] [2.267] [2.654] [0.226] [2.655]
Effect-High Productivity 0.567*** 2.754** 10.72** -2.613 0.396 16.04*
SE 0.135 1.154 3.937 5.335 0.368 9.403
SE (bootstrap) [0.171] [1.207] [4.133] [5.111] [0.364] [9.008]
Baseline mean (DV) 11.75 21237.0 50973.5 109802.4 7291.8 119203.8
Observations 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190
Number of households 229 229 229 229 229 229
R-Squared 0.590 0.509 0.439 0.468 0.470 0.589
Panel B: Fixed-effects approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VF short-term credit Total short-term credit Profits Non-wage Expenses Wage Expenses Assets
Post X Inv HH X High Productivity -0.434*** 1.211 11.61*** -3.524 0.409 13.52
(0.145) (1.152) (3.689) (6.485) (0.490) (9.362)
Post X Inv HH 0.719*** 1.012*** -0.159 -2.055 -0.0306 1.161
(0.144) (0.364) (1.103) (1.343) (0.108) (2.308)
Effect High Productivity 0.285 2.223 11.45 -5.578 0.379 14.68
SE 0.231 1.394 3.812 6.237 0.462 9.600
Baseline mean (DV) 11.75 21237.0 50973.5 109802.4 7291.8 119203.8
Observations 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190
Number of households 229 229 229 229 229 229
R-Squared 0.592 0.511 0.439 0.469 0.471 0.588
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table reports the reduced-form estimates of the effects of the program as a function of productivity estimated through the proxy-variable approach (Panel A) and the fixed-effects
approach (Panel B). The coefficients have been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the effect of an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level (64 clusters) to account for the quasi-experimental design. Panel A also presents bootstrap standard errors in brackets, which are computed using 500
bootstrap samples and clustered at the village level. The estimating sample includes only household who reported owning business assets the year preceding the rollout of the program.
138
Table 3.5. IV Estimates of the Effects of Total Credit on Income and Profits
Panel A: IV estimates of the effect of credit on household income (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Income Wage Income Total Profits
Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized
Total Short Term Credit * High Productivity 2.292* 1.658** 0.341 0.314 2.535** 1.211***
(1.345) (0.839) (0.399) (0.380) (1.022) (0.399)
[1.239] [0.727] [0.404] [0.406] [1.062] [0.580]
Total Short Term Credit -0.932 -0.978** 0.147 0.123 -0.778 -0.825***
(0.625) (0.476) (0.279) (0.273) (0.503) (0.308)
[0.879] [0.564] [0.357] [0.352] [0.738] [0.416]
Effect- High Productivity 1.361* 0.681 0.488** 0.436 1.757** 0.386
SE 1.060 0.616 0.243 0.211 0.936 0.352
SE bootstrap [0.778] [0.455] [0.245] [0.226] [0.777] [0.423]
Panel B: IV estimates of the effect of credit on Profits by source (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Farm Fishing/Shrimping Off-farm Business
Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized
Total Short Term Credit * High Productivity 0.471 0.418 -0.0849 0.0239 2.149* 0.769**
(0.359) (0.301) (0.0955) (0.0291) (1.076) (0.387)
[0.499] [0.394] [0.097] [0.060] [1.125] [0.519]
Total Short Term Credit -0.332 -0.495** -0.0291 -0.0153 -0.417 -0.315
(0.322) (0.245) (0.0836) (0.0285) (0.501) (0.323)
[0.494] [0.408] [0.090] [0.059] [0.759] [0.285]
Effect- High Productivity 0.139 -0.0766 -0.114 0.00860 1.732** 0.454
SE 0.309 0.244 0.147 0.00694 0.869 0.283
SE bootstrap [0.334] [0.208] [0.151] [0.013] [0.679] [0.373]
First-stage F-stat: Short Term Credit 5.403
First-Stage F-stat: Interaction 5.126
Observations 8650
Number of households 914
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table reports the instrumental-variables estimates of the effects of total short-term credit as a function of productivity estimated through the proxy-variable approach. Panel A
presents effects on income by source and Panel B presents effects on profits by type of activity. Odd-numbered columns report IV coefficients after winsorizing the respective dependent
variable with respect to the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the village level (64 clusters) to account for the quasi-experimental design. Bootstrap standard errors are
presented in brackets, and are computed using 500 bootstrap samples and clustered at the village level. Short-term credit involves program loans with a term shorter than a year, and has been
top coded with respect to the 99th percentile for precision. Household profits include farm, fishing and shrimping and off-farm business profits.
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Table 3.6. IV Estimates of the Effect of Total Credit on Off-farm Businesses (Pre-existing
Businesses Only)
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Supplementary figures and tables
Table A.1. Distribution of Targeted Households by Alternative Criteria
Panel A: Distribution of households under alternative allocation criteria
Means testing Credit score Random assignment
Included in alternative only 24.08 21.97 19.48
Included in MBVF only 25.21 23.1 21.17
Included in both allocations 34.65 36.76 40.95
Excluded from both allocations 16.06 18.17 18.4
Panel B: Share of program beneficiaries which would have been excluded from the benchmark criteria
Means testing Credit score Random assignment
Share 0.42 0.39 0.34
Note: The table presents the distribution of households across different targeting criteria. Each column represents an alternative targeting criteria–means testing, credit score, and random
assignment. The first row in Panel A presents the share of households which would have been targeted by only the alternative targeting criterion but did not obtain credit from the program.
The second row presents the share of households that obtained a loan from the program but would not have been eligible for a loan under the alternative criterion. The third row presents the
share of households that obtained loans from the MBVF and would have also be eligible by the alternative criterion. The fourth row presents the share of households which would have been
ineligible by the alternative criterion and did not borrow from the program. The reference period corresponds to the first two years following the implementation of the program. Panel B
presents the share of program beneficiaries who would have been ineligible by alternative targeting criteria.
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Figure A.1. Cumulative Distribution Functions of Baseline Consumption and Productivity by
Different Criteria
Note: The top panel shows the cumulative density functions (CDF) of per-capita consumption (in logs) , measured at baseline, for households served by the program, and the baseline
distribution of log per-capita consumption for households who would have been reached under the alternative criterion (MT). The bottom panel shows CDFs of value-added total factor
productivity, measured at baseline, for households served by the program and for households who would have been reached under the alternative criterion. Both variables are centered with
respect to the village mean in order to perform within-village comparisons. Per-capita consumption is measured as the total per-capita expenditure on consumption goods during the 12 months
preceding the implementation of the program. Baseline total factor productivity is estimated using capital and labor elasticities corresponding to a value-added production function estimated
as in Ackerberg et al. (2015).
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Table A.2. Connections and Baseline Borrower Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Access to institutional credit Avg. delinquency rate Ever missed a payment Income volatility
Connected 0.155*** -0.003 0.133*** 0.308***
(0.036) (0.007) (0.040) (0.084)
Constant 0.478*** 0.027*** 0.264*** 0.591***
(0.028) (0.006) (0.031) (0.068)
Observations 649 616 616 649
R-squared 0.325 0.052 0.169 0.122
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents within-village comparisons of baseline characteristics across elite members or households directly connected with local elites and unconnected households. The table
presents OLS coefficients from cross-section regressions of each baseline characteristic (columns) on an indicator that captures whether the household includes a village council member, a
first-degree kin of council members or a member with pre-program socioeconomic interactions with village council member (Connected), after controlling for village fixed effects. Access to
institutional credit is an indicator of whether a household held any loan from either formal lenders or quasi-formal lenders. The delinquency rate is computed as the share of loans for which
the household had made any delinquent payments and is computed using repayment information for loans from all lender types, including loans from relatives and informal lenders. Income
volatility: log of the coefficient of variation of monthly income computed over all the survey waves preceding the program. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.3. Connections with Local Elites and Indicators of Poverty and Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log per-capita consumption (N=660)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Connected 0.058 0.124* 0.005 0.057 0.152** -0.029
(0.057) (0.067) (0.055) (0.050) (0.070) (0.076)
Panel B: Total factor productivity (logs) (N=637)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Connected 0.003 0.114** 0.084** 0.032 -0.102* -0.173***
(0.047) (0.050) (0.042) (0.047) (0.056) (0.051)
Panel C: Asset turnover (log revenues/assets) (N=680)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Connected 0.007 0.021*** 0.018** 0.022 0.008 -0.007
(0.040) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.052) (0.151)
Panel D: Profitability margin (profits/revenues) (N=684)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Connected -0.045 -0.111 -0.032 -0.100*** -0.044*** -0.021**
(0.033) (0.068) (0.034) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
Panel E: Total factor productivity (logs) -Revenue function dynamic panel (N=637)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Connected -0.244*** -0.002 -0.077 -0.194*** -0.238*** -0.317***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.059) (0.058) (0.080) (0.120)
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: Column (1) presents coefficients corresponding to a regression of baseline characteristics on an indicator of won an indicator that captures whether the household includes a village
council member, a first-degree kin of council members or a member with pre-program socioeconomic interactions with village council member (Connected). Columns (2)-(6) present results for
equivalent quantile regressions. The bandwidth used for the estimation of quantile regressions was selected using Hall-Sheather’s method. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Panel A reports results for baseline per-capita consumption (in logs). Baseline per-capita consumption is measured as total expenditures during the 12 months preceding the implementation
of the program. Panel B reports results for baseline log total factor productivity estimates recovered using capital and labor elasticities corresponding to a value-added production function
estimated as in Ackerberg et al. (2015). Panel C presents results for baseline asset turnover ratio (in logs) computed as the average ratio of total revenues over a calendar year divided by
the average stock of fixed assets in each household, over the two calendar years preceding the program’s rollout (1999-2000). Panel D presents estimates for baseline profitability margins
measured as the average ratio of net revenues (net of costs of purchased inputs outside the household) to gross revenues in a given year. Panel E presents results for baseline log total factor
productivity estimates recovered using capital, labor, and intermediate inputs elasticities corresponding to a gross-revenue function estimated using a dynamic panel estimator.
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Figure A.2. Average Village Lending
Note: The top panel shows depicts village means for total lending in the months around the program rollout. The dotted line denotes the month preceding the release of the program’s funds.
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Table A.4. Effects on Program and Total Borrowing
Panel A: Effects on credit from the program
Any credit from MBVF Gross debt from MBVF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All Connected Unconnected All Connected Unconnected
Postvt 0.328*** 0.384*** 0.233*** 5,529.391*** 7,092.555*** 2,538.676***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.029) (373.757) (527.504) (409.526)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008]
Observations 23,228 14,830 8,398 23,155 14,779 8,376
R-squared 0.613 0.632 0.564 0.590 0.619 0.523
Clusters (# households) 671 430 241 671 430 241
Panel B: Effects on total credit
Any credit Total Gross outstanding debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All Connected Unconnected All Connected Unconnected
Postvt 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.086*** 3,264.857* 4,689.658* 601.350
(0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (1,965.708) (2,642.890) (2,863.731)
[0.000] [0.004] [0.008] [0.120] [0.124] [0.856]
Observations 23,228 14,830 8,398 23,128 14,795 8,333
R-squared 0.661 0.628 0.660 0.866 0.825 0.910
Baseline DV mean 0.665 0.747 0.521 60747 59840 62356
Clusters (# households) 671 430 241 671 430 241
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on total borrowing, by connectedness with the local elite. The reported
coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the resources from the program were released in village v in month t, controlling for household
fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects ( see equation (2.2)). Estimations were performed using all the available observations for the 18 months before and after the rollout
of the program in each village. Panel A reports results for the effect of the rollout of the program on the program’s uptake and Panel B shows results for total borrowing (winsorizing the top
1% of observations). Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible serial correlation. P-values that account for potential within village
correlation are presented in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for a reduced number of clusters (16) as in Cameron and Miller (2015). Connected:
households who reported having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey waves preceding the release of the funds from the program.
Unconnected: households without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Table A.5. Short-run Effects on Credit from Non-program Institutional Lenders
Panel A: Effects on any credit from non-program institutional lenders
BAAC Local credit groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All Connected Unconnected All Connected Unconnected
Postvt 0.015* 0.014 0.020 0.015 0.024 0.010
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
[0.092] [0.184] [0.120] [0.412] [0.352] [0.668]
Observations 23,228 14,830 8,398 23,228 14,830 8,398
R-squared 0.842 0.830 0.852 0.666 0.661 0.643
Baseline DV mean 0.366 0.434 0.247 0.255 0.313 0.152
Clusters (# households) 671 430 241 671 430 241
Panel B: Effects on total credit from non-program instutional lenders
BAAC local credit groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All Connected Unconnected All Connected Unconnected
Postvt 602.755 552.604 1,018.859 114.126 97.648 350.761
(1,074.413) (1,728.284) (1,069.061) (660.160) (852.427) (1,075.008)
[0.392] [0.620] [0.324] [0.544] [0.544] [0.632]
Observations 23,095 14,747 8,348 23,106 14,747 8,359
R-squared 0.876 0.857 0.914 0.773 0.796 0.720
Baseline DV mean 23369 26650 17565 6890 8409 4204
Clusters (# households) 670 430 240 671 430 241
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on borrowing from non-program institutional lenders, by connectedness with
the local elite. The reported coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the resources from the program were released in village v in month
t, controlling for household fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects ( see equation (2.2)). Estimations were performed using all the available observations for the 18 months
before and after the rollout of the program in each village. Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible serial correlation. P-values that
account for potential within village correlation are presented in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for a reduced number of clusters (16) as in Cameron
and Miller (2015). Connected: households who reported having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey waves preceding the release of
the funds from the program. Unconnected: households without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Figure A.3. Short-term Effects on Lending to Other Households
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Note: The figure depicts OLS point estimates from a flexible difference-in-difference model following equation 1.6. The left panel presents estimates for the probability of lending to other
households, and the right panel presents estimates for total lending to other households. Each dependent variable was regressed on household fixed effects, calendar month and year fixed
effects, and a set of indicators that denote time to treatment. Each dot represents the coefficient associated with each of these indicators. The base category corresponds to the period preceding
the first month of operation of the fund: τvt =−1. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the household level, to account for serial correlation. The estimation
sample includes only households with baseline connections with the local elites.
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Table A.6. Short-run Effects on Lending to Other Households
Connected Unconnected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Any lending Total lending Any lending Total lending
Post 0.033** 730.314 0.011 398.918
(0.014) (917.580) (0.016) (431.449)
[0.016] [0.548] [0.424] [0.432]
Observations 13,212 13,097 6,948 6,879
R-squared 0.783 0.862 0.783 0.675
Baseline DV mean 0.207 6148 0.140 2798
Clusters (# households) 367 365 193 193
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on lending to other households, by connectedness with the local elite. The
reported coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the resources from the program were released in village v in month t, controlling for
household fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects ( see equation (2.2)). Estimations were performed using all the available observations for the 18 months before and after the
rollout of the program in each village. Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible serial correlation. P-values that account for potential
within village correlation are presented in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for a reduced number of clusters (16) as in Cameron and Miller (2015).
Connected: households who reported having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey waves preceding the release of the funds from the
program. Unconnected: households without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Figure A.4. Short-term effects on Total Borrowing
Note: The figure depicts OLS point estimates from a flexible difference-in-difference model following equation 1.6. The top panel reports coefficients for the probability of holding any
outstanding loan from any source (both institutional and informal). The bottom panel presents results for the stock of outstanding debt. Results for connected households are shown in the
left-hand panels while results for unconnected households are shown in the right-hand panels. Each dependent variable was regressed on household fixed effects, calendar month and year
fixed effects, and a set of indicators that denote time to treatment. Each dot represents the coefficient associated with each of these indicators. The base category corresponds to the period
preceding the first month of operation of the fund: τvt =−1. Confidence intervals are constructed using standard errors clustered at the household level, to account for serial correlation.
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Table A.7. Summary Statistics for Baseline Characteristics( 1999-2000)
Summary statistics N=675
Panel A: Demographic characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household size 4.09 1.78 1.00 14.75
Males 1.94 1.11 0.00 8.00
Females 2.14 1.15 0.00 6.75
Mean hh age 35.59 13.78 12.15 89.88
Head of household is male 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00
Mean hh years of schooling 4.27 2.39 0.00 16.00
Panel B: Land and wealth
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Landless 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Land in hectares 21.46 32.66 0.00 320.00
Land value/Assets 0.48 0.34 0.00 0.99
Total household assets 1826612 6393885 3463 143000000
Panel C: Revenues
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total household revenues 224866 630660 0 11900000
Cultivation (share) 0.34 0.35 0 1
Livestock (share) 0.08 0.21 0 1
Fishing-Shrimping (share) 0.06 0.18 0 1
Off-farm business (share) 0.11 0.26 0 1
Wage labor (share) 0.32 0.36 0 1
Other (share) 0.09 0.18 0 1
Cultivation (any) 0.74 0.44 0 1
Livestock (any) 0.65 0.48 0 1
Fishing-Shrimping (any) 0.41 0.49 0 1
Off-farm business (any) 0.31 0.46 0 1
Wage labor (any) 0.78 0.42 0 1
Other (any) 0.84 0.37 0 1
Number of sources of revenue 3.73 1.30 0 6
Panel D: Per-capita annual income and consumption ( 1999 TBH)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Per-capita income 21306 90105 0 2030435
Per-capita consumption 15060 13271 0 193597
Note: The table presents summary statistics for demographic and productive characteristics corresponding to the two years preceding the rollout of the MBVF program for the households in
the Townsend-Thai Monthly Survey.
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Table A.8. Summary Statistics for Credit Adoption by Type of Lender
Panel A: Full sample (N=643)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Any loans ( any source) 0.67 1 0.47 0 1
Any formal/quasi-formal loans 0.58 1 0.49 0 1
Any informal loans 0.31 0 0.46 0 1
Number of loans (total) 1.76 1 2.14 0 18
Number of loans (formal+quasi-formal) 1.12 1 1.32 0 8
Number of loans (informal) 0.64 0 1.39 0 14
Gross stock of debt (total) 60747 20000 120655 0 1015000
Gross stock of debt (formal+quasi-formal) 50235 9500 110795 0 890000
Gross stock of debt (informal) 8076 0 21900 0 200000
Panel B: Village council members (elites) (N=60)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Any loans ( any source) 0.85 1 0.36 0 1
Any formal/quasi-formal loans 0.82 1 0.38 0 1
Any informal loans 0.33 0 0.47 0 1
Number of loans (total) 2.82 2 2.66 0 17
Number of loans (formal+quasi-formal) 2.11 2 1.75 0 8
Number of loans (informal) 0.70 0 1.47 0 11
Gross stock of debt (total) 81791 39625 116003 0 762000
Gross stock of debt (formal+quasi-formal) 72502 30900 114488 0 762000
Gross stock of debt (informal) 9289 0 22731 0 172000
Panel C: Households with baseline connections with the elites (N=352)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Any loans ( any source) 0.73 1 0.44 0 1
Any formal/quasi-formal loans 0.66 1 0.47 0 1
Any informal loans 0.34 0 0.47 0 1
Number of loans (total) 2.03 1 2.26 0 18
Number of loans (formal+quasi-formal) 1.29 1 1.32 0 8
Number of loans (informal) 0.74 0 1.54 0 14
Gross stock of debt (total) 56200 22000 104156 0 795400
Gross stock of debt (formal+quasi-formal) 46085 15000 96334 0 795400
Gross stock of debt (informal) 8477 0 21734 0 200000
Panel D: Households without baseline connections with the elites (N=231)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Any loans ( any source) 0.52 1 0.50 0 1
Any formal/quasi-formal loans 0.39 0 0.49 0 1
Any informal loans 0.25 0 0.43 0 1
Number of loans (total) 1.09 1 1.53 0 10
Number of loans (formal+quasi-formal) 0.61 0 0.93 0 6
Number of loans (informal) 0.49 0 1.09 0 8
Gross stock of debt (total) 62356 2780 142614 0 1015000
Gross stock of debt (formal+quasi-formal) 50936 0 128394 0 890000
Gross stock of debt (informal) 7160 0 21908 0 200000
Note: The table presents summary statistics for the probability of holding a loan, the number of outstanding loans, and gross stock of debt in a given month, by type of lender. Formal loans
include loans from the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives or commercial banks. Quasi-formal loans include loans from cooperatives, production credit groups (PCGs), village
funds and other village organizations. Informal loans include loans both from personal lenders and relatives inside or outside of the village. Connected: households who reported having any
socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey waves preceding the release of the funds from the program. Unconnected: households without any
direct connection with members of the village council.
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Table A.9. Demographic Characteristics by Membership in the Village Council
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Table A.10. Baseline Socioeconomic and Kinship Relationships with Village Council Members
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Village council member (elites) 643 0.09 0.00 0.29 0 1
Directly transacts with elites 643 0.55 1.00 0.50 0 1
Degree with the elites 643 1.32 1.00 1.55 0 8
Geodesic distance to elites (excludes singletons) 631 1.30 1.00 0.72 0 4
Closeness to the elite 643 0.48 0.50 0.20 0 1
First degree relative with the elites 643 0.13 0.00 0.34 0 1
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Table A.11. Summary Statistics for Connections with the Elite
Type of transaction Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Assets purchase 583 0.06 0.24 0 1
Assets sale 583 0.05 0.23 0 1
Contribution/Transfer 583 0.02 0.13 0 1
Gift reception 583 0.05 0.22 0 1
Lending 583 0.05 0.22 0 1
Borrowing 583 0.08 0.27 0 1
Paid employee 583 0.25 0.43 0 1
Employer 583 0.11 0.32 0 1
Provides unpaid labor 583 0.22 0.42 0 1
Receives unpaid labor 583 0.21 0.41 0 1
Input sale 583 0.10 0.30 0 1
Input reception 583 0.30 0.46 0 1
Output sale 583 0.13 0.34 0 1
Output purchase 583 0.19 0.39 0 1
Note: Input sale and reception include physical inputs as well as mentoring and advising. Socioeconomic interactions are based on data corresponding to the periods preceding the rollout of
the program. Calculations exclude village council members.
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Table A.12. Poverty and Productivity by Baseline Access to Credit and Alternative Targeting
Criteria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log per-capita consumption (N=660)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
High Baseline access to institutional credit 0.161*** 0.143** 0.060 0.082 0.195*** 0.164
(0.060) (0.064) (0.057) (0.061) (0.057) (0.116)
Panel B: Total factor productivity (logs) (N=637)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
High Baseline access to institutional credit -0.067 -0.051* -0.027 0.007 -0.087* -0.147**
(0.044) (0.030) (0.034) (0.047) (0.051) (0.068)
Panel C: Log per-capita consumption (N=660)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Offered credit under means-testing criterion -0.417*** -0.253*** -0.309*** -0.428*** -0.500*** -0.577***
(0.051) (0.067) (0.054) (0.050) (0.060) (0.075)
Panel D: Total factor productivity (logs) (N=637)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Offered credit under means-testing criterion -0.017 0.182*** 0.139*** 0.017 -0.131*** -0.178***
(0.039) (0.029) (0.031) (0.049) (0.047) (0.066)
Panel E: Log per-capita consumption (N=660)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Offered credit based on credit score 0.096* 0.080 0.072 0.126*** 0.204*** 0.177**
(0.053) (0.062) (0.051) (0.049) (0.058) (0.082)
Panel F: Total factor productivity (logs) (N=637)
Mean Percentiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Offered credit based on credit score 0.069* 0.020 0.059* 0.074* 0.119*** 0.077
(0.038) (0.034) (0.033) (0.041) (0.043) (0.064)
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: Column (1) presents coefficients corresponding to a regression of baseline characteristics on an indicator of whether a household obtained institutional credit during the baseline periods
(Panels A and B), an indicator of whether a household would have been offered credit under a counterfactual means-testing criterion( Panels C and D), and an indicator of whether a household
would have been offered credit under a counterfactual allocation based on predicted credit scores (Panels E and F). Columns (2)-(6) present results for equivalent quantile regressions. The
bandwidth use for the estimation of quantile regressions was selected using Hall-Sheather’s method. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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Figure A.5. Loan Portfolio Before and After the Program
Note: The top panel illustrates the distribution of loans by source (number and value of loans) for loans started between 1999 and 2000 (baseline periods). The bottom panel replicates
the results for the two years following the rollout of the program. Formal loans include loans from the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) and commercial banks.
Quasi-formal loans include agricultural cooperatives and production credit groups (PCGs).
.
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A.2 Productivity
Estimating value-added productivity
This section provides a detailed explanation of the estimation of total factor productivity
from a value-added production function, following the approach proposed by Ackerberg et al.
(2015). Value added (VA) is computed as total revenues R net of the value of the intermediate
inputs M used to generate them over a calendar year. Assuming that households choose the
amount of labor L and capital K to be used in order to generate value added, it is possible to
represent the log value-added production function as follows (variables in lower case denote
logs):
yit = β0+βllit +βkkit +ωit + εit (A.1)
This expression is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas value-added production function, or
a production function which is Leontief in intermediate inputs and Cobb-Douglas in capital
and labor. This specification allows for the existence of two different shocks to production:
shocks to productivity that are observed or forecasted by each household (ωit) but not observed
by the researcher, and shocks to production that are unobserved by both the household and
the researcher(εit). As profit-maximizing households allocate capital and labor such that the
marginal product of each factor equals the factor’s price. This behavior leads to the main
empirical challenge in the estimation of a the production function: Capital and labor are chosen
based on the observed productivity shocks ω , which means that an OLS regression of log
value added on log labor and log capital would be biased. Following the insights discussed in
Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al. (2015) propose a
two-stage approach to recover consistent estimates of βl and βk as well as predicted values for
the productivity shocks.
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A.2.1 Identification assumptions
The identification of the parameters from equation (A.1) is achieved through assumptions
corresponding to the information available to each household when deciding on the use of labor
and capital, the process through which productivity evolves over time, and the extent to which
input decisions can be adjusted in response to productivity shocks. This section intuitively
describes these assumptions and refers the reader to Ackerberg et al. (2015) for more formal
statements of these assumptions.
The first assumption is related to the information available to households at each point in
time. The estimation approach assumes that during period t, households are aware of current
productivity shocks as well as past productivity shocks; however, future shocks to productivity
are not known by the households. Denote each household’s information set at t as Iit . Since
households do not expect or observe current transitory shocks to production εit , this assumption
implies that the shocks to production are orthogonal to productivity shocks:
E[εit |Iit ] = 0 (A.2)
The second assumption is related to the ability of households to use information to predict
shocks to productivity and the persistence of these shocks. This paper assumes that productivity
evolves according to a first-order Markov process, which is known to households:
ωit = g(ωit−1)+ζit (A.3)
E[ζit |Iit−1] = 0
This assumption, while restrictive in terms of the dynamics of productivity, is weaker than
assumptions that would be made in an OLS approach or fixed-effects model or a dynamic panel
approach (see for example Anderson and Hsiao (1982)). In the context of this study, it allows
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productivity at baseline to be a good predictor of productivity in the periods following the
implementation of the program, and hence to be a relevant margin for evaluating the targeting
performance of the program. The third assumption is related to the law of motion for the stock
of capital (kit). In particular, the assumption is that capital in the current period kt is a function
of the stock of capital and investment in the previous period kt−1, it−1:
kt = k(it ,kt−1) (A.4)
This assumption means that capital is fixed in the sense that households would experience
high costs to adjust their choices of capital in response to current productivity shocks. A further
assumption is that labor decisions are made in any time period up to period t. Thus, labor is
allowed to adjust with respect to current productivity shocks. In this sense, labor is a free input
in this model. While this assumption implies that lagged values of l could be used as instruments
for current values of labor, the fact that capital is pre-determined is not enough to recover
consistent estimates of βl and βk, as investment might be a function of observed productivity
and hence kt may be correlated with ωt given that there is persistence in the productivity shocks.
Thus, variation in productivity still needs to be controlled for. The final two assumptions
allow the researcher to control for variation in productivity by imposing some structure on
the way intermediate inputs relate to productivity. The key assumptions in this approach are
that conditional on their labor and optimal capital decisions, as well as the observed shocks to
productivity, in each period households demand intermediate inputs according to a monotonically
increasing function of ωit , conditional on labor and capital choices:
mit = ft(kit , lit ,ωit) (A.5)
wit = f−1t (mit ,kit , lit)
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This assumption allows for inversion of f and use of the conditional variation in m to
control for the variation in productivity shocks that are not observed by the researcher; that
is, it allows ω to be written as a function of the intermediate input m, capital k, and labor l.
This assumption rules out models in which there are adjustment costs to intermediate inputs, or
models in which there are shortages in the supply of these inputs. While restrictive, the latter
assumption has the advantage that it is testable as discussed in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Moment conditions
Using the assumptions in (A.2) to (A.6), it is possible to derive the two moment conditions
that will allow the identification of βl and βk.
E[εit |It ] = E[yit−Φt(mit ,kit , lit)|Iit ] = 0 (A.6)
E[ζit + εit |Iit−1] =
E[yit−β0−βllit−βkkit−g(Φt−1(mit−1,kit−1, lit−1)−βllit−1−βkkt−1)|Iit−1] = 0 (A.7)
with Φt = β0 + βllit + βkkit + f−1t (mit,lit ,kit ) The first moment condition results from
plugging in (A.6) into (A.1), and combining it with (A.2). The Second moment condition
exploits the assumption that productivity evolves according to a first-order Markov process
as in (A.4). Note that none of the structural parameters can be identified only from the first
equation, however it is possible to use these moment conditions to identify Φˆt , and plug in
Φˆt−1(mit−1, lit−1,kit−1) into the second equation (A.7). The resulting set of moment conditions
after this process is:
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E
(yit−β0−βllit−βkkit−g(Φt−1)−βllit−1−βkkt−1))⊗

1
lit−1
kit
Φˆit−1


= 0 (A.8)
The behavioral assumptions made in this sections are represented in this set of moment conditions.
First, as capital is pre-determined, kt is a function of investment at t− 1 and thus kit ∈ Iit−1.
This means that capital is chosen prior to observing innovations in the productivity process ζit .
However, this approach does not restrict the adjustment of labor and it is perfectly possible
that a household will adjust labor given the innovations ζit . The only restriction in terms of the
adjustment of labor decisions is that households cannot forecast ζit , and thus their past labor
decisions are orthogonal with respect to current innovations to productivity. Finally, note that
there is no extra variation coming from the intermediate input m in the latter set of moment
conditions; the relevant variation was already used to recover Φˆt from (A.6). This last observation
prevents identification of a elasticity parameter for m, and hence the identification of a revenue
function without assuming that the underlying technology is Leontief in intermediate inputs. 1
Estimation and variable definition
The estimation approach to recovering βl and βk follows the simplification detailed in
Appendix A.4 in Ackerberg et al. (2015). This process reduces the system in (A.8) to:
E
ζˆit⊗
 lt−1
kt

= 0 (A.9)
1 Gandhi et al. (2016) discuss this issue extensively and develop an alternative approach which in principle
allows to estimate a revenue function and relax these assumptions.
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with ζˆit = (Φˆt − βllit − βkkit)− h(Φˆt−1− βllit−1− βkkit−1). h is an arbitrary function. The
estimation is performed through the generalized method of moments (GMM) using kit and lit−1
as instruments. To operationalize this process, value added y is computed as the total revenues,
over a calendar year t, net of the value of the inputs purchased outside the household that
were used to generate revenue during the period (mit). The proxy variable is the total value of
inputs, purchased outside the household, that were used for generating revenues (mit). These
inputs include fertilizer and seeds for agriculture, tools for fishing, transportation spending,
appliances to be used in off-farm family businesses, and labor from outside the household. Labor
is measured as the total hours per year of labor employed in households’s revenue-generating
activities. On average 85% is provided by household members; this includes hours spent on
agriculture, fishing, caring for cattle, working at the off-farm family business, and working for
wages outside the household. Capital is measured as the value of the total stock of fixed assets,
and to be consistent with the assumptions regarding the timing of the inputs, it is measured in
January of each calendar year. Section A.2.1 discusses robustness checks against alternative
measures of labor and capital.
Estimation procedure
Value added function estimation
The elasticities from the household value added function and the estimates for productivity
are recovered following the process detailed below.
1. Using the 14 years of data, the first-stage regression corresponding to the sample analog
of (A.6) is estimated. The function f−1t that maps productivity ωit into the demand for
intermediate inputs is approximated using a third-order polynomial on m, k, and l. To
allow f to vary with changes in the price of final output and inputs over time and across
villages–but which are common to households within a village–village-year fixed effects
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(δvt) are included in the first stage:
yit =
h=3
∑
h=0
j=3
∑
j=0
n=3
∑
n=0
φh jnmhit l
j
itk
n
it +δvt + eit
2. Φˆt is computed as Φˆt = ∑h=3h=0∑
j=3
j=0∑
n=3
n=0φh jnmhit l
j
itk
n
it +δvt .
3. Using candidate values for βk and βl , obtained from an OLS regression, ωˆit is computed
as:
ωˆit = Φˆt−βllit−βkkit
4. Since productivity is assumed to follow a first-order Markov process, the following
equation is estimated:
ωˆit(βl,βk) =
n=3
∑
n=1
ψnωˆit−1(βl,βk)+δvt + ζ˜i
5. The resulting residuals ζˆi(βl,βk) are used to construct the sample analog of (A.9), and βˆl
and βˆk are estimated using GMM.
6. To account for the uncertainty in the estimation of the first stage, standard errors are
computed using 500 non-parametric block bootstrap samples stratified at the village level.
Additionally, p-values associated with percentile t-bootstrap tests for significance are
reported in order to provide an asymptotic correction for a small sample estimation.
7. Value-added productivity is recovered using the GMM estimates βˆk and βˆl :
ωˆ∗it = Φˆt− βˆllit− βˆkkit
8. For the analysis in the paper I only focuss on estimates of productivity ωˆ∗it corresponding
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to the average over the baseline years 1999-2000.
9. I also report results using only data from 1999-2001 to estimate the elasticities (baseline
data only). Results are robust to this approach.
Revenue Function estimation
An alternative way of recovering factor elasticities and productivity is to estimate a
household revenue function following a dynamic panel model by “ρ-differencing” the equation
below:
yit = β0+βllit +βkkit +βmmit +ωit + εit (A.10)
and assuming that ω follows a first-order autoregressive process: ωit = ρωit−1+ζit . In this case,
the dependent variable y denotes total revenues for a household, and m (intermediate inputs) is
also included in the revenue function.
The estimation process is detailed below:
1. First I subtract ρyt−1 from both sides of the equations.
(yit−βkkit−βllit−βmmit) = ρ(yit−1−βkkit−1−βllit−1−βmmit−1)
+ζit + εit−ρεit−1
2. Using candidate values for βk, βm, and βl obtained from an OLS regression of (A.10), ωˆit
is computed as:
ωˆit = (yit−βkkit−βllit−βmmit)−β0
3. Since productivity is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process, the following
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equation is estimated:
ωˆit(βl,βk,βm) = ρωˆit−1(βl,βk,βm)+δvt + ζ˜i
where δvt include a full set of village-year fixed effects.
4. The resulting residuals ζˆi(βl,βk,βm) are used to construct the sample analog of:
E

(ωit−ρωit−1)⊗

1
lit−1
kit−1
mit−1


= 0 (A.11)
and βˆl and βˆk are estimated using GMM.
5. Revenue productivity is recovered using the GMM estimates βˆk and βˆl:
ωˆ∗it = yit− βˆllit− βˆkkit− βˆm
6. I use only pre-program values of ωˆit corresponding to an average of predicted productivity
for 1999-2000.
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Table A.13. Value Added Function Estimates
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Alternative specifications and discussion
To avoid imposing restrictive assumptions regarding the use of credit and the interactions
of all possible sources of income that households may have, this paper uses the benchmark
specification that employs total revenues over all activities and total expenditures on intermediate
inputs. Table A.14 presents robustness checks of the productivity estimates associated with
different definitions of labor, capital, and revenues. Column (1) replicates the benchmark
estimates for comparison. Column (2) presents estimates from a model that excludes hired labor.
In this case βl only captures the contribution of labor provided by household members. While
labor from household members accounts on average for 85% of total labor, and the resulting
coefficients are similar with respect to the benchmark specification, excluding hired labor reduces
the observations as there are some households that rely exclusively on hired labor. Column
(3) excludes household assets from the computation of capital. Household assets are mainly
composed of the value of the dwelling in which households live and other appliances in the
household. The resulting estimates are basically identical to the benchmark specification. Finally,
Column (4) reports estimates that exclude revenues and expenses related to paid labor outside the
household. The resulting estimates are smaller in the case of βl with respect to the benchmark
cases. Note however that excluding revenues from wage labor reduces the available observations,
as some households may rely exclusively on this source of revenue.
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Table A.14. Production Function Estimates Under Alternative Specifications
Panel A: GMM Estimates of the Value-Added function
Benchmark Specification Excluding hired labor Excluding household assets Excluding wage earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor (log) 0.724* 0.812 0.745 0.634***
(0.350) (0.949) (0.396) (0.0497)
Capital (log) 0.233* 0.254 0.210* 0.213
(0.110) (0.160) (0.0997) (0.136)
Obs 6438 6231 6438 5592
Returns to Scale 0.958 1.066 0.955 0.846
Chi2 (Test for constant RTS) 0.00885 0.952 3.828 35.44
Pval (Test for constant RTS) 0.925 0.329 0.0504 0.000
Panel B:Value-added productivity estimates
Benchmark Specification Excluding hired labor Excluding household assets Excluding wage earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 2.51 1.69 2.68 3.87
SD 0.58 0.72 0.59 0.77
Panel C: GMM Estimates of the Value-Added function
ACF Farm ACF No Farm DP Farm DP No Farm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor (log) 1.010 1.085 0.749 0.734
(2.012) (234.9) (0.605) (0.550)
Capital (log) 0.145 0.249 0.141 0.189
(0.207) (29.21) (0.226) (0.220)
Obs 3517 2921 3474 2898
Returns to Scale 1.155 1.335 0.890 0.923
Chi2 (Test for constant RTS) 0.006 0.000 0.0179 0.0103
Pval (Test for constant RTS) 0.943 0.999 0.894 0.919
Panel D:Value-added productivity
Benchmark Specification Excluding hired labor Excluding household assets Excluding wage earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 1.42 -0.55 3.50 3.00
SD 0.85 0.70 0.95 0.94
Note: Panel A presents estimates of production function from different specifications using the method proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2015). All estimations control for village × year fixed
effects both in the first and second stage and are estimated using GMM. The dependent variable is Value-added from all the economic activities of the household. It is computed by subtracting
the value of intermediate inputs from the total revenues for each household. Revenues correspond to agriculture, livestock-raising and fishing, paid labor, and family business activities. Labor
is measured in hours/year across all activities and includes work performed by household members as well as by people outside the household. Capital is the value of each household’s fixed
assets, measured at the beginning of each year. All variables are in logs. Column (1) replicates the benchmark specification used in the paper. Column (2) presents estimates excluding hired
labor from the estimations. Column (3) presents estimates from a model that excludes households’ assets from the computation of capital and Column (4) presents estimates of value-added
excluding earnings and costs from labor outside the household. Bootstrap standard errors are clustered at the household level to account for serial correlation, and are presented in parentheses.
Panel B provides summary statistics for productivity measures that were estimated using each specification. Panel C presents estimates for households for whom farm activities (agriculture,
livestock and fishing) were on average the main sources of income Column (1) and for whom non-farm activities were the main source of income Column (2) using the approach proposed by
Ackerberg et al. (2015). Columns (3)-(4) replicate this estimations using a dynamic panel approach.
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Testing the monotonicity assumption
The main identifying assumption in this context is the existence of a demand function
that maps the demand of intermediate inputs m purchased outside the household to productivity
in a strictly monotonic way. The empirical implication of this assumption is that the productivity
estimates should exhibit a strictly monotonic relationship to the value of the intermediate inputs,
conditional on labor, capital, and village-year fixed effects. Figure A.6 provides a graphical
test for the strict monotonicity assumption. The y-axis plots residuals from a regression of
the value of intermediate inputs mit on a third-order polynomial of labor and capital and a full
set of village-year dummies. The x-axis plots residuals of a similar regression in which the
dependent variable corresponds to the value-added productivity estimates. The picture depicts a
clear monotonic relation among these variables, validating the main identification assumption in
this approach.
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Figure A.6. Productivity and Intermediate Inputs
Note: The figure plots residuals of a regression of productivity on a third-degree polynomial of log labor and log capital, controlling for village-year fixed effects (x-axis) and residuals
of a regression of log purchased inputs on a third-degree polynomial of log labor and log capital,controlling for village-year fixed effects (y-axis). Top and bottom 1% of observation are
winsorized.
A more formal test for the validity of this assumption is provided by Shenoy (2017). The
idea is that if firms were constrained with respect to the intermediate inputs or faced rigidities
in the markets of intermediate inputs, production in period t should be a function of past input
choices (first lags of capital, labor and intermediate inputs). I test for this using a two-stage
approach. First, I regress log value-add y on a third order polynomial of current values of log
capital,labor and intermediate inputs (h(kt , lt ,mt)), controlling for village-year fixed effects, and
compute the residuals εˆit . Then I regress these residuals on a vector rt−1 of lagged capital, labor
and intermediate inputs and test the extent to which all the elements of the vector κ = 0:
εˆi = rt−1κ+ vi (A.12)
If households do not face constraints in the adjustment of inputs, then variation in output should
be only explained by current choices of input and κ = 0. Table A.15 shows that the null of no
constraints is not rejected under several specifications. While this validate the identification
assumptions, note that this is not evidence of no credit constraints. For instance, households may
hold excess on inventory simply because they don’t have access to credit to finance increases in
inputs when a households experiences positive productivity shocks.
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Table A.15. Test for Frictions in Intermediate Inputs
Regressors (rt−1): kt−1, lt−1,mt−1 {kt− j, lt− j,mt− j} j=2j=1 {kt− j, lt− j,mt− j} j=3j=1 2nd order f (kt−1, lt−1,mt−1) 3rd order f (kt−1, lt−1,mt−1)
Observations 6,532 5,916 5,240 6,438 6,438
Adjusted R-squared -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.003
F Stat :κ = 0 0.0759 0.554 1.250 0.383 1.104
P-val :κ = 0 0.927 0.758 0.279 0.930 0.338
Note: The table presents F statistics and P-values corresponding to the null hypothesis that κ = 0 (see equation A.12) for several specifications. Column (1) presents results from a model
including first lags of capital, labor and intermediate inputs. Columns (2) and (3) present results from specifications that include second and third lags of the variables respectively. Columns(4)
and (5) report results from tests which include flexible polynomials of the first lags for capital, labor and intermediate inputs. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
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A.3 Robustness to the agricultural cycle and placebo analy-
sis
This section replicates the flexible difference-in-difference results of the paper in the
placebo sample following the approach discussed in section 1.7.3. To do so, I use the two
years preceding the implementation of the program. In particular I focus on a time window
that excludes the data I used to compute my main estimates: τv,t ∈ [−36,−6). I normalize the
time-to-treatment variable τ to be between -12 and 17 (centered at -1) such that the calendar
months in which the funds were actually released coincide to those in the placebo exercise. For
example, if the funds for a certain village were released in June (τvt = 0), for that same village
June would be the first month of treatment in the placebo periods τPLACEBOvt = 0. The placebo
sample coincides with the period September 1999-February 2001.
It is worth mentioning that more placebo months are available for the villages that enter
into treatment later, conversely villages that enter the treatment earlier are not observed for all the
periods preceding the placebo treatment ( i.e. months for which τvt < 0 in the placebo sample).
Appendix Figures A.7 A.8 reproduces the main figure in the paper. They plot the results from
the study sample on the left-hand side, and present the placebo results on the right-hand-side.
There is a pattern of pre-trends in the placebo sample which could be related to decreases in
overall financial activity due to the South-East Asian financial crisis and the associate recovery, or
measurement error in the first rounds of the survey. However, the flexible difference-in-difference
estimates in the placebo sample look flat in most cases, and, when different from zero, move in
the opposite direction of the effects reported in the original analysis suggesting that, if anything,
the main estimates understate the true effects.
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Placebo test for main results
Figure A.7. Short-term on Credit from Local Informal Sources
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Note: The figure depicts flexible difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to equation (1.6). The top panel plots OLS coefficients capturing the effects of the program on borrowing
from informal lenders (either personal lenders or relatives) by connected households, while the bottom panel presents estimates for total borrowing from informal lenders by unconnected
households. The left-hand-side graphs present results related to the implementation of the program, while the graphs in the right-hand panel represent estimates using the placebo sample.
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Figure A.8. Short-term Effects on Credit from Relatives- Unconnected Households
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Note: The figure depicts flexible difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to equation (1.6). The top panel plots OLS coefficients capturing the effects of the program on borrowing
from relatives (number of outstanding loans) by unconnected households, while the bottom panel presents estimates for total borrowing from relatives by unconnected households. The
left-hand-side graphs present results related to the implementation of the program, while the graphs in the right-hand panel represent estimates using the placebo sample.
179
A.3.1 Attrition
Table A.16. Effects on Total Borrowing (Excluding Attriters)
Panel A: Effects on credit from the program
Any credit from MBVF Gross debt from MBVF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All Connected Unconnected All Connected Unconnected
Postvt 0.363*** 0.423*** 0.251*** 6,320.631*** 7,895.595*** 2,983.796***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.035) (446.287) (604.506) (531.589)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012]
Observations 18,305 12,230 6,075 18,232 12,179 6,053
R-squared 0.617 0.635 0.569 0.591 0.616 0.527
Baseline DV mean 0.0301 0.0450 0 45.57 68.19 0
Clusters (# households) 509 340 169 509 340 169
Panel B: Effects on total credit
Any credit Total Gross outstanding debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All Connected Unconnected All Connected Unconnected
Postvt 0.073*** 0.058*** 0.104*** 3,435.158 3,899.126 1,858.497
(0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (2,454.030) (3,226.529) (3,709.507)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.232] [0.356] [0.612]
Observations 18,305 12,230 6,075 18,205 12,195 6,010
R-squared 0.653 0.623 0.658 0.876 0.833 0.919
Baseline DV mean 0.673 0.745 0.529 65935 61728 74462
Clusters (# households) 509 340 169 509 340 169
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on total borrowing, by connectedness with the local elite. The sample includes
only households who are always interviewed during the 172 survey waves. The reported coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the
resources from the program were released in village v in month t, controlling for household fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects ( see equation (2.2)). Estimations were
performed using all the available observations for the 18 months before and after the rollout of the program in each village. Panel A reports results for the effect of the rollout of the program on
the program’s uptake and Panel B shows results for total borrowing (winsorizing the top 1% of observations). Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to
allow for flexible serial correlation. P-values that account for potential within village correlation are presented in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for
a reduced number of clusters (16) as in Cameron and Miller (2015). Connected: households who reported having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members
during the survey waves preceding the release of the funds from the program. Unconnected: households without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Table A.17. Effects on Informal Credit (Excluding Attriters)
Panel A: Any loan from informal lenders
Connected Unconnected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Any informal Relatives Non-relatives Any informal Relatives Non-relatives
Postvt -0.007 -0.000 -0.004 0.040** 0.032* 0.014
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) (0.012)
[0.684] [0.916] [0.752] [0.188] [0.028] [0.800]
Observations 12,230 12,230 12,230 6,075 6,075 6,075
R-squared 0.703 0.674 0.642 0.600 0.561 0.605
Baseline DV mean 0.164 0.0650 0.111 0.0946 0.0511 0.0488
Clusters (# households) 340 340 340 169 169 169
Panel B: Gross stock of debt with informal lenders
Connected Unconnected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any informal Relatives Non-relatives Any informal Relatives Non-relatives
Postvt 624.130*** 114.186 280.446* 446.749* 409.031** 176.284
(232.407) (79.465) (150.523) (231.349) (195.825) (127.309)
[0.016] [0.116] [0.180] [0.224] [0.020] [0.632]
Observations 12,115 12,168 12,096 6,004 5,995 6,075
R-squared 0.771 0.745 0.711 0.585 0.603 0.598
Baseline DV mean 1791 615.6 963.2 982.3 439 535.3
Clusters (# households) 340 340 339 169 169 169
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on borrowing from informal lenders, by connectedness with the local elites.
The sample includes only households who are always interviewed during the 172 survey waves. Informal lenders include personal money lenders and relatives in the village. The reported
coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the resources from the program were released in village v in month t, controlling for household
fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects (see equation (2.2)). Estimations were performed using all the available observations for the 18 months before and after the rollout
of the program in each village. Panel A reports results for the number of outstanding loans and Panel B shows results for the gross stock of debt (winsorizing the top 1% of observations).
Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible serial correlation. P-values that account for potential within village correlation are presented
in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for a reduced number of clusters (16) as in Cameron and Miller (2015). Connected: households who reported
having any socioeconomic interaction or direct kin relations with council members during the survey waves preceding the release of the funds from the program. Unconnected: households
without any direct connection with members of the village council.
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Table A.18. Effects on Total Borrowing by Connectedness Score
Panel A: Effects on credit from the program
Any credit from MBVF Gross debt from MBVF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All High Low All High Low
Postvt 0.328*** 0.389*** 0.267*** 3,264.857* 7,929.495*** 2,851.297***
(0.019) (0.030) (0.026) (1,965.708) (619.981) (378.041)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.120] [0.000] [0.020]
Observations 23,228 11,468 11,760 23,128 11,417 11,738
R-squared 0.613 0.641 0.570 0.866 0.636 0.527
Baseline DV mean 0.0290 0.0574 0.00151 60747 86.47 0.757
Clusters (# households) 671 331 340 671 331 340
Panel B: Effects on total credit
Any credit Total Gross outstanding debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES All High Low All High Low
Postvt 0.074*** 0.057*** 0.098*** 5,529.391*** 6,392.798** 987.431
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (373.757) (2,685.509) (2,734.166)
[0.000] [0.004] [0.008] [0.000] [0.088] [0.752]
Observations 23,228 11,468 11,760 23,155 11,433 11,695
R-squared 0.661 0.595 0.649 0.590 0.786 0.908
Baseline DV mean 0.665 0.821 0.515 42.97 60121 61356
Clusters (# households) 671 331 340 671 331 340
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on total borrowing, by connectedness with the local elite. The reported
coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the resources from the program were released in village v in month t, controlling for household
fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects ( see equation (2.2)). Estimations were performed using all the available observations for the 18 months before and after the rollout
of the program in each village. Panel A reports results for the effect of the rollout of the program on the program’s uptake and Panel B shows results for total borrowing (winsorizing the
top 1% of observations). Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible serial correlation. P-values that account for potential within
village correlation are presented in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for a reduced number of clusters (16) as in Cameron and Miller (2015). The
connectedness score corresponds to an index based on the factor loadings of the first principal component related to all the different types of socioeconomic interactions with local elites. High
score: households whose score is above the median. Low: households whose score is below the median.
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Table A.19. Effects on Informal Credit by Connectedness Score
Panel A: Any loan from informal lenders
High connectedness Low connectedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Any informal Relatives Non-relatives Any informal Relatives Non-relatives
Postvt -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 0.025* 0.025** 0.011
(0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010)
[0.932] [0.876] [0.692] [0.404] [0.076] [0.816]
Observations 11,468 11,468 11,468 11,760 11,760 11,760
R-squared 0.683 0.646 0.627 0.671 0.630 0.678
Baseline DV mean 0.210 0.0864 0.143 0.116 0.0555 0.0673
Clusters 331 331 331 340 340 340
Panel B: Gross stock of debt with informal lenders
High connectedness Low connectedness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any informal Relatives Non-relatives Any informal Relatives Non-relatives
Postvt 637.667** 291.817* 116.849 404.136** 220.620* 160.543*
(266.360) (150.283) (166.179) (177.592) (128.296) (88.772)
[0.028] [0.056] [0.544] [0.220] [0.024] [0.460]
Observations 11,311 11,330 11,332 11,656 11,664 11,687
R-squared 0.762 0.672 0.695 0.732 0.644 0.644
Baseline DV mean 2272 686.2 1361 1271 464.9 533.1
Clusters 331 331 330 340 340 339
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates of the short-run effect of the rollout of the program on borrowing from informal lenders, by connectedness with the local elites.
Informal lenders include personal money lenders and relatives in the village. The reported coefficients correspond to OLS regressions of the respective dependent variables on whether the
resources from the program were released in village v in month t, controlling for household fixed effects and calendar month and year fixed effects ( see equation (1.7)). Estimations were
performed using all the available observations for the 18 months before and after the rollout of the program in each village. Panel A reports results for the number of outstanding loans and
Panel B shows results for the gross stock of debt (winsorizing the top 1% of observations). Standard errors, presented in parentheses, are clustered at the household level to allow for flexible
serial correlation. P-values that account for potential within village correlation are presented in brackets; they are computed using a wild bootstrap t-procedure to account for a reduced number
of clusters (16) as in Cameron and Miller (2015). he connectedness score corresponds to an index based on the factor loadings of the first principal component related to all the different types
of socioeconomic interactions with local elites. High score: households whose score is above the median. Low: households whose score is below the median.
A.4 Appendix: Proofs of propositions 1 and 2
Consider the case of a rural household which chooses the optimal amount of inputs
to be used for the family business or farm at the beginning of the year (t = 0) and uses the
profits and other government transfers to finance consumption in the rest of the year (t = 1).
These households may finance the only input in this economy (k0i) using their initial exogenous
wealth (wi) or borrow (d0i) at an interest rate of r. However, they may be liquidity constrained
and only be able to borrow up to d¯, which is exogenously determined and can be expanded
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by receiving loans from by the MBVF committee (bi). Households maximize the following
simplified problem:
max
c1i,k0i,d0i
U(c1i) (A.13)
s.t.
c1i+(1+ r)qid0i = Ai f (k0i) (A.14)
pkk0i ≤ wi+d0i (A.15)
d0i ≤ d¯+bi (A.16)
where U denotes an increasing and concave utility function of consumption in period
t = 1 (c1i), Ai denotes household total factor productivity associated to the production function
f (k0i) which is increasing and concave in k.
Assume u is a function of consumption in period t such that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. f is a
production function that transforms the only input (k) into units of consumption goods and is
increasing in k and concave ( f ′′ < 0). Let λ1,λ2,λ3 be the lagrange multipliers associated to
constraints (A.14)-(A.16), respectively. The lagrangian function associated to the optimization
problem solved by household i is:
L = u(c1i)+λ1(Ai f (k0i)− c1i− (1+ r)qid0i)+λ2(wi+d0i− pkk0i)+λ3(d¯+bi−d0i)
The first order conditions imply:
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u′(c1i) = λ1 (A.17)
u′(c1i)
pk
(Ai f ′(k0i)) = λ2 (A.18)
u′(c1i)
1
pk
(Ai f ′(k0i)− pk(1+ r)) = λ3 (A.19)
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 If households face borrowing constraints, the marginal utility of relaxing this
constraint is decreasing in initial wealth. Moreover, the marginal utility of relaxing a household’s
liquidity constraint is an increasing function of household productivity if the distortion in the
optimal choice of inputs is large.
Proof 1 In the context of binding liquidity constraints, each households only borrows up to
d∗0i = d¯ and purchases inputs such that k
∗
01 =
wi+d¯+bi
pk
. Without loss of generality assume qi = 1.
Optimal consumption in this case is c1i = Ai f (wi+d¯+bipk )− (1+ r)(d¯+bi). As a consequence of
the envelop theorem, the marginal utility of loans from the program equals the marginal utility of
relaxing the household’s liquidity constraint (∂V∂b = λ3).
To see whether λ3 is an increasing or decreasing function of borrowing from the program
bi, initial wealth wi, and household productivity Ai, I obtain the respective partial derivatives of
λ3 using equation (A.19).
∂λ3i
∂wi
=
u′′Ai f ′
pk
(
1
pk
(Ai f ′− (1+ r)pk))+u′Ai f
′′
pk
< 0 (A.20)
∂λ3i
∂Ai
=
u′′ f
pk
(Ai f ′− pk(1+ r))+u′ f
′
pk
(A.21)
(A.22)
Equation (A.20) is negative because u and f are concave, and because Ai f ′ > (1+ r)pk when
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liquidity constraints are binding. The intuition is that because households are liquidity con-
strained, the marginal product of an extra unit of input still exceeds the costs of financing it. The
sign of (A.21) will depend on the curvature of the utility function and the size of the distortion in
the allocation of inputs Ai f ′− pk(1+ r)
f ′
f
(Ai f ′− pk(1+ r))>−u
′′
u′
(A.23)
Note that this condition will be satisfied depending on the concavity of the utility function. For
example, this condition is trivially satisfied if household are simply profit maximizers –i.e., linear
utility function–.
Equation (A.20) implies that the marginal utility from borrowing from the program is
decreasing in both borrowing and wealth. Equations (A.21) and (1.2) imply that households
with a higher utility derived from the program are high-productivity households.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 If households do not face borrowing constraints but face high borrowing interest
rates, the marginal utility from a reduction in the interest rate is a decreasing function of initial
wealth and an increasing function of household productivity
Proof 2 If the liquidity constraints are not binding, then households choose inputs based on
prices, interest rates and household productivity (k∗∗0i = k(Ai,r, pk)). In this environment, house-
hold debt accounts for (d∗∗0i = pkk(Ai,r, pk)−wi) and the marginal utility of decreasing interest
rates is: λ1d∗∗0i and is positive if households are net borrowers (d
∗∗
0i > 0). Taking derivatives with
respect to wi and Ai:
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∂λ1d∗∗0i
∂wi
= u′′(1+ r)d∗∗0i −u′ < 0 (A.24)
∂λ1d∗∗0i
∂Ai
= u′′ f d∗∗0i +u
′pk
∂k∗∗
∂Ai
(A.25)
Equation (A.24) is negative due to the concavity of u. Equation (A.25) is positive if the
marginal increase in utility derived from increasing inputs offsets the marginal cost in terms of
utility of having to repay debt.
1
f
pk
∂k∗∗
∂Ai
>−u′′d∗∗0i
This will typically be true for profit maximizing households–i.e., linear utility function–.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Supplementary figures and tables
188
Table B.1. Treatment Effects: Parents of Children from 1st to 8th Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Work Outcomes (Adults - Household)
Total hours/week Total working adults
TE (DD) 3.322** 2.638** 2.941** 0.045 0.025 0.026
(1.380) (1.295) (1.346) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 30,618 29,502 29,502 30,791 29,663 29,663
R-squared 0.007 0.155 0.156 0.005 0.243 0.243
Mean DV 78.24 78.24 78.24 1.712 1.712 1.712
Panel B: Work Outcomes (Female household heads/ heads’ spouses)
Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) 2.418*** 2.279*** 2.083*** 0.033** 0.031** 0.025*
(0.660) (0.629) (0.653) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 29,533 29,518 29,518 29,917 29,902 29,902
R-squared 0.013 0.101 0.102 0.006 0.099 0.099
Mean DV 26.45 26.45 26.45 0.650 0.650 0.650
Panel B: Work Outcomes (Male household heads / heads’ spouses)
Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) 1.176 1.450** 1.608** 0.005 0.007 0.009*
(0.749) (0.672) (0.697) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 26,368 25,251 25,251 26,829 25,699 25,699
R-squared 0.007 0.088 0.088 0.003 0.066 0.067
Mean DV 47.50 47.50 47.50 0.948 0.948 0.948
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Municipality FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Group Trend NO NO YES NO NO YES
Clusters 293 293 293 293 293 293
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents OLS estimates for a difference-in-difference model. The coefficients represent differential changes in labor supply before and after the program between exposed and
non exposed-children. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Panel A presents treatment effects concerning aggregate data at the household level.
Panels B and C present treatment effects regarding employment for female heads of household or spouses and male heads of household or spouses, respectively. The sample includes children
from 1st to 8th grade.
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Figure B.1. Treatment Effects on Total Household Labor Supply (adults): Total Weekly Work
Hours (left) and Number of Adults Working
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Treatment effect on total hours worked (weekly) by adults
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Treatment effects on number of employed adults
The figure depicts OLS coefficients from equation (2.1). Left-hand panel: each coefficient estimates differences in differences on hours worked by adults between the treatment and control
group with respect to the period just before the program was implemented (τ = −1). The dependent variable measures the total number of hours worked by adults in child i’s household.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Right-hand panel: Each coefficient estimates differences in differences on adult employment between the treatment and control group
with respect to the period just before the program was implemented (τ =−1). The dependent variable measures the number of adults employed in child i’s household. The estimation sample
includes all potential beneficiary children from 1st grade to 8th grade. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
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Figure B.2. Effects on Employment for Adults (1st-8th grade)
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The figure depicts OLS coefficients from equation (2.1). Each coefficient estimates differences in differences on the relevant measure of labor supply between the treatment and control group
with respect to the period just before the program was implemented (τ =−1). The plots on the left present results for adult males, while the plots on the right present results for adult females.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The estimation sample includes all potential beneficiary children from 1st grade to 8th grade.
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B.1.1 Effects Excluding Children with Siblings with Different Treatment
Status
Figure B.3. Employment and Work Hours (weekly) for Adults
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The figure replicates the main event-study analyses focusing in a reduced sample of children whose siblings treatment status is the same as theirs. The top panels depict employment rate for
adult males (heads of household or spouses) and adult females (heads of household or spouses) in child i’s household before and after child i is exposed to treatment. The bottom panel depicts
weekly hours for both adult males and females. Time to treatment is equal to 0 in the first period in which treatment kicks in. Children who have siblings with different treatment status are
excluded from the sample.
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Table B.2. Effects Excluding Children with Siblings with Different Treatment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Work Outcomes (Adults - Household)
Total hours/week Total working adults
TE (DD) 3.847 1.616 2.387 0.069 0.007 0.014
(2.825) (2.597) (2.912) (0.056) (0.057) (0.065)
Observations 9,112 8,624 8,624 9,178 8,687 8,687
R-squared 0.010 0.192 0.194 0.010 0.287 0.290
Mean DV 75.04 75.04 75.04 1.654 1.654 1.654
Panel B: Work Outcomes (Female household heads/heads’ spouses)
Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) 4.853*** 4.700*** 4.743*** 0.069** 0.061* 0.058
(1.419) (1.403) (1.539) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036)
Observations 8,639 8,632 8,632 8,766 8,759 8,759
R-squared 0.016 0.116 0.117 0.007 0.117 0.119
Mean DV 25.97 25.97 25.97 0.634 0.634 0.634
Panel B: Work Outcomes (Male household heads/heads’ spouses)
Hours/week Worked last week
TE (DD) -0.298 -0.397 0.459 0.001 -0.005 0.007
(1.498) (1.587) (1.566) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 7,562 7,075 7,075 7,685 7,193 7,193
R-squared 0.010 0.110 0.111 0.008 0.104 0.106
Mean DV 46.51 46.51 46.51 0.934 0.934 0.934
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Municipality FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Group Trend NO NO YES NO NO YES
Clusters 286 286 286 286 286 286
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents OLS estimates for a difference-in-difference model under alternative specifications. The table replicates the main results excluding those children who have siblings in
a different treatment group. The coefficients represent differential changes in labor supply before and after the program between exposed and non-exposed children. Standard errors, clustered
at the municipality level, are presented in parentheses. Panel A presents treatment effects concerning aggregate data at the household level. Panels B and C present treatment effects regarding
employment for female heads of household or spouses and male heads of households or spouses, respectively.
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B.1.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Counterfactual Attendance
Rate
Figure B.4. Predicted and Observed Attendance Rates
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This picture depicts attendance rates as a function of age for the 2004 wave for the estimation sample and the validation sample. Attendance rate is depicted for actual and predicted data. The
probit model included age fixed effects, years of schooling fixed effects, and demographic characteristics. 80% of the 2004 observations were randomly assigned to an estimation sample, the
remaining were assigned to a validation sample. The table shows that the model performs well when it comes to out-of-sample prediction.
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Table B.3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Counterfactual Attendance Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total adults Males hh heads
VARIABLES Hours/week Worked Hours/week Worked
TE (DD) 2.679 0.033 0.737 -0.005
(1.834) (0.034) (0.848) (0.007)
TE x 1[Attendance rate¡0.8] (DDD) -5.878 -0.144* 1.812 0.015
(4.800) (0.077) (2.064) (0.018)
Observations 17,434 17,543 14,747 15,010
R-squared 0.164 0.254 0.093 0.075
Clusters 290 290 289 289
Mean DV 79.37 1.732 47.86 0.949
Mean Covariate 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154
TE at CV=1 -3.199 -0.111* 2.549 0.0103
p-val 0.423 0.0878 0.183 0.546
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
Note: The table presents OLS estimates for a triple-difference model. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The coefficients in the first row
represent treatment effects when the relevant covariate equals 0 (DD) (inframarginal children). The estimates in the second row report heterogeneity by counterfactual predicted attendance
rate based on a probit model estimated for the 2004 sample. Treatment effects for marginal children are presented in the bottom panel.
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Table B.4. Treatment Effects on Enrollment and Employment (Children)
Panel A: Enrollment and child employment
Enrollment Worked last week
TE (DD) 0.037** 0.040*** 0.017 0.010 0.004 0.007
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 15,164 14,519 14,519 18,447 17,678 17,678
R-squared 0.015 0.321 0.322 0.011 0.315 0.315
Mean DV (Baseline) 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.294 0.294 0.294
Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES
Municipality FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Group Trend NO NO YES NO NO YES
Clusters 289 289 289 290 290 290
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates (DD) for the probability of enrollment and the probability that child i reported working the week preceding the interview. Note that
since the surveys report enrollment at the beginning of each school year, treatment effects on enrollment are identified using eligibility in the year preceding the survey. For example, a child
who has completed 5th grade in 2005 and is observed in the 2006 wave will be in the control group for that year. Conversely, a child who completed 4th in 2005 and is observed in the 2006
sample will be in the treatment group.
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Table B.5. Adult females: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Access to Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total adults Males hh heads
Hours/week Worked Hours/week Worked
TE (DD) 2.850 0.013 3.301 0.023
(2.219) (0.015) (4.602) (0.080)
TE x # branches per 100000 people (DDD) 0.140 -0.001 -0.101 -0.007
(0.092) (0.001) (0.229) (0.005)
Observations 10,738 10,967 12,811 12,895
R-squared 0.088 0.077 0.144 0.233
Controls YES YES YES YES
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES
Group Trend NO NO NO NO
Area-cohort-year FE YES YES YES YES
Clusters 98 98 98 98
Mean DV 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662
Mean # branches per 100000 people 9.341 9.341 9.341 9.341
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents difference-in-difference estimates (DD) and triple-difference estimates (DDD) in the first and second row, respectively. The number of financial branches per 100,000
individuals in each municipality is used as a third source of variation. Data regarding financial branches correspond to 2005, the year before the program’s implementation, and is only
available for the municipalities that are provincial capitals. The sample for these regressions accounts for one-third of the clusters’ sample but two-thirds of the total observations.
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Table B.6. Effects on Self Employment-Adult Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total adults Male hh heads
Self-employed Works at home Self-employed Works at home
TE (DD) 0.038* -0.003 0.008 -0.083
(0.020) (0.008) (0.012) (0.063)
Observations 17,506 17,554 7,923 1,128
R-squared 0.117 0.071 0.143 0.332
Controls YES YES YES YES
Municipality FE YES YES YES YES
Group Trend YES YES YES YES
Clusters 290 290 281 116
Mean DV 0.691 0.0520 0.898 0.309
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The table presents OLS estimates for a difference-in-difference model. The coefficients represent differential changes in the number of self-employed adults in the household before
and after the program for exposed and non-exposed children, and differential changes in the self-employment probability before and after the program between male heads of household
from exposed and non-exposed children, respectively. Standard errors, clustered at the municipality level, are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable is denoted as 1 if the head of
household is self-employed and 0 if they did not report working the week preceding the survey.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Supplementary figures and tables
Table C.1. Correlation between beliefs and value-added
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log Value Added
Log beliefs 0.0530*** 0.0296** 0.0512*** 0.0334**
(0.0170) (0.0143) (0.0167) (0.0150)
Observations 1,915 1,911 1,915 1,911
R-squared 0.010 0.137 0.155 0.240
Control for capital No Yes No Yes
Village F.E. No No Yes Yes
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents estimates of a regression of value-added in logs on household beliefs regarding current profits for several specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the household
level to account for serial correlation. Beliefs are measured as the self-reported household projected income for period t predicted in t−1.
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Table C.2. Correlation between Within-village Productivity Rankings
(1) (2)
Percentile ranking - Proxy-variable Method
Percentile ranking - Fixed Effects Method 0.470*** 0.499***
(0.0315) (0.0341)
Constant 0.331*** 0.316***
(0.0187) (0.0165)
Observations 821 821
R-squared 0.208 0.266
Village FE NO YES
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table presents correlations between within-village productivity rankings obtained by the proxy-variable method and the fixed effects method. Standard errors are clustered at the
village level.
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Table C.3. Correlates of baseline productivity and demographic characteristics
Proxy-variable Fixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity Productivity Rank High-productivity Productivity Productivity Rank High-productivity
Number of Adult Males in Household 0.0626** 0.0199* 0.0159 0.158*** 0.0335*** 0.0516***
(0.0305) (0.0104) (0.0185) (0.0417) (0.0111) (0.0179)
Number of Adult Females in Household 0.259*** 0.0923*** 0.126*** 0.271*** 0.0432*** 0.0673***
(0.0333) (0.0118) (0.0235) (0.0505) (0.0129) (0.0219)
Number of Children in Household -0.0638*** -0.00754 0.00103 0.0295 0.00666 -0.00554
(0.0239) (0.00795) (0.0136) (0.0285) (0.00743) (0.0129)
Dummy: Male Head of Household 0.146* 0.0438 0.0515 0.188* 0.0448 0.0394
(0.0742) (0.0270) (0.0426) (0.106) (0.0280) (0.0425)
Head’s main occupation: Farm (agriculture/livestock) 0.254*** 0.0447* 0.0965** 0.371*** 0.0572** 0.136***
(0.0732) (0.0243) (0.0408) (0.123) (0.0260) (0.0471)
Number of Businessowners in Household 0.340*** 0.0591*** 0.0588* 0.370*** 0.0618*** 0.0718**
(0.0637) (0.0215) (0.0334) (0.100) (0.0197) (0.0322)
Age of Head of Household -0.00481* 0.0000670 0.00229* -0.0166*** -0.00253*** -0.00334**
(0.00245) (0.000820) (0.00136) (0.00320) (0.000716) (0.00136)
Years of schooling - HH head 0.0253** 0.0122*** 0.0163** 0.0357** 0.00649* 0.00961*
(0.00975) (0.00338) (0.00622) (0.0149) (0.00327) (0.00516)
Observations 886 886 886 811 811 811
R-Squared 0.257 0.134 0.0845 0.218 0.127 0.0893
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table reports within village correlations between estimates of productivity and demographic characteristics. All regressions include village fixed-effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level.
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Figure C.1. Effects of program rollout on household income - Fixed-effects approach
Note: The figure depicts flexible estimates corresponding to the specification in (3.5).Each dot represents differences in income between households from villages with high and low per-capita
program funds, for each year with respect to the year preceding the announcement of the program (2001). Each coefficient has been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the effect of
an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. High A: household belongs to the top-third tercile of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Low
A: households belongs to the bottom two-thirds of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Productivity estimates correspond to the control function approach using household
beliefs about profits as a proxy variable. 95 % confidence intervals are computed based on standard errors, which are clustered at the village level to account for the empirical design.
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Table C.4. Reduced-form effects of the program on off-farm business activities- Winsorized
Panel A: Proxy-variable approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VF short-term credit Total short-term credit Profits Non-wage Expenses Wage Expenses Assets
Post X Inv HH X High Productivity -0.0476 1.102* 5.680*** 1.406 0.294** 9.241***
(0.150) (0.570) (1.559) (4.416) (0.125) (2.751)
[0.150] [0.718] [2.022] [4.145] [0.155] [2.672]
Post X Inv HH 0.566*** 0.624 -1.009 -1.570 -0.0204 -0.964
(0.187) (0.426) (0.766) (1.245) (0.0443) (0.794)
[0.213] [0.580] [0.699] [1.730] [0.079] [1.854]
Effect-High Productivity 0.518*** 1.726** 4.671** -0.165 0.273** 8.277***
SE 0.156 0.592 1.446 4.303 0.123 3.137
SE (bootstrap) [0.185] [0.590] [1.898] [4.046] [0.128] [2.611]
Baseline mean (DV) 11.75 19149.5 31903.0 92164.4 3362.5 92236.6
Observations 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190
Number of households 229 229 229 229 229 229
R-Squared 0.595 0.522 0.391 0.548 0.525 0.645
Panel B: Fixed-effects approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VF short-term credit Total short-term credit Profits Non-wage Expenses Wage Expenses Assets
Post X Inv HH X High Productivity -0.407*** 0.328 4.042** 0.396 0.350** 6.046**
(0.141) (0.632) (1.602) (4.983) (0.135) (2.561)
Post X Inv HH 0.685*** 0.930*** -0.294 -1.224 -0.0328 0.454
(0.152) (0.287) (0.760) (0.904) (0.0442) (1.698)
Effect High Productivity 0.278 1.257 3.748 -0.829 0.318 6.500
SE 0.229 0.801 1.567 4.847 0.132 2.491
Baseline mean (DV) 11.75 19149.5 31903.0 92164.4 3362.5 92236.6
Observations 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190 2190
Number of households 229 229 229 229 229 229
R-Squared 0.597 0.523 0.386 0.547 0.523 0.640
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table reports the reduced-form estimates of the effects of the program as a function of productivity estimated through the proxy-variable approach (Panel A) and the fixed-effects
approach (Panel B). The coefficients have been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the effect of an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. The
dependent variables are winsorized with respect to the 1st and 99th percentile, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the village level (64 clusters) to account for the quasi-experimental
design. Panel A also presents bootstrap standard errors in brackets, which are computed using 500 bootstrap samples and clustered at the village level. The estimating sample includes only
household who reported owning business assets the year preceding the rollout of the program.
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Figure C.2. Effects of program rollout on household income
Note: The figure depicts flexible estimates corresponding to the specification in (3.5). Each dot represents differences in income between households from villages with high and low per-capita
program funds, for each year with respect to the year of the of announcement of the program (2001). Each coefficient has been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the effect of
an additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. High A: household belongs to the top-third tercile of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Low
A: households belongs to the bottom two-thirds of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Productivity estimates correspond to the control function approach using household
beliefs about profits as a proxy variable. 95 % confidence intervals are computed based on standard errors, which are clustered at the village level to account for the empirical design.
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Figure C.3. Effects of program rollout on business profits
Note: The figure depicts flexible estimates corresponding to the specification in (3.5). Each dot represents differences in income between households from villages with high and low per-capita
program funds, for each year with respect to the year in which the program was announced (2001). Each coefficient has been scaled down by 1,000,000 in order to capture the effect of an
additional per-capita TBH in each village on the corresponding outcome. High A: household belongs to the top-third tercile of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Low
A: households belongs to the bottom two-thirds of the baseline productivity distribution in each village. Productivity estimates correspond to the control function approach using household
beliefs about profits as a proxy variable. 95 % confidence intervals are computed based on standard errors, which are clustered at the village level to account for the empirical design.
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Table C.5. IV Estimates of the Effects of Program Credit on Income and Profits
Panel A: Effects on Income (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Income Wage Income Total Profits
Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized
VF Short Term Credit * High Productivity 3.321*** 2.445* 0.663 0.585 3.879** 1.768***
(2.031) (1.282) (0.606) (0.567) (1.597) (0.653)
[1.930] 1.1321 [0.717] 0.6965 [1.871] 0.9992
VF Short Term Credit -1.355 -1.376** 0.216 0.188 -1.072 -1.086***
(0.833) (0.627) (0.338) (0.329) (0.692) (0.368)
[0.918] 0.5747 [0.408] 0.4034 [0.864] 0.398
Effect- High Productivity 1.966 1.069 0.878* 0.773* 2.806 0.681
SE 1.631 0.963 0.418 0.358 1.513 0.586
SE bootstrap [1.709] [0.991] [0.514] [0.469] [1.739] 0.9009
Panel B: Effects on Profits by source (full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Farm Fishing/Shrimping Off-farm Business
Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized
VF Short Term Credit * High Productivity 0.524 0.377 -0.141 0.0151 3.496*** 1.376***
(0.526) (0.442) (0.168) (0.0208) (1.456) (0.526)
[0.642] 0.4781 [0.235] 0.06 [1.691] 0.8501
VF Short Term Credit -0.350 -0.569* -0.0443 -0.0265 -0.678 -0.491
(0.461) (0.321) (0.112) (0.0445) (0.655) (0.397)
[0.488] 0.3935 [0.108] 0.0572 [0.812] 0.2868
Effect- High Productivity 0.173 -0.192 -0.185 -0.0115 2.818* 0.885
SE 0.519 0.367 0.243 0.0320 1.243 0.445
SE bootstrap [0.662] [0.399] [0.317] [0.036] [1.463] [0.785]
First-stage F-stat: Short Term Credit 30.75
First-Stage F-stat: Interaction 8.030
Observations 8650
Number of households 914
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table reports the instrumental-variables estimates of the effects of program credit as a function of productivity estimated through the proxy-variable approach Panel A presents
effects on income by source and Panel B presents effects on profits by type of activity. Odd-numbered columns present results after winsorizing the dependent variable with respect to the 1st
and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the village level (64 clusters) to account for the quasi-experimental design. Bootstrap standard errors are presented in brackets and are
computed using 500 bootstrap samples and clustered at the village level. Short-term credit involves program loans with a term shorter than a year. Household profits include farm, fishing and
shrimping and off-farm business profits.
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Table C.6. IV Estimates of the Effect of Program Credit on Off-farm Businesses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Profits Non-wage Expenses Wage Expenses Assets
Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized Raw Winsorized
VF Short Term Credit * High Productivity 15.52*** 7.328*** 3.110 2.692 0.838* 0.410** 24.31** 13.49***
(6.474) (1.793) (8.165) (6.395) (0.453) (0.158) (14.46) (5.386)
[5.826] [2.192] [7.377] [5.159] [0.442] [0.197] [10.838] [3.622]
VF Short Term Credit -1.349 -1.588 -6.187* -1.977 -0.160 -0.0475 -0.522 -1.321
(2.050) (1.092) (3.735) (2.138) (0.177) (0.0685) (1.265) (1.231)
[3.535] [1.332] [4.191] [2.100] [0.367] [0.126] [3.596] [2.462]
Effect- High Productivity 14.17*** 5.740** -3.077 0.715 0.677* 0.363** 23.78** 12.17***
SE 6.177 1.914 7.552 5.961 0.481 0.171 14.84 5.809
SE bootstrap [4.462] [2.064] [6.726] [4.623] [0.396] [0.165] [10.158] [3.196]
First-stage F-stat: Short-term credit 13.11
First-Stage F-stat: Interaction 8.146
Observations 2188
Number of households 228
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1
Note: The table reports instrumental-variables estimates of the effects of program credit as a function of productivity estimated through the proxy-variable approach. Odd-numbered columns
present results after winsorizing the dependent variable with respect to the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered at the village level (64 clusters) to account for the quasi-
experimental design. Bootstrap standard errors are presented in brackets and are computed using 500 bootstrap samples and clustered at the village level. Short-term credit involves program
loans with a term shorter than a year. The estimating sample includes household with pre-existing businesses only. The dependent variables have been winsorized with respect to the 1st and
99th percentile.
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